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Law enforcement agencies are dominant end users of information communication 
technologies.  These technologies are not necessarily created for pursuing criminal 
justice objectives.  They are mechanisms that are built, administered, and maintained by 
private actors for their own purposes and later incorporated into law enforcement 
processes.  They serve an effective role in the investigation, detection, and prosecution of 
crime, particularly through their collection and processing of relevant data.  For the 
purposes of this thesis, the data at issue concerns the who, where, when, and how of a 
communication.  Broadly classed as ͚communications data͛ this information is readily 
and consistently available due to technological developments which result in blanket 
collection and retention, enable easier access, and create opportunities to derive greater 
meaning from the information through data analysis.  The thesis examines the challenges 
of reconciling privacy with the use of this data in policing by conducting a critical 
analysis of ͚how, and to what extent, do the current legal and policy frameworks 
governing the retention of, access to, and analysis of communications data by law 
enforcement, constitute a violation of privacy which requires substantive changes to the 
legal regime?͛. 
Employing the approach of Thomas P. Hughes for examining socio-technical systems, 
the thesis argues that technology and privacy are co-constructed.  This is evidenced 
though the evolution of the technology and the relevant legal and policy factors which 
contributed to the information communication system͛s development and acceptance as a 
policing tool.  Three key areas, namely data retention, access to data, and data analysis 
are used to explore how communications data intersects with law enforcement objectives.  
Each element of the system is critiqued to assess significant changes in actors and roles, 
information types, and transmission principles.  Utilising Helen Nissenbaum͛s theory of 
contextual integrity, it is argued that changes in each of the three key areas represent a 
prima facie violation of informational norms.  Where a violation of these norms is 
identified, it is then evaluated against the perceived benefits of the technology to 
determine the impact on privacy.  The impact on privacy is weighed against the existing 
legal safeguards in the investigatory powers mechanisms.  Examining the privacy interest 
in a contextual manner allows for the specifics of the technology system to be 
incorporated into the assessment of the privacy violations.   
The thesis concludes that it is insufficient to apply traditional interpretations of privacy to 
technologies which have fundamentally altered social expectations through the 
scale/scope of data, the deconstruction of traditional boundaries, the limitation of 
ephemerality, and changes in technologically mediated presence.  Applying a legal 
framework which does not acknowledge this impact fails to guarantee fundamental 
privacy rights.  A number of recommendations are advanced for reform of the 
investigatory powers mechanisms to ensure privacy is protected when communications 
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In June 2013 a series of disclosures concerning the collection and use of data by the 
security and intelligence services were revealed by Edward Snowden, an employee of a 
GHIHQFHFRQWUDFWRUDWWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶1DWLRQDO6HFXULW\$JHQF\16$.  Amongst 
these disclosures were revelations that security agencies in both the United States and 
United Kingdom (UK) had access to the communications records of millions of people.1  
The documents leaked by Snowden showed that monitoring of individuals through their 
data was occurring on a large scale and was being facilitated by private companies 
responsible for the collection and generation of that data.  Subsequent publications in the 
press revealed that the NSA was collecting the telephone records and metadata of 
millions of customers and that the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) 
in the UK had access to that repository.2  For his part, Snowden made clear that the 
decision to disclose the data collection and processing programmes placed society at a 
FURVVURDGVµ:LOOWKHGLJLWDODJHXVKHULQWKHLQGLYLGXDOOLEHUDWLRQDQGSROLWLFDOIUHHGRPV
that the Internet is uniquely capable of unleashing?  Or will it bring about a system of 
RPQLSUHVHQWPRQLWRULQJDQGFRQWURO"¶3 
Regardless of the motives of Edward Snowden and the condemnation from Governments 
which followed, his disclosures highlighted a worrying trend in the collection and 
processing of information.  Under cover of opaque legal processes, ever increasing 
quantities of information were potentially being viewed and utilised by State actors.  
                                                          
1
 0LUUHQ*LGGDµ(GZDUG6QRZGHQDQGWKH16$ILOHV± WLPHOLQH¶The Guardian (London, 21 Aug 2013) 




Guardian (6 June 2013) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-
court-order> accessed 11 Oct 2014.  
3
 Laura Poitras, Citizenfour (Praxis Films 2014).  
 2 
 
Power dynamics shifted with Governments increasingly being able to know more and 
more about citizens but with the citizens knowing less and less about how they were 
being monitored by the government.  Conversations which had previously been confined 
to privacy advocates and civil liberties groups were brought to the fore of public 
consciousness.  Mass surveillance became a common term in public discourse.  Glenn 
Greenwald, one of the journalists responsible for publishing the Snowden revelations 
QRWHGWKDWWKHUHDFWLRQWRWKHGLVFORVXUHVµWULJJHUHGDQLQWHQVHVXVWDLQHGZRUOGZLGH
debate precisely because the surveillance poses such a grave threat to democratic 
JRYHUQDQFH¶4  The collection of data, whether it related to criminals or non-criminals 
raised serious challenges for democracy and fundamental rights.   
In this charged political context, two joined cases were pending before the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU), Digital Rights Ireland v Minister for 
Communications and Michael Seitlinger & Ors. The outcome of these cases would 
reflect the shifting attitudes towards the collection of information, and particularly its 
retention for later use by law enforcement, and shape legislative changes across the EU.  
Key to these cases was the impact the data retention processes had on the rights to 
private, family, and home life.  The ruling in the joined cases would serve to invalidate 
the data retention policies across the EU, triggering a wave of legislative changes.  In the 
United Kingdom, such changes found form first in the Data Retention and Investigatory 
Powers Act 2014 and subsequently in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016.  These Acts 
provide legislative underpinning to the collection, retention, and processing of data which 
is utilised by public authorities.   
                                                          
4
 Glenn Greenwald, No Place to Hide (Penguin 2014).  
 3 
 
Yet these Acts do not address the threats to democratic governance posed by the 
increasing use of surveillance technologies to monitor en masse.  The technology 
provided for under these Acts serves as a tool for retaining more data, for enabling ease 
of access to that data, and for enhancing the analytical capabilities which can be applied 
to the data.  Rather than enshrine the fundamental rights principles key to a democratic 
society, the Acts further intrude on individual liberties.  Law enforcement powers are 
increased, as are the obligations placed upon private actors to facilitate these powers.  
Surveillance is conducted by a wide variety of actors utilising technologies which were 
not originally designed for the purposes of surveillance, thereby creating a surveillant 
assemblage.5  This assemblage is utilised to promote State interests that result in 
limitations on civil liberties, and notably for the purposes of this thesis, privacy.  The 
powers conveyed by these Acts are dynamic and frequently changing.  As such, the 
thesis engages with a highly topical area of law and aims to address the developments in 
technology and law which violate privacy in this context.  In so doing, the thesis aims to 
fulfil a gap in the literature by assessing privacy in the particular context of the 
investigatory powers instruments in the United Kingdom and argues that these 
instruments fail to adequately consider the normative changes which have resulted from 
the development of these powers.  The thesis therefore argues that the collection and use 
of communications data for law enforcement purposes results in a disproportionate 
encroachment on privacy.   
 
 
                                                          
5
 Judith 5DXKRIHUµ3ULYDF\DQG6XUYHLOODQFH/HJDODQG6RFLRHFRQRPLF$VSHFWVRI6WDWH,QWUXVLRQLQWR




I. The Focus of the Analysis: Communications Data 
The focus of this thesis will be on the retention and processing of communications data.  
Communications data concerns the who, where, when and how of a communication but, 
FUXFLDOO\RPLWVWKHZKDW,QWKLVZD\LWLVGLVWLQFWIURPµFRQWHQWGDWD¶ZKLFKFRQFHUQs 
what is being said or written. Communications data was chosen as the focus of the thesis 
for several reasons.  Principally, it is a key tool for law enforcement in the investigation 
and detection of crime.  Indeed, at times the examination of communications data may be 
the only avenue for investigation.  As the former independent reviewer of terrorism 
legislation David Anderson QC recognised: 
Some categories of crime, such as online crime, could not be investigated without 
[communications data].  In these cases, they also provide an opportunity for law 
enforcement to be proactive, looking for suspects rather than waiting until a crime 
has been committed and a complaint made.6   
Yet safeguards and oversight for this type of data are considerably weaker than its 
content counterpart.  Communications data is not subject to the warrant requirements that 
govern the interception of content.  Nor are authorisations to access this type of data 
subject to judicial approval; a designated person within the law enforcement agency may 
authorise the request.  Knowing that communications data can disclose the information 
necessary but without the stringent processes required for access to content data results in 
the data being relied upon in an increasing number of areas.  This is clearly evidenced 
through the prevalent use of the data by public authorities generally.  In 2016, 754,559 
                                                          
6
 David Anderson, A Question of Trust: Report of the Investigatory Powers Review (Stationary Office 
2015) 7.47.  
 5 
 
items of communications data were acquired by public authorities.7  Of that 93% of the 
data was accessed by police and law enforcement agencies.8  As communications data 
becomes more widely used in investigations, it reinforces its value to police as an 
effective tool.  As Elkin-Koren and Haber recognise, this creates a feedback loop, 
ZKHUHLQµDVJRYHUQPHQWVEHFRPHPRUHGHSHQGHQWRQGDWDJHQHUDWHG«IRUJRYHUQDQFH
and law enforcement purposes, they develop a stake in facilitating more collection of 
GDWD¶9  This results in more categories of data being classed as communications data in 
the relevant Acts, thereby expanding the data pool on which the police can rely.   
Furthermore, communications data is not subject to the same admissibility limitations as 
its content counterpart.  Where the contents of communications are intercepted, the 
material is not admissible as evidence in the British criminal courts.  Under RIPA, 
disclosure to the defence of intercepted communications is precluded.10  Such a 
prohibition does not contravene the principles of a right to fair trial as both parties are 
prevented from relying on the intercept material in court.11  As a consequence, the 
interception of communications is seen as an investigatory mechanism; an information 
gathering tool rather than an evidentiary tool.  Communications data is both.  It may 
provide valuable leads or information relevant to an investigation and, significantly, it is 
                                                          
7
 Stanley Burnton, Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner (2016, HC 297).  This 
figure represents a 42% increase in access since statistical information has been provided for this type of 
information.  In the first IOCCO report to provide the statistical information concerning requests for this 
data (2005) 439,054 items were acquired.  Since then, there has been a year on year increase in the amount 
of data acquired.    
8
 Ibid  
9
 Niva Elkin-.RUHQDQG(OGDU+DEHUµ*RYHUQDQFHE\3UR[\&\EHU&KDOOHQJHVWR&LYLO/LEHUWLHV¶
82 Brooklyn L R 105, 144.  
10Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 s 17. However, there are some instances in which this 
material can be disclosed, namely for prosecuting offences under RIPA itself, such as unlawful 
interception.  The material may also be disclosed in proceedings before the Investigatory Powers Tribunal.   
11
 OxfRUG3UR%RQR3XEOLFRµ/HJDO2SLQLRQRQ,QWHUFHSW&RPPXQLFDWLRQV¶8QLYHUVLW\RI2[IRUG
Jasper v United Kingdom App no 28901/95 (ECtHR, 16 Feb 2000) held that the bar on disclosure of 
intercept evidence was consistent with Article 6 ECHR.    
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admissible and used extensively as evidence in court.12  Even following judicial rulings 
which invalidated the policies by which the data was retained, the evidence gathered 
through those retention processes remained admissible in legal proceedings.13  Coupled 
with the lower requirements for access, this increases its value in the overall criminal 
justice process.   
The nature of communications data and the frequency with which it is utilised by law 
enforcement indicate its importance to the investigation, detection, and prevention of 
crime.  As communicative technologies advance, particularly those which occur online, 
this data is more readily and consistently available.  Legal developments demonstrate a 
tendency towards classifying more types of data as communications data.  The impact of 
these developments has made it possible for individuals to be knowable without law 
enforcement having access to the content of communications.  The thesis aims to fill a 
gap in the literature by assessing the nature and impact of technological and legal 
developments on communications data and how they have impacted on the powers of law 
enforcement.   
II. The System at Issue: Information Communications Technology 
The significance of communications data is best evidenced through a discussion of the 
Information Communications Technology (ICT) system through which it is generated.  
Crucial to this are the social, technological, and political factors which have motivated 
                                                          
12
 Jon Murphy, National Co-ordinator for Serious and Organised Crime for the Association of Chief Police 
2IILFHUVVWDWHGµ7KHDFFHVVWRFRPPXQLFDWLRQVGDWDLVDIXQGDPHQWDOLQYHVWLJDWLYHFDSDELOLW\ZKLFKLVXVHG
GDLO\E\SROLFHRIILFHUVWRLQYHVWLJDWHµVHULRXVFULPH¶DQGVDYHOLYHVDVZHOODVEHLQJXVHGURXWLQHO\DVD
FRUHHOHPHQWRIWKHSURVHFXWLRQHYLGHQFHLQFRXUW¶+RPH2IILFHProtecting the Public in a Changing 
Communications Environment (Cmd 5668, 2009) 26.  
13
 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Fundamental Rights Report (FRA 2016) 125.See also 
the cases of DPP v Graham Dwyer (2014) CCCD [Ireland] and Estonia Criminal Chamber of the Supreme 




the development of this system and resulted in more categories of data being collected 
DQGSURFHVVHGµ,QGLYLGXDOKDELWVSHUceptions, concepts of self, ideas of space and time, 
social relationships, and moral and political boundaries have all been powerfully 
UHVWUXFWXUHGLQWKHFRXUVHRIPRGHUQWHFKQRORJLFDOGHYHORSPHQW¶14   
Law enforcement agencies15 are dominant end users of ICTs.  Whilst these technologies 
and associated interception and processing methods are not necessarily created for 
pursuing criminal justice objectives,16 they serve an effective role in the investigation, 
detection, and prosecution of crime.  Technologies are significantly advancing from their 
forebears in the nature of data, the scale and scope of operations, the elimination of 
temporal limitations, the removal of traditional boundaries, and the deconstruction of the 
LQGLYLGXDOLQWRGLVFUHWHµGDWD¶'HYHOopments have increased storage capacities, 
transmission speeds, and allowed for better analytical processes through aggregation and 
automated processing.  The increased saturation levels of technology in society have 
made this data more extensive and accordingly more valuable.  Law enforcement 
agencies have capitalised on these developments, leading to new methods of monitoring 
and tracking, complemented by permissive access rules and analytical techniques.   
Despite the role of law enforcement in the eventual use of these technologies, the creators 
and controllers of these technologies are private actors.  In the context of ICT systems, 
providers of communications services are identified as the control and access points for 
the necessary information.  As a result, these entities are a principal focus of the 
                                                          
14
 Langdon Winner, The Whale and the Reactor (U of Chicago Press Books 1986) 9.  
15
 For the purposes of this thesis, law enforcement agencies refers to the territorial police services, national 
law enforcement agencies (including the National Crime Agency), and other police services who have 
specific remits (such as ports and harbour police forces).   
16
 In fact, most technologies are created for commercial purposes and then co-opted by these agencies.  
Bruce Schneier [Data and Goliath (WW Norton & Co 2015) Loc 759] notes that the data collection and 
processing procedures used by businesses are in effect surveillance models, and these products are 
optimised when individuals have less privacy.  
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investigatory powers laws governing the ultimate use of communications data.  A 
striking feature of the current law enforcement strategy in the United Kingdom is the 
extent of the obligations on these providers, as private actors, to enable and complement 
law enforcement objectives.  Rather than merely operating databases of information 
which are left to law enforcement to utilise and interpret, private actors are increasingly 
being asked to perform functions relating to the investigations themselves, such as 
applying filters to information to seek out potential suspects and witnesses.  The private 
actors are under a mandatory obligation to comply.17  Such a system effectively imposes 
the role and duties of a public authority on a private company.  These companies must 
then act as intermediaries, operating enforcement mechanisms via the network 
infrastructure, without being subject to the obligations placed on public authorities under 
the human rights instruments.  Private actors operating in this manner are under no 
responsibility to do so in a transparent manner; the methods and processes through which 
they collect and utilise data under these instruments are not subject to public scrutiny.  
The lack of transparency surrounding the proceedings renders it difficult to hold these 
actors to account for their role and the subsequent consequences of their actions in 
performing these duties.  As such, there is a lack in the protections afforded to 
individuals whose data is collected and processed.   
The relationship between the public and private is crucial to understanding the social, 
political, and technological factors which exist within the ICT system.  Changes in 
technology may usher in changes in social and political norms and similarly changes in 
those norms may alter technologies.  The two are interrelated and must be treated as such 
in analysing the impact of these developments.  Therefore, this thesis focuses on the co-
                                                          
17
 Potential actions for non-compliance include civil proceedings being brought by the Secretary of State 
for an injunction or for performance of a statutory duty under the Court of Session Act 1988 s 45; see 
Investigatory Powers Act 2016 s 95(5).  
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constructed relationship between privacy, and its underpinning social, political, and 
technological factors, and information communications technologies.  The focus herein is 
on assessing the role of privacy in the context of investigatory powers mechanisms which 
govern communications data used by law enforcement agencies.  It is in this context that 
privacy must be assessed in order to determine what interferences have resulted and 
novel ways that privacy may be under threat.  Such an assessment is necessary to 
subsequently prescribe changes to these mechanisms which can better protect this right.   
III. Conceptualising Privacy 
The context is particularly important to the concept of privacy here as the thesis 
approaches privacy as a context relative concept.  Technology and privacy have evolved 
alongside each other, with conceptions of what privacy embraces being responsive to 
contemporary social and political GHYHORSPHQWV$VREVHUYHGE\6RORYHµ7KHKLVWRU\RI
communications privacy indicates that it was more the product of social desires than 
H[LVWLQJUHDOLWLHV¶18  Communications were considered private not because the 
technologies inherently made them so, but rather because people wanted them to be 
viewed as such.  The role of society in shaping what is deemed private is therefore 
crucial.  It is necessary to look not only at how privacy of communications is viewed in 
WKHSDVWDQGSUHVHQWEXWDOVRH[DPLQHKRZLWVKRXOGEHYLHZHGLQWKHIXWXUHµ3ULYDF\LV
DFRQGLWLRQZHFUHDWHDQGDVVXFKLWLVG\QDPLFDQGFKDQJLQJ¶19 A key question for this 
thesis is what society is looking to protect when it discusses privacy in the context of 
                                                          
18
 Daniel Solove, Understanding Privacy (Harvard University Press 2008) 62; for further discussions on 
the historical relationship between privacy expectations and communications systems see David Siepp, The 
Right to Privacy in American History (Harvard University Program on Information Resources Policy 1978) 
11: µ1LQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\SXEOLFRSLQLRQUHJDUGHGWKHµVDQFWLW\RIWKHPDLOV¶DVDEVROXWHLQWKHVDPHZD\LW
HVWHHPHGWKHLQYLRODELOLW\RIWKHKRPH¶&ODXGH)LVKHUAmerica Calling: A Social History of the Telephone 
from 1940 (University of California Press 1994µIURPWKHEHJLQQLQJRIWHOHSKRQ\SHRSOHH[SUHVVHG
concern that they were being overheard, at first simply by others in the same room ± one had to speak 
loudly ± DQGWKHQE\RSHUDWRUVRUIHOORZVXEVFULEHUVRQDSDUW\OLQH¶ 
19
 Solove n (18) 65. 
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technological developments in the field of communications.  Developments in the ICT 
system threaten privacy by blurring traditional spatial distinctions, whilst the automatic, 
all encompassing, and ubiquitous nature of communications systems have increased 
SULYDF\¶VFROOHFWLYHYDOXH 
In assessing the privacy intrusions which result from these technologies, it is necessary to 
determine what is meant by the term privacy.  There is no singular definition of privacy.  
Conceptualisations take several forms.  Privacy may be seen as a right which must be 
balanced against other values or as a critical constitutive element of values and universal 
principles.  Theorists utilising these conceptualisations attempt to isolate a common 
denominator of privacy in order to determine its value.  These concepts focus on distinct 
commonalities in purposes or ends such as: the right to be let alone to protect ones 
thoughts and a sphere for self-development;20 the right to limit access to the self;21 the 
ability to control personal information;22 and secrecy.23  Similarly, these concepts focus 
on utilising privacy to enhance and develop other rights by defining privacy as a right 
integral to the individual.24 However, these conceptions are insufficient for the analysis 
                                                          
20
 ThLVFRQFHSWLVURRWHGLQ:DUUHQDQG%UDQGHLV¶VVHPLQDODUWLFOHµ7KH5LJKWWR3ULYDF\¶7KHDXWKRUV
establish that man has more than a mere interest in property; rather his thoughts and creations from an 
LQWHJUDOSDUWRIWKHµVHOI¶DQGVKRXOGEHSURWHFWHGIrom appropriation by others; Samuel Warren and Louis 
%UDQGHLVµ7KH5LJKWWR3ULYDF\¶-1891) 4 Harv L Rev 193. 
21
 Proponents of this concept argue that man should be entitled to remain apart from others and free from 
unwarranted access in order to further self-development. This is established by theorists such as Hyman 
*URVVµ7KH&RQFHSWRI3ULYDF\¶1<8/5HYDQG6LVVHOD%RN Secrets: On the Ethics of 
Concealment and Revelation (Pantheon 1983) 10-11. 
22
 Theorists such as Alan Westin [Westin, Privacy and Freedom (The Bodley Head 1967)] and Charles 
)ULHG>)ULHGµ3ULYDF\¶-1968) Yale L J 475] noting that privacy violations result when information 
about us is communicated to others without the permission of the subject.   
23
 Conceptions of secrecy equate the desire for privacy with having something to hide.  Advocates of this 
conception, such as Richard Posner [The Economics of Justice (Harvard University Press 1981) 272] 
believe that actors require privacy to conceal facts about themselves, and privacy is violated when these 
facts are disclosed.  According to Posner and others, privacy as a means to promote secrecy is inherently 
contrary to the overall social welfare and is equated with deceptive purposes.   
24
 Conceptualisations which emphasise the importance of privacy to the individual often find its value in 
promoting two distinct concepts: personhood and intimacy.  Notions of personhood find value in privacy in 
enabling the protection of the integrity of the personality; in creating the elements that allow a person to 
EHFRPHDQLQGLYLGXDO>-HG5XEHQIHOGµ7KH5LJKWRI3ULYDF\¶-1990) 102 Harv L Rev 737].  These 
HOHPHQWVLQFOXGHFKRLFHVVXFKDVZKRWRPDUU\DQGZKDWWRGRZLWKRQH¶VRZQERG\&RQFHSWLRQVRI
LQWLPDF\GUDZSULYDF\¶VYDOXHIUom the benefits it provides to human relationships [Fried n(22) 475].   
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of privacy intrusions resulting from information collection and processing mechanisms.  
Privacy intrusions resulting from collection and processing cannot be clearly categorised 
into any of the preceding concepts; rather, they possess elements relevant to each.  
Whether an individual will see an action as an infringement of privacy will depend on the 
context in which it occurred.  For example, the privacy interests at issue in the thesis do 
not merely relate to the fact that information is accessed; rather, the concern is when 
someone accesses or uses that information in a way which does not conform to expected 
informational norms.  Further, technical capabilities mean that spatial boundaries may 
not be violated in the traditional sense; the State no longer must physically intrude into a 
space in order to obtain the desired information.  However, this does not mean that a 
privacy violation has not occurred.   
In contrast to the preceding approaches which attempt to identify a common value to the 
P\ULDGLQWHUHVWVSULYDF\SURWHFWVWKHWKHVLVWDNHVDQDSSURDFKEDVHGRQ:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶V
LGHDRIµIDPLO\UHVHPEODQFHV¶ZKLFKSURYLGHVIRUWKHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQWKDWSULYDF\LV
composed of numerous distinct yet interrelated things.25  The value of privacy will be 
dependent on the particular context in which it is engaged.26  In order to conceptualise 
privacy as it relates to communications technologies, this thesis employs Helen 
1LVVHQEDXP¶VDSSURDFKRIFRQWH[WXDOLQWHJULW\µ&RQWH[WXDOLQWHJULW\IXQFWLRQVDVD
IUDPHZRUNWKDWLVVHQVLWLYHWRPHDQLQJIXOFKDQJHVDIIHFWLQJSHRSOH¶VUHDFWLRQVWRQHZ
systems or practices¶27  1LVVHQEDXP¶VDSSURDFKDOORZVIRUDQDQDO\VLVRIKRZ
                                                          
25
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Blackwell Publishers 2001) ss 66. 
26
 Examining privacy in context is supported by many theorists, among them: 5REHUW3RVWµ7KH6RFLDO
)RXQGDWLRQVRI3ULYDF\&RPPXQLW\DQG6HOILQ&RPPRQ/DZ7RUW¶&DO/5ZKRVWDWHVWKDW
LQIRUPDWLRQFDQRQO\EHGHWHUPLQHGWREHSULYDWHZKHQZHµKDYHVRPHQRWLRQRIWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHV
surrounding the revelation of that LQIRUPDWLRQ¶6HUJH*XWZLUWK>Privacy and the Information Age (Raf 
&DVHUW@GHILQHVSULYDF\E\LWVFRQWH[WDQGUHODWLRQVWRVRFLHW\*DU\0DU[>µ0XUN\&RQFHSWXDO
:DWHUV7KH3XEOLFDQGWKH3ULYDWH¶(WKLFV	,QIR7HFK@DUJXHVWKDWWKH public and private are 
fluid and dependent on the particular situation or context.   
27
 Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context (Stanford University Press 2010) 190.  
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technology shapes expectations of privacy in a manner which accounts for contexts, 
UROHVQRUPVDQGYDOXHV+HUIUDPHZRUNDUJXHVWKDWµWHFKQRORJLHVV\VWHPVDQG
practices that disturb our sense of privacy are those that have resulted in inappropriate 
flows of personal information.  Inappropriate information flows are those that violate 
context-specific informational norms, a subclass of general norms governing respective 
VRFLDOFRQWH[WV¶28  When there is a violation of these context-relative informational 
norms, there is a prima facie privacy violation and the question becomes whether the 
changes effected by the norms are justifiable in moral and political terms.  The contextual 
integrity approach does not merely assess how technical systems function, but determines 
how they relate to social structures as well.  It is therefore a useful basis on which to 
frame an analysis of information communications technologies. 
IV. The projects central questions  
The core question addressed by this thesis is how, and to what extent, do the current legal 
and policy frameworks governing the retention of, access to, and analysis of 
communications data by law enforcement, constitute a violation of privacy which 
requires substantive changes to the legal regime?   
This core question is supported by several supplemental questions.   
x How are information communications technology methods and processes 
organised and utilised to pursue criminal justice objectives?   
                                                          
28+HOHQ1LVVHQEDXPµ5HVSHFWIRU&RQWH[WDVDEHQFKPDUNIRUSULYDF\RQOLQHZKDWLWLVDQGLVQ¶W¶LQ
Roessler and Mokrosinska (eds) Social Dimensions of Privacy: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge 
University Press 2015) 360. 
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x How and to what extent is the development of the information communications 
technology reflective of a co-constructed relationship between law and 
technology? 
x How and to what extent are these technologies regulated and deployed in a 
manner that accommodates privacy values? 
x What is meant by privacy in the context of communications data?   
x Can conceptions of privacy rooted in traditional liberal values be maintained or 
must privacy be re-conceptualised to accommodate the role of technology? 
x How do ICT processes utilised and deployed by law enforcement affect this 
defined privacy right?  
x How can the laws and policies in this area be developed in a manner that strikes 
an appropriate balance between privacy rights and the criminal law enforcement 
objectives of the State? 
These questions, once answered, will address the key aim of this thesis, namely 
prescribing an alternative legal regime for communications data which protects privacy.  
By addressing the topic on this level, it is believed that the thesis will open a line of 
research to other areas where the police use non-typical categories of data in their 
investigations.  As new types of data are generated which no longer clearly fit into the 
pre-H[LVWLQJER[HVRIµFRQWHQW¶RUµFRPPXQLFDWLRQV¶LWLVQHFHVVDU\WRGHWHUPLQHD






V. Methodology  
This thesis takes an interdisciplinary approach, combining law, technology, and 
sociology.  The communications technologies are examined in the context29 of the ends 
they serve for law enforcement and QDWLRQDOVHFXULW\<HWµFommunicative technologies 
sit slightly awkwardly with the other applications [of the technology] since they have no 
claim to be specific to crime control and therefore cannot be seen as a purpose or 
IXQFWLRQRIFULPLQDOMXVWLFH¶30  The principal aim of these technologies is to facilitate 
interactions between individuals and this is accomplished through private means.  
Communicative technologies do not exist separately as a tool for law enforcement but 
rather are co-opted in to the policing process.  It is therefore difficult to analyse and 
regulate these technologies using traditional criminal justice frameworks.  Thus, it is 
instructive to use an alternative framework which does not simply look at the ultimate 
end use of these technologies by law enforcement but at other social and technological 
factors which contribute to the value of these instruments.  This relationship between law 
enforcement and ICT lends itself to a systems theory framework.   
This framework acknowledges that law and technology are complex and interrelated 
structures which shape and define each other.  In terms of communications technologies, 
an analysis cannot be separated from the social context nor from the way the technology 
has come to shape society.  The value of the information derived from the ICT system 
comes from the nature of the data generated by the system, which is expansive in its 
scope and generated on an exponentially increasing scale.  As the technologies permeate 
                                                          
29
 Contexts here are defined as structured social settings characterised by roles, relationships, power 
structures, norms, and values. [Nissenbaum n(27) 132] 
30
 Ben Bowling Amber Marks and Cian Murphy, 'Crime Control Technologies: Towards an Analytical 
Framework and Research Agenda' 60 in Brownsword and Yeung (eds), Regulating Technologies (Hart 
Publishing 2008).  
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everyday life, their impact on society increases.  Concurrently, so does their value to law 
enforcement which requires more advanced technical means to be employed to fully 
capitalise on this growth of data.  These developments reflect on established social 
norms, including that of privacy.  As explained by Beate Roessler,  
Social norms governing informational private constitute and regulate different 
social relationships.  Insofar as these social relationships, practices, and roles are 
constitutive for society, so too is the protection of privacy of these relationships and 
the individuals engaged in them.31   
A systems theory approach, in line with that developed by Hughes, allows for the fact 
that there is a mutual or co-constructed process between technology and society.32 
The systems theory framework acknowledges that technologies cannot be divorced from 
society; but nor are they purely social constructs.33  The approach to systems theory 
utilised in this thesis is based largely on the work of Thomas P Hughes and 
acknowledges that systems are complex interdependent arrangements of technology, 
cultural factors, social actors, and situated meanings.34  All aspects of the system can be 
interconnected; no greater value is placed on one element over the others.  Elements of 
the system can be classed as physical, organisational or legislative.  The system does not 
develop in a linear fashion but evolves through various phases which overlap and 
backtrack as the system develops.  Through this process of development, the elements of 
the social are incorporated further into the system, allowing it to be assimilated into 




 3ULVFLOOD5HJDQµ3ULYDF\DQGWKHFRPPRQJRRGUHYLVLWHG¶LQ5RHVVOHUDQG0Rkrosinska (eds) Social 
Dimensions of Privacy: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Cambridge University Press 2015) 360 
33
 7RULQ0RQDKDQµ4XHVWLRQLQJ6XUYHLOODQFHDQG6HFXULW\¶LQ-RKQVRQDQG:HWPRUHHGVTechnology 
and Society: Building our Sociotechnical Future (MIT Press 2008) 545 
34
 Regan n(32) 51. 
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society.  However, issues arise within these systems when the components fall out of 
sync with other elements of the system.  In +XJKHV¶Vsystems theory, such elements are 
known as reverse salients.  Further development of the system occurs when reverse 
salients are identified and the system is altered in some way as a result.  The changes 
made as a result of a reverse salient will be dependent on the actors and contexts which 
are involved and will be informed by their specific values and goals.   
This thesis argues that the ICT system utilised in the collecting and processing of 
communications data, and governed by investigatory powers legislation, changed 
traditional norms associated with information in the context of law enforcement.  This 
has been accompanied by changes in legislation which do not reflect the significance of 
this shift in norms.  This thesis argues that instead of taking technological changes into 
account, the law seeks to apply traditional communication norms which are based on 
technologies which were limited in their scope, scale, and spatial bounds.  Under 
traditional communications norms, a clear distinction could be made between various 
W\SHVRIGDWD&RPPXQLFDWLRQVGDWDZDVµHQYHORSHGDWD¶LQIRUPDWLRQWKDWFRXOGEH
easily derived from merely looking at the outside of an envelope and therefore did not 
benefit from any expectation of privacy.  The data generated was that which companies 
needed in order to provide the service and bill their customers.  The information provided 
went no further.  Current legislation still uses these DQDORJLHVRIµHQYHORSHGDWD¶DQG mere 
µELOOLQJLQIRUPDWLRQ¶WRFODVVFRPPXQLFDWLRQVGDWDZKLFKLVQRZFDSDEOHRIUHYHDOLQJ
extensive personal and private information.  The law does not acknowledge that the value 
and intrusiveness of this category of information has changed as a result of the 
development of technology.   
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Within +XJKHV¶V terminology, the failure of law to account for the changing social norms 
associated with this information results in a reverse salient which requires correction.  
However, the size and scope of the ICT system has provided it with technological 
momentum.  As will be discussed further in Chapter 2, such momentum makes the 
system resistant to change.  When assessing how the system may be altered to take into 
account these significant changes, it is necessary to examine the variety of technical 
elements, modes of communication, legislative aims, and organisational structures which 
form the system.  All of these elements possess their own political, economic, and social 
motivations.  The thesis argues that the elements must be addressed in order to determine 
how the identified issues within the system can be corrected, with the particular aim of 
incorporating an effective conceptualisation of privacy.   
A. Methods 
To identify the relevant relationships and issues between communications data, law 
enforcement, and privacy, a multi-disciplinary approach is taken which permits the 
relevant factors from the fields of law, sociology, and technology to be incorporated into 
the analysis.  It is necessary to understand these varied and sometimes competing factors 
to be able to prescribe effective legal and policy recommendations for the future.  The 
extant legal frameworks are assessed through statutory interpretation and case law 
analysis at both the domestic and European Union levels.  In analysing these primary 
sources, the accompanying traveaux preparatoires and Hansard debates are utilised to 
provide a wider understanding of the factors which influenced the development of the 
law.  Secondary instruments which are primarily concerned with the implementation of 
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these primary sources, namely relevant Codes of Practice and Statutory Instruments,35 are 
analysed to determine the practical impact and use of the powers set forth in the 
legislative mechanisms.  Where it provides a useful comparator, information regarding 
the communications data policies of other jurisdictions is discussed.  This is particularly 
evident in the concluding chapter which sets forth prescriptive measures to be taken to 
amend the investigatory powers instruments to better protect privacy as conceptualised in 
this thesis.  This thesis also draws on secondary scholarship in the area of law, 
technology, and sociology.  The analysis of this literature informs the discussion of what 
norms and values need to be incorporated into the system in light of the technology.  The 
elucidation of norms and values is critical to understanding privacy as conceptualised 
herein.  Therefore, the focus is on those norms and values which relate directly to the 
processing and collecting of data and communications.  The body of literature engaged 
with looks at how the various disciplinary fields utilise these concepts.  The contours of 
privacy established through this assessment are then used to unpack the legislative 
developments and technological practices of the system.   
In addition to the critical analysis of primary sources and scholarship, select semi-
structured interviews were undertaken.  The interviews were approved utilising the 
ethical approval process set by Kent Law School.  These interviews are rooted in a 
URPDQWLFHSLVWHPRORJ\WKHIRFXVRIZKLFKLVRQWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶EHOLHIVSHUVSHFWLYHV
opinions, and attitudes concerning the investigatory powers mechanisms and their 
particular experiences.36  7KLVDOORZVWKHHPSKDVLVWREHSODFHGRQµZKDWWKHLQWHUYLHZHH
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Home Office, Operational Case for the Retention of Internet Connection Records (4 November 2015); The 





(2005) 28(1) Academy of Management R 13.; David Silverman, Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods 
for Analysing Talk, Text, and Interaction (Sage 2001) 
 19 
 
views as important in explaining and understanding events, patterns, and forms of 
EHKDYLRXU¶37  This interview technique was selected in order to allow conversations to 
flow freely and let the interview subjects speak about the areas of interest from their own 
perspective.  Whilst these interviews were not the core methodological approach 
employed in the thesis, they do provide insights which are illustrative of the issues raised 
by the use of communications data.  In approaching interview subjects, three key groups 
were identified: industry, activists, and public actors.  Each group has a different 
approach to communications data and will stress certain factors over others in the 
development of the system.  
In the area of industry an interview was undertaken with the head of the Internet Service 
Providers Association.  The goal of this interview was to gain an industry perspective on 
the requirements imposed on these companies and what, if any challenges they perceived 
with implementing the requirements delegated to them under the legislation.  Throughout 
the interview, technical issues with the processes required of Communication Service 
Providers (CSPs) became apparent.  These issues underpin the critique of the retention, 
access, and analysis elements of the system discussed in Chapters 3 to 5.  With regard to 
activists, two interviews were undertaken.  One concerned the use of communications 
data relating to journalistic material.  The other was a discussion about the investigatory 
powers instruments more generally.  The core focus of each of these interviews was the 
overall impact on human rights, and in particular, privacy that occurred as a result of the 
use of these powers.  Finally, with regard to public actors, the head of a relevant 
oversight agency was interviewed.  This interview provided a more thorough 
understanding of the practical capabilities of the oversight agency and its limitations.  In 
                                                          
37
 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (Oxford University Press 2012) 468; Carol Warren, Handbook 
of Interview Research (Sage Publications 2002) 83.  
 20 
 
formulating an alternative process for ensuring privacy in the context of communications 
data, it is necessary to provide for an adequate oversight structure. The interview is used 
to direct the formation of that structure.   
The aim of these interviews was to gain a first-hand understanding of how the relevant 
actors saw the law and their relationship to it.  As individuals engaged with the law and 
its functioning, the interview subjects were able to bring to light areas which were not 
apparent from doctrinal research.  Direct accounts from these professionals are 
instructive and are incorporated in to the analysis in subsequent chapters.   
In speaking with the head of IPSA, it was made apparent that the industry viewpoint on 
the use of the communications data powers was largely concerned with functionality and 
cost effectiveness.  The concerns raised in this interview related to implementing the 
provisions rather than any restrictions or legal requirements necessary to provide the 
information.  This was interesting, particularly as the public dialogue advanced by these 
CSPs so often discusses the importance of their users and their rights.  With regard to the 
activist interviews, the content largely followed the criticisms and critiques of the law 
which these bodies publicly advance.  Little additional insight was garnered.  However, 
with regard to public authorities, the interview with the acting head of the IOCC offered 
unique insight into the functioning and limitations of the oversight body.  As the audits 
undertaken by this body were confidential, with only a general report on their outcomes 
provided to the public, the interview with the head of the IOCC allowed for greater 
understanding of the functions of that body.   
Additional interviews were sought with actors from within the police.  The targets of 
WKHVHUHTXHVWZHUHWKHµGHVLJQDWHGSHUVRQV¶DQGµVLQJOHSRLQWRIFRQWDFWV¶ZKRGHDOZLWK
approving and processing requests by public authorities for communications data.  It was 
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hoped that by speaking with individuals directly involved in the approval processes, it 
would be possible to determine the standards and criteria that the public authorities apply 
before granting access to communications data.  As the law requires that these requests 
be judged against the standards of necessity and proportionality, these first-hand accounts 
would provide insights into what factors were taken into account and how the demands 
for access were balanced against individual rights.   
However, it was not possible to secure interviews with these subjects.  Approaches were 
made via phone, e-mail, and post.  As the applications for this information are 
confidential, it was not possible to identify the precise persons within each precinct with 
which to make contact.  As a result, the requests were sent to Chief Constables of the 
police authorities as well as press officers.  One of two outcomes resulted from the 
attempts to make contact: the request, and subsequent follow-up request, would simply 
go unanswered; or a response would be provided with links to websites containing 
information on police use of communications data and/or police standards and ethics.  
Therefore, it was not possible to interview these individuals.  The reluctance of public 
authorities to speak to how these powers are used represents a further limitation of the 
material available in this area and raises concerns for the transparency of the process as it 
relates to communications data.    
B. Methodological limitations  
As noted, this project engages with a very topical area of law.  Whilst this has made it an 
engaging and relevant area to research, it is necessary to acknowledge the limitations of 
the material.  At the time of writing, a consultation has been issued by the Government 
concerning the Investigatory Powers Act and proposed changes to the regime.  Similarly, 
three cases of note are currently going through the courts and are at various stages.  It is 
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envisaged that the outcome of either/both the consultation and the cases will result in 
changes being made to the law as it stands.  Where possible in subsequent chapters, the 
potential implications of these changes are discussed.  However, it is not possible to 
confidently foresee any and all potential outcomes at this stage.   
VI. Chapter Overview 
 The thesis begins by defining the conception of privacy against which to assess the 
interferences which occur through the collection and processing of communications data 
by law enforcement.  In order to conceptualise privacy, Chapter 1 first looks to the 
existing conceptions rooted in Western liberal thought.  Each of these conceptions are 
evaluated for their perceived benefits and shortcomings in determining how privacy is 
impacted in the use of communications data.  The thesis argues that the established 
conceptions of privacy cannot adequately address interferences with the right to privacy 
which arise as a result of the use of this data.  As such, an alternative conception of 
privacy will be applied.  This conception is bDVHGRQ+HOHQ1LVVHQEDXP¶VWKHRU\RI
contextual integrity.  Chapter 1 sets out the reasoning behind the selection of this 
approach.  The chapter then proceeds to outline how this definition of privacy will be 
applied in the context of the ICT system utilised by law enforcement.  Determinant 
factors which dictate the informational norms breached in this context are summarised to 
provide the foundational elements which will be discussed in assessing how retention, 
access, and analysis of data affect privacy.  The overall aim of this chapter is to provide 
the foundation for the subsequent evaluation of the impact on privacy of the ICT system.   
Following the conceptualisation of privacy in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 will define the 
parameters of the system which is the context in which that concept is to be applied.  
Chapter 2 establishes that privacy will be assessed in the context of the information 
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communications technology system which is ultimately responsible for the collection and 
processing of communications data.  The aim of this chapter is to determine how the ICT 
system is reflective of a co-constructed relationship between law and technology.  In 
order to evaluate this relationship it is necessary to examine technological and social 
developments and evaluate the components of the ICT system and the traditional norms 
associated with these processes.  To do so, the thesis utilises +XJKHV¶Vsystems theory 
approach which is defined in Chapter 2.  The selection of systems theory is oriented 
within the body of extant literature on law and science and technology studies.  +XJKHV¶V
systems theory approach is then applied to the ICT system.  The discussion of the 
development of the ICT system and the elements which comprise it allows for an 
assessment of the changes in context relative informational norms and an evaluation of 
how to better guarantee these norms in future developments.  The framework created in 
Chapter 2 will be applied to the specific processes of the system discussed in Chapters 3 
to 5.   
Chapter 3 examines the first of these processes, namely the collection and retention of 
communications data.  The data retention element is a critical component of the ICT 
system.  It is only through the retention of large amounts of communications data that 
law enforcement can benefit from subsequent access and analysis capabilities.  As such, 
it is necessary to set forth the precise dictates of the data retention process.  In Chapter 3 
this is done by first undertaking a thorough examination of the evolution of the data 
retention system, with reference to technological and legislative developments that 
underpinned its creation.  The current dictates of the data retention policies are then 
established.  The concept of privacy established in the preceding chapters is then 
examined in light of the powers of retention.  Specific attention is paid to the information 
types, transmission principles, and actors engaged in the retention process.  These 
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elements are assessed to determine the overall impact on context relative informational 
norms.  This analysis argues that there has been a breach of contextual integrity in the 
retention of the data.  
Chapter 4 then goes on to address the second function of the ICT system, namely 
facilitating access to the retained data.  The focus of this chapter is on the manner and 
mechanisms through which law enforcement officials are able to access communications 
data.  Historic examples of access provisions are compared to the current technological 
context.  External factors to the technological developments are assessed to determine 
their impact on the evolution of the system.  It is established that the existing access 
provisions indicate that law enforcement can retrieve the information more readily than 
previously possible.  The limitations on access have been altered with the balance 
shifting toward law enforcement over the individual.  The analysis of these changes 
suggests that there has been a breach of contextual integrity and thereby a violation of 
privacy.   
The final function of the ICT system that is addressed in the thesis is that of analysis 
which is the subject of Chapter 5.  Analysis here means the methods through which 
greater meaning can be derived from the communications data.  This is accomplished 
through applying additional technological processes to the information to generate data 
that is more relevant to law enforcement.  Principally, with regard to communications 
data this occurs via three processes: IP address resolution, the µUHTXHVWILOWHU¶, and 
downstream use of the data.  The specifics of these processes are addressed in this 
chapter.  It is argued that the analytical techniques employed pose a distinct threat to 
privacy.   
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The treatment of retention, access, and analysis in these chapters reveal breaches in 
contextual integrity which result in privacy violations.  The question then becomes how 
the privacy violations may be offset by oversight and remedial mechanisms designed to 
ensure that these violations are justified in accordance with the law.  Chapter 6 focuses 
on the current methods which are used to ensure that such privacy violations only occur 
where they are necessary and proportionate.  In doing so, the focus is on the additional 
safeguards and oversight mechanisms which apply to the collection and processing of the 
communication data.  Chapter 6 offers a thorough critique of the existing powers, 
examining the key agencies who are involved, namely, the Information Commissioner, 
the Interception of Communications Commissioner, the Investigatory Powers 
Commissioner, and the Investigatory Powers Tribunal.  The analysis developed herein 
determines that these mechanisms are insufficient to offer the necessary safeguards for 
privacy to ensure that the investigatory powers measures are in accordance with the rule 
of law.   
Finally, the thesis will offer Conclusions and Proposals for Reform.  In this chapter, the 
discussion will examine the findings evidenced in the preceding chapters which 
demonstrate that, through the development of the ICT system, fundamental informational 
norms have been altered, representing a privacy violation which has not been adequately 
provided for in the current legal and policy regimes.  This chapter then goes on to offer 
prescriptive policy recommendations to address the shortcomings in the current legal 
framework.  These recommendations are aimed at ensuring that the informational norms 
inherent in the use of communications data generated by the ICT system protect privacy 
as conceptualised under the contextual integrity decision heuristic.  The practical 
recommendations propose mechanisms for purpose limitation, data minimisation, an 
increase in the rights of individuals, and a reclassification of CSPs.  These 
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recommendations will thereby mitigate the privacy intrusions created by the use of 
technology to collect and process communications data.  Such a framework addresses the 
failings of the current regime and offers mechanisms to ensure that privacy as defined in 
this thesis can be protected in light of technological developments in communications 




CHAPTER 1: CONCEPTUALISING PRIVACY 
I. Introduction 
This chapter presents the key concepts and literature on privacy and develops a 
conception of privacy which can accommodate the development of the technological 
system discussed in the next chapter.  This conceptualisation is necessary in order to 
determine the unique characteristics of privacy; what is intruded upon and what we seek 
to protect when we invoke privacy.  Crucial to this analysis is determining whether 
privacy retains value in a society where it is so easily forfeited for the convenience that 
modern technology brings.  It is important to identify what precisely is meant by privacy 
in terms of this analysis.  Conceptions of privacy draw from biological, historical, 
sociological, and legal influences.  The matters we consider private are not static; they 
change according to these influences.1  Despite the variations on what should be 
considered private, these interpretations are consistent in maintaining that privacy has 
value.  In order to assess privacy͛s value in the ICT system, this chapter will be 
comprised of four parts.   
Part I discusses the traditional concepts of privacy that have been employed in literature 
and transposed into law through judicial interpretation and statute.  Part II critiques these 
conceptions in light of technological developments which have altered the traditional 
interpretation of privacy.  Changes in this area can be broadly classified under four 
distinct areas: temporal, spatial, saturation, and ephemeral.  The technologies referred to 
for the purposes of this analysis are limited to those ICTs which will be discussed in 
Chapter 2.  In light of the analysis of existing conceptions of privacy, Part III posits that 
                                                          
1Daniel Solove, Understanding Privacy (Harvard University Press 2008) 50. 
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privacy and technology can best be conceptualised from a bottom-up approach which 
focuses on the context in which privacy is employed.  This section utilises legal scholar 
Helen Nissenbaum͛s theory of contextual integrity as the basis for examining privacy 
through context.  This theory forms the foundation of the conception of privacy used in 
the thesis.  Finally, Part IV sets forth the conception of privacy in the context of the ICT 
system used for collecting and processing communications data.   
This conception is based on shifts in information flows, transmission principles, and 
actors, changes in which result in a violation of context relative informational norms.  
Each of these factors is assessed in relation to the context of the ICT system.  Particular 
emphasis is placed on the shift in dominant actors and power structures in information 
collection and processing from governmental to commercial actors; how norms have 
changed due to the structure of the technology, and whether that is reflective of a shift 
from traditional panoptic conceptions which often govern issues of monitoring and 
tracking; and finally whether the values embodied by these technologies are indicative of 
a shift in the criminal justice system toward more community driven rights.  This section 
argues that changes in the ICT system alter traditional information flows and result in 
privacy intrusions.  The conception of privacy defined in this chapter is then applied to 
the components of the ICT system in Chapters 3 to 5.  Utilising the conception of privacy 
established in this chapter, the subsequent chapters will argue that processing and 
collection of data under the investigatory powers mechanisms results in privacy 
violations which are not adequately protected by the current oversight regime.  Through 
applying a context relative conception of privacy, the impact of the technology can be 





II. Traditional Concepts of Privacy 
Concepts of privacy offer an abstract picture of what identifies privacy in its various 
manifestations.  Despite extensive analysis and debate there is no agreed upon conception 
of what privacy is, nor what specific elements are required for there to be a violation of 
privacy.  Scholars have argued for a variety of different approaches, alternatively 
viewing privacy as a derivative right2 or a constitutive right;3 attempting to identify a 
common set of necessary and sufficient elements that exemplify privacy and its ͚core͛ 
characteristics;4 or arguing that privacy reflects a plurality of values.5  The following 
analysis will look at the dominant concepts of privacy that have permeated the literature 
before critiquing their effectiveness in determining privacy violations as a result of 
technology.   
a. Spatial 
Privacy in its earliest iterations was tied to the notions of space, derived from the idea 
that there are distinct public and private spheres and an intrusion into the latter 
represented a violation.  American jurists Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis gave voice 
to this idea in their article The Right to Privacy in 1890.  Responsive to technological 
developments of the time, specifically the development of portable cameras which 
allowed for the advancement of so-called ͚yellow journalism͛ and a press which could 
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record and photograph personal acts like never before, Warren and Brandeis argued for a 
right to privacy, akin to the ͚right to be let alone͛ to protect the private sphere from 
intrusion.6  This privacy right required definitive boundaries between the public and 
private sphere, wherein the private could not be interfered with.  Sociologist Ernest Van 
Den Haag built upon this idea in his conception of privacy as the exclusive right of an 
individual to a realm of his own, where others are excluded from watching, utilising, or 
intruding on his private space.7  Spatial intrusion remains a common theme in privacy 
discourse.  The intrusions can take a variety of forms, from those associated with 
infringement of concrete spaces8 to those associated with more abstract violations such as 
intrusions that result from noise or odours.9  The common theme to these interpretations 
is the idea that there is a spatial element which remains distinct from the public; a space 
wherein the individual can have a reasonable expectation that they will be safe from 
interference.   
These conceptions rely on the idea that there can be no privacy in public.  A conception 
of privacy based on a delineation of public and private spheres does not account for the 
idea that there may be an expectation of privacy in a public area.  There is discourse on 
both sides of the issue.  Proponents argue that there can be no expectation of privacy 
once one enters the public sphere whereas others argue that entrance into the public arena 
does not in itself negate privacy interests.10  The latter interpretation is reflective of the 
challenges of the spatial concept of privacy.  These difficulties are compounded when 
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 This was demonstrated by the ECHR in the case of Peck v United Kingdom App no 44647/98 (ECtHR 
28 Jan 2003), wherein the court held that although the applicant was in SXEOLFKHµZDVQRWWKHUHIRUHWKH
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privacy, even though he was in the public sphere. 
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this conception of privacy is examined in reference to information technology systems.  
Information cannot be constrained by traditional spatial bounds; it is not always possible 
to delineate between public and private arenas, particularly in the online sphere.  
Traditional spatial distinctions are ill equipped to deal with these issues.    
Spatial notions of privacy are tied to other conceptions.  Professor Randall P Benzanson 
noted the importance of the notion of a distinctive private space for the development of 
the individual.11  This interpretation of privacy as necessary to protect a space for self-
development is echoed in further conceptions of privacy, albeit ones that identify the core 
value of the right, not in the protection of a concrete space, but in the value it has to the 
individual.   
b. Autonomy/Self 
This conception of privacy maintains that privacy has value because it promotes the 
development of the self and individual autonomy.  Autonomy conceptions are rooted in 
liberal ideals of individualism, exemplified by John Stuart Mill in On Liberty. Mill 
argues against the tyranny of the majority, which, by imposing prevailing social opinions 
and feelings, fetters the development and formation of the individual.12  Defining privacy 
in relation to the value it provides for the individual exemplifies the liberal interpretations 
which underpin much privacy discourse.13  Individuals are recognised as the key 
benefactors of privacy14 whose interest in self-development supersedes community 
interests in all but the most extreme of cases.  As legal scholar Charles Fried puts it, 
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privacy is one of the ͚basic rights in persons, rights to which all are equally entitled, by 
virtue of their status as persons ͙ it requires recognition of persons as ends, and forbids 
the overriding of their most fundamental interests for the purpose of maximising the 
happiness or welfare of all͛.15   
Various theorists have advocated for the importance of privacy as a tool for individual 
development.  Helen Nissenbaum posits that autonomy allows individuals to determine 
their own principles and subject those principles to review.16  Moral autonomy, argues 
Professor Julie Cohen, allows for ͚independence of critical faculty and imperviousness 
from influence͛.17  Privacy is significant in that it allows individuals freedom to think for 
themselves and develop their own personality without fear of social reprobation which 
could occur if they were forced to make their views, hobbies, and ideas public.  It allows 
for the development of what American Jurist Paul Freund calls ͚those attributes of an 
individual which are irreducible in his selfhood͛.18  Where there are intrusions on 
privacy, the conduct often amounts to conduct that is ͚demeaning to individuality͛ or ͚an 
assault on human personality͛.19   
If privacy is necessary for self-development,20 then technology which interferes with 
privacy can alter this development.  Technology which makes possible the monitoring 
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scholars in the personhood field focus on the role that privacy plays in decisions crucial to the self, such as 
those concerning abortion, contraception, and marriage; decisions where the state should not interfere.  For 
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µSULYDF\LVQHFHVVDU\IRUWKHFUHDWLRQRIselves out of human beings, since a self is at least in part a human 
being who regards his existence ± his thoughts, his body, his actions ± DVKLVRZQ¶ 
 33 
 
and tracking of communications presents distinct risks to personal autonomy facilitated 
by privacy because it creates a perception of continual observation.  Political philosopher 
Stanley Benn noted the impact of observation on individuals, finding that observation 
denied individuals respect for persons as choosers ͚because they transform the actual 
conditions in which the person chooses and acts, and thus makes it impossible for him to 
act in the way he set out to act, or to choose in the way he thinks he is choosing͛.21  There 
are extrinsic losses of freedom which occur when people curtail outward behaviours due 
to their unusual or unconventional nature which may have negative consequences.22  
Similarly, there are often intrinsic losses of freedom which occur via self-censorship 
when individuals realise that their actions might be noted or recorded.23  Privacy as a 
facilitator of self-development is frustrated by the technological developments which 
increase visibility.  However, that does not mean that privacy cannot exist but rather that 
a conception must incorporate this development.   
c. Relationships 
The idea that privacy enables self-development and autonomy is linked to conceptions 
which value privacy for its role in building relationships and intimacy. The self cannot 
develop in a vacuum; interactions with others are a key element of personal growth.  
Sociologist Arnold Simmel argues that ͚we become what we are not only by establishing 
boundaries around ourselves but also by a periodic opening of these boundaries to 
nourishment, to learning and intimacy͛.24  Charles Fried similarly advocates for the 
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interpretation of privacy as a valuable good due to its ability to foster respect, love, 
friendship and trust.  In fact, Fried argues that, ͚Privacy is not merely a good technique 
for furthering these fundamental relations; rather without privacy they are simply 
inconceivable͛.25  Privacy interests are not merely found in personal data and 
information.  They are not bound to secrecy or the prevention of disclosure.  Rather, an 
interest in privacy is related to selective disclosure,26 allowing individuals to determine 
who knows what about them, and to utilise that information to develop relationships and 
nurture intimacy.   
Privacy͛s value in this instance is that it allows individuals to determine what information 
they share and whom they share it with.27  How people choose to share information will 
depend on the context of the relationship.28  This conception of privacy recognises that 
individuals do not have a single definitive persona that they present to the world.  
Different relationships require different behaviours.29  Privacy allows individuals to be 
responsive to various contexts and behave in an appropriate manner.   
Technology has a direct impact on the ability of individuals to determine the appropriate 
persona for each interaction.  Widespread information creation and dissemination due to 
the increased production of data occurring through everyday transactions and interactions 
has made individuals infinitely more knowable.  This has a direct impact on ideas of 
selective disclosure.  Indeed, Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg has criticised this idea.  
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͚You have one identity.  The days of you having a different image for your work friends 
or co-workers and for the other people you know are probably coming to an end pretty 
quickly.  Having two identities for yourself is an example of a lack of integrity͛.30  While 
this is a rather stark depiction, the increase in information as a direct result of 
technological developments has changed the traditional norms ascribed to privacy which 
grant the individual control over her various social identities and allow her to formulate 
her relationships accordingly.   
d. Access 
In a related conception, privacy is the ability of the individual to limit or deny access to 
others, in order to protect their own autonomous sphere for self-development.  Relatedly, 
this idea of access was cited by legal scholar Ruth Gavison as a key element of privacy, 
͚Our interest in privacy,͙, is related to our concern over our accessibility to others: the 
extent to which we are known to others, the extent to which others have physical access 
to us, and the extent to which we are the subject of others͛ attention͛.31  Crucial to this 
conception is the idea that the individual exercises control over the access.  It is not 
enough that information remains hidden, but that those to whom it relates are able to 
control who ultimately has access to the information.  The access in this conception is 
limited in its scope.  Hyman Gross stressed this element of limitation, stating that 
͚privacy is the condition of human life in which acquaintance with a person or with 
affairs of his life which are personal to him is limited͛.32  This was supported by David 
M. O͛Brien in his book Privacy, Law, and Public Policy wherein he found that privacy 
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͚may be understood as fundamentally denoting an existential condition of limited access 
to an individual͛s life experiences and engagements͛.33   
Privacy will be diminished not only where access is violated, but also where, even with 
permission, that access is extensive in reach. This conception of privacy requires the 
individual to limit information known, an idea that is diametrically opposed to 
technologies which function most effectively through the constant production of data.  
However, it is not that the individual͛s use of technology demonstrates an absolute 
refutation of the concept of privacy as a limited access conception; rather the practical 
use of technology enables individuals to share certain information with certain people 
and not others.  When law enforcement agencies access information, even where such 
information is freely shared with friends or colleagues, it can be said that there is a 
privacy intrusion.    
e. Control  
Following on from the view that privacy is rooted in the concept of limited access, is the 
view that privacy has value because it allows the individual control over information 
about oneself.  This is an expanded view of the preceding concept.  Legal scholar Alan 
Westin defined privacy as ͚the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine 
for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about themselves is 
communicated to others͛.34   In a similar vein, E.L. Godkin argued that ͚Nothing is better 
worthy of legal protection than private life, or in other words, the right of every man to 
keep his affairs to himself, and to decide for himself to what extent they shall be the 
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subject of public observation and discussion͛.35  This view is supported by sociologist 
Edward Shils.  ͚We say that privacy exists where the persons whose actions engender or 
become the objects of information retain possession of that information, and any flow 
outward of that information from the persons to whom it refers (and who share it where 
more than one person is involved) occurs on the initiative of the possessors͛.36   Unlike 
the limited access conception, the sharing of information or permitting others access does 
not diminish privacy.  Rather privacy is ensured by granting the individual control over 
information about themselves.37  If that information is divulged without the consent of 
the individual, then privacy is breached, regardless of what the information is.  
Additionally, privacy scholar Daniel Solove stresses that consent is not the only aspect of 
control; the individual must be able to ensure that personal information is used for the 
purposes he or she desires.38 
New technologies facilitate sharing of information and provide individuals with a method 
of doing so, thereby allowing them to determine what is shared and providing an element 
of control.  However, where the laws, such as those at issue, remove the element of 
control over the information through the creation of repositories of data, the disclosure of 
which the individual has no control over, then there is a concomitant privacy intrusion.   
f. Social 
The preceding concepts of privacy place its importance in the individual interests and 
rights it protects, the most significant of which are the freedom and autonomy of 
individuals, whether as ends in themselves to promote self-development, or as elements 
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exercised through practices of limited access or control.  These individual freedoms are 
rooted in fundamental liberal democratic societies.  However, emphasising privacy͛s role 
in protecting the individual is a weak method for protecting privacy in practice, 
particularly where privacy interests interfere with broader societal interests such as 
preventing or detecting crime or ensuring national security.  Indeed, intrusions with 
privacy are normally justified on the grounds that such an interference is necessary to 
protect the community as a whole, and intrusions facilitated by ICT are no different.  Yet 
privacy does not only promote individual freedoms and autonomy; it has a broader social 
value as well.   
Tied in to the social conception of privacy are those conceptions that equate privacy with 
secrecy.  In this concept, privacy is seen as socially detrimental.  It is ͚a plea for the right 
to misrepresent one͛s self to the rest of the world͛.39  Judge Richard Posner argues that 
privacy͛s role is in keeping secret ͚information about themselves that others might use to 
[the individual͛s] disadvantage͛.40  These conceptions frame privacy as a self-serving 
value.  Building on sociologist Erving Goffman͛s idea that people commonly employ 
differing techniques to influence the ways they are seen by others,41 psychologist Sidney 
Jourard defines privacy as ͚a desire to control others͛ perceptions and beliefs vis-à-vis the 
self-concealing person͛.42  Privacy is a negative value in that it invites deceit and 
manipulation which diverge with broader social values.  It is ͚an antisocial construct ͙ 
[that] conflicts with other important values within the society, such as society͛s interests 
in facilitating free expression, preventing and punishing crime, and conducting 
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government operations efficiently͛.43  For these theorists, privacy is an individual right; it 
possesses no value for society and indeed is a negative value that is harmful to the 
community.  However, this conception can be refuted by examining the social benefits 
derived from privacy.   
Traditional social approaches to privacy argue that it goes beyond the interest of the 
individual and enables valued social ends.  Indeed, framing privacy purely in an 
individualistic sense often means that it becomes undervalued and is too easily subverted 
for social issues.  This does not account for the interplay between privacy and other 
values, between the individual and society.  After all, as John Dewey notes, ͚we cannot 
think of ourselves save as to some extent social beings.  Hence, we cannot separate the 
idea of ourselves and our own good from our idea of others and of their good͛.44  It is 
necessary to recognise the valued social ends that privacy upholds.  For instance, privacy 
promotes professional or political relationships in much the same way that it ensures 
intimate ones.  Social norms dictate what might be personal or intimate aspects and 
similarly determine which may require privacy.  Privacy in this regard is contextual and 
only obtains its true meaning within a society.45  In a democratic society, individual 
freedoms cannot be the sole concern.  There must be an interest in protecting the privacy 
of relationships.  The value of these relationships, argues Beate Roessler, is that ͚these 
forms of social interactions and social practices have tasks and purposes that not only are 
morally valuable for the individuals involved, but which also directly serve to promote 
social integration͛.46   
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Technology has supplanted many traditional social institutions.  Most shopping can be 
done online, many people now telecommute rather than going in to the office every day, 
and communications take place more often by email than by phone.  However, the 
change in social structures does not mean that the value of privacy to society has 
decreased nor that the social benefits are lessened.  Rather, privacy plays a subtle 
conservative role in reinforcing the existing social fabric.  Julie Cohen examined the role 
of information and the increasing ͚knowability͛ of the individual to determine what 
benefit privacy may offer in a world where increasing amounts of information may be 
known about every citizen.   
We do not need, or even want, to know each other that well.  Less information 
makes routine interactions easier; we are free to choose, consensually and without 
embarrassment, the interactions that we wish to treat as less routine.  Informational 
privacy, in short, is a constitutive element of a civil society in the broadest sense of 
the term.47   
While we might choose to share more with others and while more data which is 
demonstrative of our inner selves might be generated via new technologies, there remains 
a social benefit in maintaining privacy over the information.   
III. Critique of traditional privacy conceptions as a consequence of 
technological developments 
Historically, there has been interplay between conceptions of privacy and technology 
with the two evolving alongside each other. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the 
development of cameras allowed for instantaneous photographs and newspapers which 
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͚invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical 
devices threatened to make good the prediction that ͞what is whispered in the closet shall 
be proclaimed from the house-tops͛͟.48  In the 1960s, this could be seen in the 
development of wire-tapping technologies which enabled law enforcement to listen in on 
conversations,49 and the development of computers with the ability to create centralised 
databases of personal information.50  The 1990s brought with it the creation of the 
internet and even more personal data.  Paul Schwartz͛s article ͚Privacy and Democracy in 
Cyberspace͛ looked to the links between the development of technology and the 
interpretation of privacy, ͚From the age of computer mainframes in the 1960s to the 
current reign of the internet͛s decentralised networks, academics and the law have 
gravitated towards the idea of privacy as a personal right to control the use of one͛s 
data͛.51  The individual remained the controller.  This followed traditional privacy 
interpretations rooted in liberal theories of individual rights.  ͚Both the focus on the 
individual right and the emphasis on individual control dominated much of the liberal 
legal and philosophical thinking about privacy during the late 1960s and through the 
1980s͛.52   
However, changes in technologies which have changed concepts of information, actors, 
and borders are not necessarily reflective of traditional liberal theories of individual 
rights.  Rather, they indicate a need to assess privacy͛s value not only in reference to the 
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individual, but also to the community, and determine how the norms surrounding privacy 
have been altered as a result of the technology.  Developments in technology are 
indicative of a shift toward a ͚networked public͛ wherein individual control becomes 
more contingent on the community.  As Priscilla Regan observes, ͚in a networked public, 
it is hard for any one person to have a level of privacy without all other persons in that 
network having a similar level of privacy͛.53  Privacy is shared collectively.  The control 
and use of technology by interconnected individuals results in communities which 
structure how concepts such as privacy can be determined.54  In order to effectively 
conceptualise privacy in the context of ICT it is necessary to acknowledge not just the 
role of the individual, but the role of the wider social elements which dictate privacy͛s 
value. Several issues which result from ICT and how it is handled in law have a 
determinate effect on privacy.     
First, the relationship between law and technology often suffers from a temporal 
mismatch.  Laws fail to keep pace with technological developments.  John Perry Barlow, 
internet and society scholar,55 discusses the issues with law and technology.   
Law adapts by continuous increments and at a pace second only to geology in its 
stateliness.  Technology advances in ͙ lunging jerks, like the punctuation of 
biological evolution grotesquely accelerated.  Real world conditions will continue 
to change at a blinding pace, and the law will get further behind, more profoundly 
confused.  This mismatch is permanent.56     
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In reconciling law with technology, the difficulty may lie in a lack of correspondence 
between the form of the legislation and the form the technology now takes.  At other 
times, the original legislative purposes may no longer provide clear statutory backing for 
the uses to which the technology is now put.  Many of the discussions about how to 
regulate technology focus on either ͚future-proofing͛ the technology by making it 
neutral,57 or by legislating for specific technologies which would require the law to be 
amended as new technologies develop.58  The temporal discord highlighted in the 
relationship between law and technology is easily extrapolated to the position of privacy.  
Our ideas of privacy are still rooted in those traditional conceptions; but our behaviour 
and society has changed.  The internet and permeation of technology mean that we no 
longer view privacy in the same way; and laws which attempt to regulate for traditional 
notions of privacy are ineffective.   
Second, technology has fundamentally altered traditional spatial boundaries.  On an 
individual level, this can be seen in the breaking of barriers between the public and 
private due to the extensive and intrusive nature of technology.  ͚In the past, walls, 
darkness, distance, time and skin were boundaries that protected personal information 
and helped define the self.  Information about the self-resided with the individual and 
those who knew him or her͛.59  Information now flows freely between spheres.  Things 
you post on Facebook to share with your friends may be reported back to your employer; 
thoughts and opinions posted in comments sections may be subject to scrutiny by 
hundreds of others.  Traditional spatial distinctions cannot be maintained amongst recent 
technical developments.  Technologies which deconstruct boundaries make it difficult for 
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individuals to determine the context in which they are acting thereby making managing 
privacy more difficult.60  As Miller notes, ͚Such decontextualisation erases the distinction 
between what ought and ought not to be communicated͛.61  A concept of privacy which 
cannot account for the deconstruction of spatial boundaries cannot therefore offer 
sufficient protection in light of technological developments.  
Similarly, the removal of the individual from the physical spaces they inhabit through 
their translation into discrete packets of data diminishes protections of privacy that exist 
in clearly delineated private spheres.  By interacting and utilising various technologies, 
the individual becomes a collection of disparate pieces of information, known as a 
͚dividual͛; an abstraction of oneself.  In this manner, the separation of the individual and 
the relevant data permits interferences with privacy as the personal information is 
removed from the social responsibilities owed to the individual.62  In so doing, as 
Vincent Miller notes, the technology can effectively circumvent the idea that data 
collection and processing ͚can be an invasion of privacy because such data is not directly 
tied to an individual, which possesses rights, but to a ͞dividual͟, which does not͛.63 
An interrelated aspect to the idea of spatial bounds is the alteration in traditional borders 
of governance.64  Crimes are no longer confined to one jurisdiction; perpetrators do not 
have to be in the jurisdiction of the crime they commit.  Technologies facilitate both the 
commission of crimes and their detection.  Didier Bigo offers a perspective on the 
relationship between technologies and borders in policing and the expanding use of these 
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technologies to increase collaboration between various agencies, noting that they permit 
͚the police to discipline and punish beyond borders͛.65  Privacy intrusions may likewise 
occur beyond borders.  It may be expected that at some stage information may be 
collected and used by the domestic government or law enforcement agencies.  However, 
the nature of technology means that there is no guarantee the information won͛t be 
accessed by others outside the domestic jurisdiction.  Yet despite this, the substance and 
purpose of privacy remains similar across modern industrialised nations.66  Such a result 
points to the need to conceptualise privacy, not as a territorial or space based issue, but as 
one that is dependent on the technology at issue.  
Third, technology has exponentially increased in its scope and overall saturation levels.  
Nissenbaum notes that the development of the internet has enhanced not only the ability 
to spread information, but also the degree to which it saturates the lived experiences of so 
many people in so many parts of the world.67  Traditional notions of privacy maintain 
that there are some areas which are inherently private; into which there can be no 
interference.  Historically this was possible due to limitations in the capacity and 
resources of technical systems which prevented interferences into areas.  However, 
technological developments have removed these barriers.  As more and more conduct 
occurs via information technology systems, there are very few instances in which some 
data isn͛t generated, whether it is simply purchasing groceries or reading a newspaper.  
The use of technological devices such as cell phones further contributes to the removal of 
these barriers.  ͚Prior to the digital age, people did not typically carry a cache of sensitive 
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personal information with them as they went about their day.  Now it is the person who is 
not carrying a cell phone, with all that it contains, who is the exception͛.68   
Contributing to the potency of these technologies, is the capability to store the 
information, to analyse it, and to access it for later use.  The scope and saturation levels 
presented by technology allow for greater powers of investigation by law enforcement.  
Data allows for the generation of complete profiles, accountings of individual 
movements and behaviours, and determination of social circles.  It is not that without 
these technologies these things would be necessarily impossible, but the extensive nature 
of the data makes them more accessible and comprehensive.  Individuals͛ most intimate 
traits can be discovered through improved data analysis mechanisms; machines can know 
highly detailed and significant information.  In a similar vein, if everything you do, see, 
purchase, and say creates data which can be stored, searched, accessed, or analysed, 
privacy cannot be protected through conceptions which rely on traditional methods of 
intrusion.   
Finally, technology has resulted in a disappearance of the ephemeral.  Technology has 
made it so any activity can now be recorded and disseminated regardless of whether it is 
occurring in the public or private sphere.69  This has a direct impact on notions of both 
individual freedom and autonomy and social relationships.  Cybersecurity analyst Bruce 
Schneier discusses the significance of the ephemeral, ͚Having conversations that 
disappear as soon as they occur is a social norm that allows us to be more relaxed and 
comfortable, and to say things we might not say if a tape recorder were running.  Over 
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the longer term, forgetting ʹ and misremembering ʹ is how we process our history͛.70  
Having an impermanence to conversations and interactions is valuable.  ͚With modern 
technologies, elements of the past can be preserved and offered up for visual and auditory 
consumption͛.71  Privacy cannot be maintained wherein every thought and action is 
recorded and subject to later scrutiny and judgment.  To do so would be to effectively 
normalise the behaviour of both the individual and society.   
If the current approach to privacy is not tenable in light of the technology, the necessary 
question is how to conceptualise a framework that both accounts for these developments, 
and protects against privacy violations.    In assessing privacy in the ICT system, it is 
therefore necessary to consider the social.  To consider the social elements is to broaden 
the interest in privacy beyond traditional thinking and expand its importance in light of 
the complexities of modern organisational and technological change.72  Such an approach 
͚is appropriate, intellectually defensible, and vital͛, argues Regan, ͚given the trajectory of 
current surveillance activities, whether taken in the name of national security, public 
safety, or consumer choice͛.73  
Assessing the interplay between ICT systems and privacy requires an understanding of 
the changes upon people and societies brought about by the technological transformation 
and the harms, benefits, and impacts on social and cultural values. The changes in 
information types, actors, and transmission principles, are areas wherein Nissenbaum 
orients her approach to contextual integrity.  The thesis uses Nissenbaum͛s approach as 
the starting point for analysis of the impact of these technological changes on the value of 
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privacy, in order to assess whether the changes are justifiable, and to determine, where a 
violation of privacy is established, effective prescriptive measures to ensure that privacy 
is adequately protected under future legislative developments.   
IV. Defining Contextual Integrity  
Each of the previous conceptions of privacy fails to ensure privacy in light of 
communication technologies.  It is necessary to establish a conception which can account 
for these developments in order to determine how to address any privacy violations 
which result from technological developments.  Any such framework must be able to 
balance these developments with the wider social interests in the prevention and 
detection of crime. Part of the failing of the previous conceptions results from trying to 
apply a singular framework which can relate to all the various circumstances in which 
privacy is engaged.  Daniel Solove argues against viewing privacy in such a manner, 
maintaining instead that privacy is better understood pluralistically.74  Such an approach 
is derived from Ludwig Wittgenstein͛s conception of family resemblances,75 wherein 
each problem has issues in common with other problems, but these issues are not 
necessarily the same across fields.  To put it another way, privacy can be understood as 
representing a variety of different norms and values, and to define it, it should be 
examined in the context of the particular situation.   
Central to the definition will be not only explaining the value of privacy, but utilising 
conceptual and normative resources to determine instances wherein privacy can 
legitimately override the end goals and purposes of the ICT system used in the 
investigatory powers instruments.  The technical system at issue in the thesis will be 
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explored fully in the following chapter.  In the case of ICT systems used by law 
enforcement agencies, the question therefore is: what value does privacy maintain in 
systems of comprehensive information collection and processing? And how can it be 
protected when the core purpose of privacy is directly opposed to the policy goals? 
Legal scholar Helen Nissenbaum created a framework known as contextual integrity to 
reconcile technological developments and conceptions of privacy.  Nissenbaum argues 
for examining systems in context in order to assess the status of privacy within those 
systems.  She defines the focus of her approach as follows:  
Finely calibrated systems of social norms, or rules, govern the flow of 
personal information in distinct social contexts (e.g. education, health 
care, and politics).  These norms, which [Nissenbaum] calls context 
relative informational norms, define and sustain essential activities and 
key relationship interests, protect people and groups against harm, and 
balance the distribution of power.  Responsive to historical, cultural, and 
even geographic contingencies, informational norms evolve over time in 
distinct patterns from society to society.76   
For Nissenbaum, norms that are specifically concerned with the flow of personal 
information ʹ transmission, communications, transfer, distribution, and dissemination ʹ 
are informational or context-relative informational norms.  When these informational 
norms are respected, then the context is preserved and when they are breached, 
contextual integrity is violated.77  In essence, a contextual integrity approach looks to the 
informational norms to determine when a privacy violation occurs.  This is done by 
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examining three characteristics of the informational norm: the relevant actors and the 
roles they play, the nature of the information, and the transmission of the information 
between parties.   
Under Nissenbaum͛s framework, actors are senders of information, recipients of 
information or information subjects.78  The roles these actors fulfil will be a determinate 
factor in ascertaining whether there is a privacy violation.  In addition, the nature of the 
information itself will play a key role in determining any perceived privacy violation.  In 
certain contexts, the disclosure of certain attributes can be deemed inappropriate.79  For 
example, certain types of information may be innocuous at small scale but trigger privacy 
violations in the aggregate.  Finally, the transmission principles involved may impact on 
informational norms ascribed to a practice.  Established constraints on the flow of 
information may trigger privacy concerns when information is disseminated in a way that 
does not comport with expectations.  This could be the case, for example, where 
information willingly shared for the purposes of receiving a service is later shared with a 
third party for an unrelated function. 
By examining these three areas, it is possible to tell if an informational norm has been 
altered.  ͚If a new practice generates changes in these areas, the practice is flagged as a 
prima facie violation of contextual integrity͛.80  This is not to say that all technological 
systems which alter these categories result in a violation of privacy that must then be 
rectified.  ͚Whether the alterations amount to transgressions, and whether these 
transgressions are morally and politically legitimate depends, of course, on the contexts 
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in which they transpire and how they bear on relevant values, ends, and purposes͛.81  At 
times, the developments concerning information will better reflect current norms and 
values.  It is only when they do not that they should then be addressed.   
In determining whether the informational norms are violated in a manner that mandates 
further actions to protect privacy, Nissenbaum argues information types, transmission 
principles, and actors must be examined in light of the context in which the privacy 
violation is being alleged.  Contexts are structured social settings with accepted 
characteristics; the framework of contextual integrity however does not require a singular 
context for its decision heuristic.82  It is necessary to examine the multiplicity of factors 
which create the context.  These can be derived from different arrangements of people 
and artefacts, the manners in which they coexist, and how they relate to one another and 
possess identity and meaning.83  The wider social factors which dictate the context are 
significant to achieving privacy.  Marwick and boyd find that context must be dynamic 
and responsive depending on the actors and norms at play: ͚contexts are not bounded and 
information norms are not fixed.  Instead, situations are co-constructed by all 
participants͛.84   
Where a new technological practice results in changes in these actors, information types, 
and transmission principles, the informational norms shift.  The changes in these norms 
must be evaluated against the interests and impacts on the values and contextual aims.85  
The existence of a change does not in itself indicate the need for reform.  Entrenched 
norms are not necessarily preferred and new informational norms can have value.  As 
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John Stuart Mill long ago recognised: ͚The despotism of custom is everywhere the 
standing hindrance to human advancement, being in unceasing antagonism to that 
disposition to aim at something better than customary͛.86  Any assessment of the changes 
in informational norms must be balanced against other issues and rights.  For the 
purposes of the thesis, these norms will be assessed against the aims of law enforcement 
in collecting and processing the information.  The shift in norms will be weighed against 
the benefits in using the communications data. 
  In looking at what must be done it is important to acknowledge that privacy is dynamic 
and changing.  It is through this evaluation that the framework of contextual integrity can 
offer a mechanism for developing prescriptive recommendations for the system.  
͚Contextual integrity offers a diagnostic tool with prima facie explanatory and predictive 
capacities, providing a more highly calibrated view of factors relevant to privacy than 
traditional dichotomies such as public/private͛.87  By providing this level of analysis, the 
values and aims that need to be provided for in future legislation governing the use of 
ICT systems can be identified and enshrined.     
V. Privacy in Context: Information Communications Technologies and Law 
Enforcement 
To establish the conception of privacy which will be utilised in this thesis, it is first 
necessary to determine the informational norms that apply to the context of ICT.  
Subsequent chapters will then determine whether the policies of law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies are violating these norms by utilising the technology for data 
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retention, access, and analysis.  A violation will result in a privacy intrusion which must 
be mitigated in subsequent legislation.   
a. Context 
For the purposes of this thesis, the informational norms will be assessed in the context of 
the ICT system which will be the focus of the following Chapter.  Contexts are defined as 
structured social settings which account for both individual and social characteristics.  In 
socio-technical systems, contexts are the shared ͚properties of respective media, systems, 
or platforms whose distinctive material characteristics shape ʹ modify, magnify, enable ʹ 
the character of the activities, transactions, and interactions they mediate͛.88  Systems are 
composed of legislation, organisations, and artefacts.  Systems contain characteristics 
which define their activities, and these characteristics are defined by the social structures 
and roles in which they are situated.  In the context of the ICT system, norms are defined 
by the characteristics that shape both communication and information processing.  
Traditional communications systems (i.e. landline phones, postal mail, etc.) imposed 
distinctive properties on communications.  Systems that utilise mobile and internet 
technologies have modified many of these traditional characteristics, as will be evidenced 
in the analysis of these systems in Chapters 3 to 5.  ͚If properties of technical systems and 
platforms define contexts, then a principle that supports respect for contexts presumably 
implies that policies should be heedful of these defining properties of systems and 
platforms͛.89  The thesis argues that the investigatory powers regime governing the 
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current ICT system is not responsive to the structured social settings in which it is 
oriented; regulations apply frameworks from outdated contexts to new technologies.   
b. Roles/actors 
Tied in to the concept of context are roles and actors.  Nissenbaum defines roles as 
͚typical or paradigmatic capacities in which people act in contexts͛.90  Linked to this 
concept is the idea of comportment, or the kind of behaviour shown in various roles 
relative to what is expected.91  Informational norms look to the roles of various actors to 
determine when a breach has occurred.  A breach can occur if there has been a shift in 
principal actors, or if the purpose of the actors has changed.  Nissenbaum structures 
informational norms with regard to actors which ͚affirms intuitions that the capacities in 
which actors function are crucial to the moral legitimacy of certain flows of 
information͛.92  An actor who operates outside the accepted role calls into question the 
legitimacy of the action.  Solove stresses the need to focus on the relationships in which 
information is transferred and the use to which it is put, as changes in that relationship 
necessarily impact on issues of intimacy, confidentiality, and power dynamics.93   
In terms of ICT, there has been a shift in actors and the traditional relationships found in 
this context.  The Government is no longer the principal actor in the imposition and 
application of mechanisms which interfere with communications data, whether by active 
surveillance or passive monitoring.  This role is being played by CSPs.  ͚Ostensibly non-
criminal justice institutions are being called upon to augment the surveillance capacities 
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of the criminal justice surveillance system͛.94  The technologies at issue here are normally 
developed and administered by private entities.  Political scientist Henry Farrell 
observed, ͚much of our life is conducted online, which is another way of saying that 
much of our life is conducted under rules set by large private businesses͛95 which are not 
subject to the traditional limitations that would inhibit government action.   
This change in the role of the actors facilitating privacy intruding measures is 
demonstrative of different norms than are traditionally associated with surveillance and 
monitoring when done by law enforcement.  For example, individuals often consent to 
these actions when they are done by private companies, typically to obtain some form of 
benefit or service offered.  ͚Usually when we mind that information is shared, we mind 
not simply that it is being shared but that it is shared in the wrong ways and with 
inappropriate others͛.96  The ability of individuals to opt in to technologies which result 
in increased information collection and processing is significant.  People who choose to 
disclose information in order to derive a certain benefit can consent to that information 
being known.97   
Where individuals consent to share information with private actors and the information is 
then accessed and used by government without their consent, the roles of the actors and 
expectations have changed.  The distinction between the end users of data is significant 
in that the purpose of the data and the impact of its use (whether through general 
collection, aggregation, or analysis) is different depending on who processes the data.  
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Indeed, law enforcement and intelligence agencies will have very different goals for the 
data, will process it for different reasons, and will use it to elicit different information.   
Law enforcement is expected to behave in a certain manner in the context of 
communications surveillance and monitoring; for instance, they are expected to follow 
certain steps, such as obtaining judicial authorisation.  However, where private actors are 
co-opted into these roles, these safeguards do not necessarily apply.   This has a direct 
impact on the informational norms we associate with information and communications 
technologies.   
c. Information Types 
Changes relating to the information type or attribute are also a determinate factor on 
informational norms.  The nature of the information dictates its accepted norms.  In that 
regard, consideration must be given to who the information concerns and with whom it is 
shared; what the information is about; and its scale and scope.  In the context of the ICT 
system, the nature of the communications data collected and processed will strongly 
influence informational norms and the evaluation of those norms against privacy 
interests.  Writing in 1988 Roger A Clarke found that, ͚one of the most practical of our 
present safeguards of privacy is the fragmented nature of present information.  It is 
scattered in little bits and pieces across the geography and years of our life.  Retrieval is 
impractical and often impossible͛.98  This distinction no longer holds.  Changes in the 
attributes of information occasioned by developments in technology have made it more 
accessible and comprehensive.  The nature of communications data fundamentally shifts 
the traditional limitations of data that existed when it was decentralised and discrete 
                                                          
98Clarke n(50) 498.  
 57 
 
packets of information.  As a result, the changes in information types must be evaluated 
when ascertaining whether the entrenched norms are still relevant to the ICT system.   
d. Transmission Principles 
Under the framework of contextual integrity, the third factor which is assessed in 
determining informational norms is classed as the transmission principles.  Transmission 
principles concern the constraint on the flow of information.  Relevant to this is how the 
information is distributed and the scope of its dissemination.    This is frequently dictated 
by the structure of the technologies.  Lawrence Lessig͛s book Code: Version 2.0 draws 
on this idea, arguing that it is the architecture of technology which dictates its norms.99  
For Lessig, the norms created in cyberspace are different than those in ͚real͛ space; the 
latter conform to traditional societal ideals whereas the former may not.  The difference 
in norms in cyberspace versus real space can be demonstrated in early interpretations of 
how cyberspace was meant to function.  Early iterations of cyberspace called for pseudo 
anonymization to promote free expression and speech, and this was enabled through the 
code which established the technology.  Unlike in real space, privacy was similarly 
incorporated, with many applications allowing for individuals to use services without 
placing any identification or authentication requirements.100  However, these norms are 
not necessarily replicated in current communications technologies.   
e. Norms  
In evaluating the preceding characteristics, the significant factor will be how they have 
impacted on norms.  Norms in this context are defined as principles which prescribe and 
proscribe acceptable action and practices.  They may define the relationships among 
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roles, e.g. between the government and the individual, and thereby the power structures 
that characterise social context.101  The traditional governing structure of cyberspace and 
the internet has changed.  So too have traditional mobile telephony applications.  The 
original versions of cyberspace, which saw it as a place free from regulation and 
governance have not endured.  Rather, a governing structure exists, albeit one that is 
enforced by private entities, allowing these private actors to dictate the normative 
principles of technologies.  The significance of the extensive scope, lack of defined 
spatial constraints, and relative dominance of the technology means that these normative 
constraints can have both online and off-line effects.  In that instance, it is important to 
look to what norms are being reinforced by technology.   
In providing for norms which relate to information collection and processing, the impact 
of these practices must be acknowledged.  Julie Cohen acknowledged the effect the 
constant monitoring that occurs as a result of persistent data collection can have on 
individuals.  ͚[P]ervasive monitoring of every first move or false start will, at the margin, 
incline choices toward the bland and the mainstream͛ by constraining the acceptable 
spectrum of behaviour and resulting in a ͚subtle yet fundamental shift in the content of 
our character, a blunting and blurring of rough edges and sharp lines͛.102  Similarly, Spiro 
Simitis highlights the role in personal information in enforcing standards of behaviour.103  
Thus the development of these technologies has allowed for the expansion of systems 
which allow for persistent monitoring which impacts on behaviour and social values, 
including, and especially, privacy.  Yet legislative policies which traditionally subject 
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these processes to limitations in scope and protections from abuse have not similarly 
developed.   
f. Values 
In order to determine whether the entrenched norms are indeed acceptable for the 
context, it is necessary to then determine what values the system is seeking to promote.  
These values are also known as the goals, purposes, or ends around which a context is 
oriented.  Traditionally, information processing regimes possessed clear values; the 
information was collected and processed for a particular service.  Law enforcement 
access to these systems had, at its core, the detection of suspects and the eventual 
prosecution of crime as their aims.  However, increased data flows, coupled with social 
and historical developments have altered the traditional objectives of the ICT policies 
enacted by law enforcement.   
There has been ͚a shift in thinking in which crime is no longer viewed as an aberration 
but rather a normal condition of late modern society and therefore all citizens come under 
suspicion͛.104  This has resulted in shifts in the values of technology from tools of 
detection to tools of prevention.  ͚Contemporary surveillance is characterised by its lack 
of particularity in that it is an intelligence-gathering tool used before the relevant 
enforcement agency has any suspicion that a particular individual has been involved in 
crime͛.105  Scholars such as Zedner, Ericson, and Haggerty note that the shift from a post-
crime to a pre-crime society has fundamentally changed the nature and aim of policing 
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and emphasises security.106  Van Brakel observes that the change is not merely temporal 
but also has implications for relevant actors as well: ͚In a pre-crime society the 
responsibility for security against risk is not just the responsibility of the State but 
extends to a larger group of individual, communal, and private actors͛.107  Proponents 
argue the extended scope and scale of the information processing activities which affect 
privacy interests are required in this atmosphere of ͚global insecurity͛.108  Interests such 
as privacy must be balanced against the community values which want security, and 
more often than not the former are forfeit to this security interest.  This raises the 
question, of what safeguards can be put in place to address the issues raised by these 
technologies and adequately ensure that the values ascribed are preserved, particularly in 
the wake of increasingly invasive technologies.     
VI. Conclusion 
The preceding analysis has found that privacy, in light of technological developments, is 
best conceptualised in a contextual manner.  Such a conceptualisation requires an 
analysis of the components of informational norms that are engaged in a contextual 
analysis of ICT systems which indicate areas where technologies utilised by law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies can alter entrenched norms.  The question then 
becomes whether changes in these norms represent a violation of privacy that must be 
regulated for in future or whether they can be justified by relation to values they 
enshrine.  In order to determine which of these two scenarios prevails, it is necessary to 
examine the specific nature of the technologies and their capabilities.  The following 
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analysis will proceed by setting the context by defining the ICT system and norms and 
values within it and then examine the technical systems utilised by law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies, focusing on the procedures of retention, access, and analysis.  In 
each of these areas, the impact on informational norms will be established by 




CHAPTER 2: THE INFORMATION COMMUNICATIONS 
TECHNOLOGY SYSTEM 
I. Introduction 
To assess privacy using contextual integrity, it is necessary to establish the context in 
which it is being evaluated and the norms which exist within that context.  To that end, 
this chapter evaluates privacy in the context of the ICT system.  Law and technology are 
complex and interrelated structures which are elements of a system which reflects a co-
constructed relationship.  Technologies cannot be divorced from society but that does not 
mean they are purely social constructs.1  An interpretation of technology which accounts 
for the role of the social is necessary but insufficient; further elements must be 
considered, including the technology itself and the organisational and legislative actors 
which direct its use.  Each of these elements plays a crucial role in dictating the 
capabilities and limits of technology.  It is argued that the interpretation of the 
relationship between law and technology is best informed by the systems theory 
approach of Hughes which is employed in the following analysis. As will be shown, this 
theory provides for a way to assess how technology shapes and is shaped by society.  
This chapter will define what is meant by a technological system through reference to the 
literature, before examining the ICT system at issue in the thesis.  The theory employed 
here allows for the assessment of the impact of technology on individual and social 
levels, which will help determine the informational norms associated with the concept of 
privacy identified in the Chapter 1.  This will also underpin the development of 
prescriptive measures to apply to the system which address how to incorporate the new 
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role of CSPs in the criminal justice process and how to tackle the fundamental changes to 
the nature and use of information in the system.   
This chapter sets out the rationale behind adopting Hughes͛s systems theory approach in 
four parts.  Part I begins by assessing the relevant literature on law and STS approaches 
to technologies.  These theories are critiqued with regard to its benefits and shortcomings 
in understanding ICT.  This analysis will establish that the systems theory approach of 
Thomas P Hughes is the strongest method with which to critique the ICT concerning 
communications data found within the investigatory powers instruments. Following that, 
Part II will then apply Hughes͛s systems theory to information communications 
technology, examining the technological evolution of the system, as well as problems in 
the system that were overcome both technologically and socially.  Part III will identify 
the basic legislative, organisational, and technical elements which form the system. 
Finally, in Part IV, the social structures affected by the co-construction of the system are 
assessed by examining these structures and the impact of the system on their 
development.  The foundational work of this chapter establishes the role of the system 
and the various factors which must be taken in to account in assessing its efficacy.  This 
chapter dictates the context, in the form of the structured social settings, in which the 
conception of privacy established in Chapter 1 must be assessed.  As such, this chapter 
and Chapter 1 form the theoretical basis on which the analysis of the data retention, 
access, and analysis set forth in Chapters 3 to 5 will be based.   
II. Law and STS Approaches to Technology  
In order to determine the most appropriate theory for analysing the ICT system in the 
investigatory powers regime it is necessary to examine the interplay between law and 
technology.  Falling under the broad heading of Science and Technology Studies (STS), 
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these approaches offer a way in which to examine the interdependency between law and 
technology and consider how these two areas are co-produced.  Such approaches account 
for the reciprocal relationship between the two distinct fields.  As Faulkner et al 
recognise, ͚Technology can be seen to be both an object of the law, and as a means 
(sometimes unintended) of engendering new laws and legislative understandings͛.2  The 
aim of this section is to highlight the different perspectives and approaches that are taken 
in the wider field of STS when assessing this relationship in order to establish the 
approach most useful for interrogating that relationship in the context of the ICT system.  
In determining this relationship, the context of the developments will be significant, as 
the mechanisms for interpreting these interactions will be contingent on the context in 
which they occur.  Here, in the context of ICT used for law enforcement, the respective 
norms and values embodied by the system differ from the use of ICT for purely private 
purposes.  STS approaches lend themselves to the normative considerations raised by the 
development of ICT and the implications of those developments on privacy by enabling 
the analysis of the wider social and political factors which underpin the legal changes.   
The use of STS approaches for assessing the relationship between law and technology 
have enabled the examination of the nature of legal processes and the production of 
technologies.3  Social factors are incorporated into these developments through their 
potential and eventual uses and implementations.4  An STS approach recognises that 
these developments and their impacts cannot be understood in a purely linear and static 
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manner.  Law and technologies in this area are co-produced.5  As Sheila Jasanoff notes, 
knowledge in this area ͚embeds and is embedded in social practices, identities, norms, 
conventions, discourses, instruments and institutions ʹ in short, all the building blocks of 
what we term of the social͛.6    
Scholars working within STS frameworks, particularly those in the field of criminal 
justice, have analysed heretofore unchallenged areas, including those which posit the 
self-corrective ability of science and technologies; the rule of law in these areas; notions 
of expertise; and the infallibility of evidentiary claims related to evidence derived 
through technological means.7  However, it is necessary to explore how the criminal law 
concepts overlap with the development of information communications technologies.  
Such an interpretation allows for an assessment of how these technologies shape and 
mediate interactions between individuals and wider society. As Yeung notes, 
͚information communications technologies, like other artefacts, shape and mediate our 
relationship with the world around us and, over time, we come to perceive the world 
through the lenses that our artefacts create͛.8  Changes in these perceptions impact on not 
only the technologies themselves, but also the way individuals react with social units.  
This assessment can be broadened out to wider concepts of power and the rule of law by 
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allowing for an examination of the salient factors which underpin developments in these 
areas.9  As such, an STS approach, by emphasising the construction, use, and 
implementation of technologies, allows for an evaluation of how these factors can be 
better accommodated in the legal process. 
Within STS there is a wide body of scholarship which demonstrates the need to study the 
impact of these developments on social practices and how they embed or establish 
various structures and authorities.10  Such accounts look to certain technologies or 
practices and assess how various factors in their development and use reflect back upon 
the social.  For example, in the work of sociologists Trevor J Pinch and Wiebe Bijker, the 
development of the bicycle is analysed.  This analysis works ͚on the assumption that the 
social lies behind and directs the growth and stabilisation of artefacts͛.11  Artefacts do not 
have to be singular inventions; they can be component elements of a wider technology, 
and encompass both the physical and nonphysical. In this theory, particular technologies 
remain background factors against which human, social, and political conflicts take 
shape.  For Wiebe and Bijker, technologies exist to solve dilemmas as they are defined 
by relevant social groups; a problem only exists when there is a social group for which it 
constitutes a ͚problem͛.12  These social groups consist of organised and unorganised 
groups of individuals, institutions, and organisations.  What is important for the existence 
of a social group is that the group gives the same meaning to the technological 
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͚artefact͛.13  Once the group is identified, the question becomes what problems they have 
with the artefact and the proposed solutions the group may have.  Both the problems and 
solutions may present conflicting technical requirements, conflicting solutions to the 
same problems, or other moral conflicts amongst the social group as different social 
constructions and cultural interpretations are considered. 
In determining the role of the social Pinch and Bijker argue that their ͚account ʹ in which 
the different interpretations by social groups of the content of artefacts lead by means of 
different chains of problems and solutions to further developments ʹ involves the content 
of the artefact itself͛.14  This means that in developing the artefact, each social group may 
focus on the problem most relevant to their own interests; the focus will not be the same 
across social groups and the actions taken will vary accordingly.15 These methods of 
problem solving are referred to as technological frames.16  This idea of problem solving 
is broadly interpreted as recognising the problem, defining strategies for solving it, and 
setting out the criteria for solutions that must be met for it to be accepted by the relevant 
social group.17  ͚The concept of a technological frame is intended to apply to the 
interaction of various actors.  Thus it is not an individual͛s characteristics, nor the 
characteristics of systems or institutions; frames are located between actors, not in actors 
or above actors͛.18  These technological frames therefore structure the attribution of the 
shared meaning the social group gives to the artefact.  As more members of a social 
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group or additional social groups interact with the artefact, this gives rise to and 
structures the methods of the groups, giving rise to a technological frame.  In this 
method, it is not possible to divorce those actors from the technology; as Gillespie notes 
these ͚groups of actors͙also have a stake in that technology͛s operation, meaning, and 
social value͛.19   
In structuring the meaning that a social group gives to an artefact, there is necessarily a 
reflection of social principles.  Actors will play different roles depending to which social 
group they belong.  Boundaries are blurred as actors and artefacts are socially situated in 
different ways depending on the social group under consideration.  For example, a user 
will give different meanings to an artefact than an inventor or engineer.  However, that 
user can simultaneously be a creator and an engineer; the analysis will differ depending 
on whether the technology is examined in the context of a consumer or a developer.  The 
resultant shared meaning that a group gives to the artefact is a consequence of distinct 
factors.  Langdon Winner incorporates this understanding in his discussion of a social 
approach to technological development, noting that the development of technology will 
advance certain social interests over others.20  ͚In the process by which structuring 
decisions are made, different people are situated differently and possess unequal degrees 
of power as well as unequal levels of awareness͛.21  This can serve to reinforce the 
current social structure and this reinforcement can be indicated in the decisions of 
societies to favour certain technologies over others.  These choices may not reflect the 
most efficient nor equitable use of the technology.  
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However, these approaches which assess the meaning of the social in these contexts does 
not mean that the social is placed above other factors.  STS approaches to the study of 
these technological artefacts have consistently refused to place causal primacy upon the 
social.22  The assessment of the social in the approaches of Pinch and Bijker among 
others does not imply that ͚social reality is ontologically prior to natural reality, nor that 
social factors alone determine the workings of nature͛.23  As the study of the role of the 
social in the development of technologies has matured, approaches here have required a 
reimagining of what is a complex subject.  STS links with the study of technology to 
determine how the two must be linked together, acknowledging the importance of 
people, individuals, and preferences.   
At the other end of the spectrum of the analysis between technology and society lies the 
technological determinist approach.  Technological determinism views technological 
change as an independent factor which then causes social change.24  As Marx and Smith 
state in the context of technological determinism, ͚a complex event is made to seem the 
inescapable yet strikingly plausible result of a technological innovation͛.25  Technology is 
seen as an outside force upon society which directs social growth, rather than the other 
way around.  Seeing these technological artefacts as conditioning the social allows for an 
analysis of how the devices transform everyday life.26  The impact of the technological 
on the social can either be ͚soft͛ or ͚hard͛, with the former holding that the technology 
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drives social change but is still responsive to social pressures, and the latter arguing that 
the technology develops completely independently of any social constraint.27   
Whether ͚hard͛ or ͚soft͛, technological determinism argues that technology develops in a 
fixed, naturally determined sequence.  In order for there to be technological evolution, 
development must follow a sequential and determinate course.28  Under the technological 
determinist approach, technology displays a structured history and does not develop in 
any great leaps.  Each era has a limited capacity of, and constraint on, the accumulated 
stock of available knowledge.  Technology develops through the gradual expansion of 
that knowledge.29  This expansion is similarly related to the existence of other 
technologies, as there is an interrelatedness between technologies without which certain 
innovations would not work.  Heilbroner discusses this, stating that ͚the competence 
required to create such a technology does not reside alone in the ability or inability to 
make a particular machine ͙ but in the ability of many industries to change their 
products or processes to ͞fit͟ a change in one key product or process͛.30   
It is in this developmental relationship that the interplay between society and technology 
becomes apparent.  However, in contrast to those approaches which would argue that it 
was the technological frame of a relevant social group which required the development of 
the technology, the determinist approach argues that it is through the technology that 
certain social or political characteristics are imposed on the society itself.  Heilbroner 
argues that this imposition of a pattern of social relations on society can be demonstrated 
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by examining the functional processes of technology.31  Keith Kelly similarly notes that 
͚each rise in social organisation throughout history was driven by an insertion of a new 
technology͛.32   
Technological determinism is frequently used to analyse historical examples to 
demonstrate how technologies fundamentally altered the social.  While not necessarily 
determinist themselves, historical accounts can illustrate this concept.  Lynne White 
assesses the development of the stirrup and how it fundamentally changed warfare and 
subsequently history by enabling the creation of an efficient cavalry.33  Karl Marx links 
the development of the steam mill to industrial capitalism.34  Francis Bacon listed three 
͞practical arts͟ that changed the world: the printing press, gunpowder, and the magnetic 
compass.  Bacon went on to argue that ͚no empire, no sect, no start seems to have exerted 
greater powers and influence in human affairs than these mechanical discoveries͛.35  The 
impact of technology on the social is readily apparent in these examples.  The determinist 
approach arguably offers a needed corrective to constructivist interpretations which tend 
to ignore the role of technology in effecting social change.36  It accounts for the 
significant impact of technologies on society and the ability of technologies to determine 
social and cultural changes.   
However, despite its value for assessing the impact of technology on the social, it is too 
circumscribed in its remit to prescribe an accurate analysis of the development of 
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technology and its relationship with social norms.  As has been noted by scholars such as 
Prainsack, STS approaches have worked to counter this narrative that technologies are 
only limited by those humans using them.37  Technologies necessarily incorporate the 
social into their development; they do not operate in a vacuum.  Technology, and in 
particular information technology, cannot be divorced from the social, economic, and 
political context in which it exists.38  Engineers, corporations, regulatory agencies, 
politicians, lawyers, and users all contribute to technological development.  These social 
entities mediate the technology and enable its introduction and assimilation into 
society.39  If the focus is only on the technology, then the material conditions and social 
environments through which they are produced and operate are obscured.  It is therefore 
necessary to adopt an approach which accounts for the role of both the technological and 
the social.   
In order to avoid the limitations of deterministic approaches, it is necessary to adopt an 
approach which accounts for the co-production of law and technology.40  According to 
Faulkner, ͚Whether we study the material (scientific and technological) basis of law or its 
translation into practice, we find that the malleabilities of the social and the of the 
material to be interdependent͛.41  In order to effectively trace the interdependency of 
these elements, this thesis posits that the systems theory approach developed by Thomas 
P Hughes offers the best theoretical underpinning for understanding the development of 
the ICT system and its subsequent impact on legal and policy developments. The 
reasoning for selecting this approach will now be discussed.  
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a. Thomas P Hughesげs approach to Systems Theory 
It is necessary to adopt a theoretical approach which can comprehend the complexity of 
an evolving technological system.42  This is due to the interrelated nature of technology 
and society; technology may at times be the cause of social change or conversely the 
result.  Consequently, technology is both shaped by and shapes society.  Any analysis of 
technology which fails to account for this will be limited in its practical applicability.  To 
address this, a third method of analysis is needed: systems theory.  The approach to 
systems theory used in this thesis finds its roots in the work of Thomas P. Hughes.  For 
Hughes the social and technical interact within the technological system.   
In order to adequately assess the growth of technological systems, Hughes argues for a 
systems approach which accepts that technology and society cannot be divorced from 
one another.  Instead, as Priscilla Regan notes, these systems are ͚complex 
interdependent systems of technical artefacts, cultural factors, social actors, and situated 
meanings͛.43  Artefacts in the system acquire their meaning from the spheres and 
ideologies in which they operate; the relation of one artefact to another provides a 
meaning in that particular context.44  However, meanings may change between artefacts 
as their relation to one another differs depending on a variety of factors, such as the time 
and place where the interactions occur.  As Manuel Castells summarises, ͚Appropriate 
technologies must be available at the time and place in which their need is directly felt by 
people and their organisations.  Thus there is synergistic interaction between 
technological discovery and social evolution͛.45  The development of the system cannot 
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occur in a vacuum and it is not possible for there to be a unitary interpretation of 
elements relevant to a given context.46  Further, there is a levelling of the system; neither 
the social nor the technology can be placed above the other.  All aspects of the system 
can be interconnected and their various elements can be examined without necessarily 
assigning greater value to one over the others.   
In establishing the system, all artefacts which function and interact with other elements 
are relevant.  Those artefacts are socially constructed because they are invented and 
developed by system builders and their associates.47  Hughes broadly classifies the 
various subsections of artefacts as physical, organisational, and legislative.  Each of these 
categories plays a role in the process of creating technology, preferring certain ends and 
incorporating different designs into the technology to reinforce or reconfigure particular 
values.  These artefacts can be either physical or nonphysical, and relate to the 
construction of the system by interacting with other artefacts, all of which contribute in 
some way to the common system goal.48  ͚Technological systems solve problems or fulfil 
goals using whatever means are available and appropriate; the problems have to do 
mostly with reordering the physical world in ways considered useful or desirable, at least 
by those designing or employing a technological system͛.49  The limits of the 
technological system are those which result from control exercised by artefactual and 
human operators.50   
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The construction of artefacts lends itself to the argument that social considerations are 
incorporated into the development of the technological system.51   Technologies are 
designed with certain users and uses in mind and will promote the values of those users; 
if a different group gains control over the technology, they can redefine its use and alter 
the values.  This can be clearly demonstrated by the ICT system which was designed to 
enable communications between users but has been co-opted as a law enforcement 
mechanism, favouring public over individual interests.  Law notes ͚that those who build 
artefacts do not concern themselves with artefacts alone but must consider the way in 
which the artefacts relate to social, economic, political, and scientific factors͛.52  All of 
those various factors and considerations are in themselves interrelated and potentially 
malleable as the system grows, incorporates goals, and solves different problems.   
However, despite the ability of systems theory to address the argument that technology is 
co-constructed with society, it is not without its critics.  Principal to these criticisms is 
the idea that the system presupposes a distinction between the system itself and its 
environment.  In systems theory, the world outside of technological systems that shapes 
them, or is shaped by them, is the environment.  The environment is not part of the 
system because it is not under the control of the system.  Actor Network Theory (ANT) 
aims to address these issues within systems theory.  In ANT, the actor network is 
composed of heterogeneous elements that are linked but not necessarily in a stable and 
well defined fashion, allowing the networks to redefine and transform their elements.  
Scholars such as Michel Callon and John Law advocate for this approach, noting its 
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ability to apply not just to interactions at a given time but to any subsequent 
developments as well.53  ANT also removes the reliance on the social focus of the 
elements driving technological change.  Law states that, ͚Other factors ʹ natural, 
economic, or technical ʹ may be more obdurate than the social and may resist the best 
efforts of the system builder to reshape them.  Other factors may, therefore, explain better 
the shape of artefacts in question and, indeed, the social structure that results͛.54  ANT 
therefore argues that social elements should not be distinguished from those that are 
natural or technological in the analysis.  What is important is not necessarily the role one 
element plays above others, but the patterns and conflicts that are revealed between 
different types of elements, some social and some otherwise.   
Actor network theory is distinct but not wholly different from the core of systems theory.  
Rather, it differs in the way it approaches conflict between elements.  Whilst the 
environment is treated as outside the system, MacKenzie argues that Hughes͛ approach 
͚sensitises us to the fluidity of the boundary between technological systems and their 
environments, particularly the way in which it raises the question of the extent to which 
systems builders seek to mould their environments to facilitate the growth of their 
system͛.55  The role of the actors in producing the system is significant as they dictate the 
constraints of organisational, political, and economic matters.  The technology is a 
product of this context, and a contributing factor to the development of these matters.56   
As a result, for the purposes of this thesis, the systems theory approach to dealing with 
the development of technological systems is better suited to an analysis of the ICT found 
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in the investigatory powers instruments, particularly in light of the focus on their impact 
on privacy.  An account of the impact on privacy which looks purely at the social 
implications of the technology would fail to take into account the significant changes in 
the data collected as a result of technological developments.  These include developments 
which have increased the scale and scope of data, diminished traditional boundaries, and 
removed temporal limitations.  Utilising a technological determinist approach would 
similarly be insufficient.  Such an approach relies too much on the role of the technology 
at the expense of the social factors which have contributed to its development.  
Therefore, in order to effectively assess the impact on privacy the analysis must be 
twofold.  First, the social must be considered as the conceptualisation of privacy in this 
thesis is rooted in social norms and values.  Second, the changes wrought by the 
development of the technology and their impact must be assessed.  As Kaplan finds,  
By weaving together the technical and the social, we get a more complete picture 
of human societies and technologies as well as the ways we are both independent of 
and dependent upon our machines.  Creating new interpretations of these 
relationships helps reveal the relativity and necessity behind our technological 
choice and thus opens up prospects for better, more informed decisions about our 
current and future technologies.57   
Hughes͛s approach to systems theory, which takes into account both these factors without 
preferring one over the other, is therefore the chosen method for the analysis of the 
information communications technology herein.   
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III. Applying Hughesげs approach to information communications technology 
While the preceding analysis examined the overarching principles which guide systems 
theory, this section will address the specific issues that need to be considered when 
applying the framework to the analysis of an ICT system.  Key to this framework is the 
development of the system itself.  Whilst the technological determinist approach argues 
for the linear progression of technological development, a systems theory approach 
recognises that systems do not necessarily evolve in this manner.  There are various 
phases which overlap and backtrack as the system develops, including invention, 
development, innovation, transfer, growth, competition, and consolidation.58  Systems 
are driven by various inventions, which can be classed as radical, requiring the 
establishment of a new system; or conservative, such as changes and developments to an 
existing system that are necessary to enable the system to improve and expand.59   
As the system develops, the incorporation of the social becomes more readily apparent, 
as economic, political, and social characteristics are embodied in the system to enable it 
to function in the world.60  As systems begin to embody these relevant characteristics, 
they become more entrenched and adaptations become more incremental.  It is therefore 
difficult to have a dramatic overhaul or complete abolition of a system along the lines of 
what may occur through ͚radical inventions͛; it is more likely that invention in the system 
will be conservative.  Jeremy Bentham described this tendency to conform to entrenched 
systems in the legislative context: ͚when new laws are made in opposition to a principle 
established by old ones, the stronger that principle is, and the more odious will the 
inconsistency appear.  A contradiction of sentiment results from it, and disappointed 
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expectations accuse the legislator of tyranny͛.61  This respect for custom and principle 
can lead to a sense of security.   
Yet as technology continues to develop, the question remains of how to address those 
components, entrenched as they may be, when they fall behind or out of phase with other 
elements in the system.  Social customs and principles are insufficient to allow these 
elements to remain in the system, and systems must be able to account for different 
environments and developments or risk losing all value.   
Hughes classifies components that are out of sync with the system as reverse salients.  
Development of the system is achieved through identifying these reverse salients and 
attempting to correct them.  Much like in the social constructivist theory, different groups 
may identify different reverse salients as they prioritise goals and identify elements as 
barriers to progress.  However, it cannot be said that even members within the same 
group will agree on the barriers to achieving their goals or the best means to accomplish 
them.62  In the case of the ICT system used for investigatory powers purposes, the reverse 
salients will differ depending on whether the artefact, communications data, is examined 
from the legislative perspective which incorporates law enforcement͛s views, or from the 
organisational viewpoint which examines the problems from the perspective of 
communications service providers.   
Similarly, the reverse salients do not have to be physical artefacts in themselves; they 
may be part of the organisational or legislative elements.  For example, when there is a 
need to pass new investigatory powers legislation, the legislative process could be 
interpreted as a reverse salient which needs to be addressed.  In doing so, the different 
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interpretations of political parties, NGOs, and technology companies must be considered 
before passing law which requires changes to the technologies.  Conversely, the reverse 
salients could be technological advances that render elements of the current legislation 
ineffective or obsolete. The key aspect is that there is an element of a system which has 
fallen out of phase with the others.  The existence of reverse salients in the technological 
system at issue herein is readily apparent.  The growth of large ICT systems has altered 
information gathering, analysis, and distribution, as well as the types of information, 
actors, and any conditions or constraints on information flows.63  Such changes directly 
impact upon traditional conceptions of privacy.  The components which currently exist at 
the legislative and organisational level are ill suited to deal with these developments.  
Solutions to these reverse salients are necessary to ensure the continuing effectiveness of 
the system.   
As the systems overcome their reverse salients, allowing them to grow and develop, they 
acquire what Hughes calls ͚technological momentum͛.  The systems ͚have a mass of 
technical and organisational components; they possess direction or goals; and they 
display a rate of growth suggesting velocity͛.64  Constant similarly recognises this idea of 
technological momentum, arguing that it is the culture of technology that enables this 
momentum; the development of technology along previously defined trajectories 
contributes to this concept.65  People, whether they are in the form of individuals, 
governments, corporations, etc., can direct the development of new technologies, but as 
these systems gain momentum, they move beyond the control of these entities.  It 
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requires a powerful external force to alter technologies once they possess this 
momentum.66   
Altering technologies becomes increasingly more difficult once the system has embodied 
various political, economic, social, and value components.  As Koops states: ͚Because 
technology is often irreversible ʹ once it is developed and applied in society, it is hard to 
fundamentally remove it from society in those applications ʹ the process of developing 
technology is a key focus when normativity is at stake͛.67  Once the artefacts or elements 
of a system become entrenched, they embody the characteristics and norms present at 
their inception, rather than changing their characteristics.68  Other barriers to change, 
once the system has gained technological momentum, exist as well.  Technology is 
highly path dependant and it becomes expensive to undo or alter entrenched 
characteristics.69  Legislative delays contribute to the technological momentum and the 
longer the system is left to develop unchecked, the more difficult it becomes to change 
the path of the technology.70 
It is argued that the ICT system has acquired substantial momentum along these lines.  
The system encompasses a variety of modes of communications, technical components, 
legislative aims, and organisational structures, all of which embody the various political, 
economic, social, and value components.  The communications data at issue in this 
thesis, and the norms and characteristics ascribed to it still relate to the socially 
constructed character of data that existed prior to technological developments which 
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fundamentally altered information norms.  In the following Chapters, these norms will be 
determined with regard to the specific retention, access, and analysis processes to which 
they relate.  An analysis of ICT utilising systems theory is necessary to determine how to 
correct for technological momentum in amending the current regime governing 
communications data in order to ensure that privacy, as conceptualised in Chapter 1, can 
be protected when information is collected and processed by law enforcement. 
IV. The elements of the information communications technology system 
The following provides a brief synopsis of the elements of the ICT system.  Broadly 
speaking, the technological system is that which enables communications between 
entities, who are themselves both components and constructors of the system.  The 
relationship between the constituent parts of the system are at times technical, at times 
social, and at times both.  The interconnections between the relevant elements may not be 
readily apparent but it is hoped that through the elaboration of the elements of the 
system, it will be possible to demonstrate the links, reverse salients, and potential future 
developments.  The following defines the technological system through reference to the 
legislative mechanisms, organisational elements, and artefacts retained, accessed, and 
analysed in the system itself.   
a. Legislative Mechanisms 
Legislative artefacts such as Acts of Parliament and statutory instruments are an integral 
part of the technological system.  These components are creations of social groups, 
including politicians and law enforcement, and can embody the motivations and 
principles of the entities for whom those legislative proposals are drafted.  Principally, 
the ICT system examined relates to the investigatory powers instruments utilised to 
collect, retain, provide access to, and analyse communications data by law enforcement 
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agencies in discharging their duties.  The legislative developments in this area are 
motivated both by the increasing capabilities of technology and by the demands of law 
enforcement to create new and adapt existing technologies to further criminal justice 
aims.  The use of technology is ubiquitous in contemporary criminal justice, both in its 
use by law enforcement and in motivating the development of further technologies.71  It 
would therefore be impossible to adequately address the development of the system 
without reference to legislative elements and the groups responsible for creating them.   
One particular area wherein the relationship between technology and law enforcement 
has been altered as a result of legislation is in the regulation of information across 
traditional jurisdictional bounds.  Technological developments have enabled the free flow 
of information across the globe and frustrated law enforcement attempts to access 
relevant data as it is no longer necessarily held in in the domestic jurisdiction.  Further, 
distinctions between national and international, military and police, intelligence 
gathering, and police investigations have been blurred and/or merged.  As Marx notes, 
͚with increased internationalisation and globalisation of crime, terror, and social control, 
the meaning of national borders and foreign and domestic actions is less clear͛.72  The 
lack of traditional jurisdictional distinctions results in legislation which increases 
requirements on states to place restrictions on ICT providers working in their 
jurisdictions to ensure domestic rules are embodied within the architecture of the 
technology.73  One such rule prevalent in the use of ICT by law enforcement under the 
investigatory powers instruments is to impose positive obligations on the intermediaries 
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who facilitate communications to retain and process this information, rather than having 
law enforcement undertake these processes themselves.  These intermediaries are able to 
capture information that passes through their systems, even if that information originates 
or has an end destination outside of the jurisdiction.   This allows law enforcement to 
minimise the resources they themselves have to dedicate to collecting and analysing this 
material and assists them in dealing with potential offenders who are dispersed across 
traditional boundaries.74 
In order to facilitate these processes and provide legal backing for their implementation 
and use, legislation works to dictate the development of technology. Specific examples of 
the legislative development are examined in the following chapters.  However, for now it 
is sufficient to note that one of the primary motivating factors behind these legislative 
developments is that the information is available consistently and efficiently to those 
relevant law enforcement agencies.75   
Practical examples from other jurisdictions demonstrate the legislative application of 
regulations to technologies utilised for law enforcement purposes and can be a useful 
comparator for the UK system. In the United States, a shift in the infrastructure of 
telephone networks meant that wiretapping would become more difficult.  As a result, in 
1994, Congress passed the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act 
(CALEA) to cope with the transition of telephone technology from analogue to digital 
networks.  When the networks changed, law enforcement lost the ability to tap phones.76  
The Government responded by passing legislation which required private companies to 
facilitate law enforcement͛s ability to conduct electronic surveillance.77  Lawrence Lessig 
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notes that in this case, ͚The industry created one network architecture.  That architecture 
didn͛t adequately serve the interests of government.  The response of the government was 
to regulate the design of the network so it better served the government͛s ends͛.78  This 
requirement did not require a wholesale change in the structure of the IT system, rather, 
companies were placed under a legislative obligation to comply with requests.79 
If the data must be modified or retained in specific circumstances based on the laws of 
the country, then that directly impacts on the technological processes which concern that 
data.  This pattern can be transposed to the situation in the UK where the technologies 
through which communications services are provided are required to incorporate 
elements which serve the interests of State security and law enforcement.  Such 
requirements can similarly be witnessed when the legislature amends or authorises 
practices in the wake of judicial rulings.80  The impact of the legislative components of 
the system on the development of the technology and the embedding or alteration of 
social norms is demonstrated through the analysis in Chapters 3 to 5.  In order to 
facilitate this analysis, it is necessary to examine legislative restrictions placed on CSPs 
at the organisational level; on the artefacts of the data retention systems, access systems, 
and analysis provisions; and at the legislative level on the public authorities accessing 
and analysing the data.   
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b. Organisational Elements 
Technological systems similarly possess an organisational element which must be 
incorporated into any analysis of the system.  Constant succinctly sets out the key roles 
of the organisation in the system, ͚Purchase or use of almost any modern technology is 
mediated by the complex organisations that are required to integrate the knowledge and 
resources necessary to produce and distribute that artefact or service͛.81  Organisations 
are system creators, incorporating prescribed elements into the system.  These elements 
may reflect legislative aims; technical limitations of the artefacts; and incorporate distinct 
social, economic, and political values.  As such, organisational factors fundamentally 
shape the system.  It is similarly important to note that organisations are themselves 
shaped.  An organisation may have a hierarchy which reinforces a particular social 
structure, possesses functionally differentiated departments which have different aims, 
and so on.82  All of these organisational variables will have an impact on the 
development and functioning of the system.  The primary organisational element 
discussed in the context of the ICT system and the investigatory powers instruments is 
that of communications service providers (CSPs).  These are private commercial bodies 
which are required to fulfil law enforcement and national security aims concerning 
retention, access, and analysis, as established by the legislative mechanisms.   
CSPs embody several forms with the primary objective of enabling communications 
between at least two parties.  To that end, entities such as phone companies and internet 
providers are all communications providers.  In Britain these companies are private 
entities and have been since the establishment of telephone services in this jurisdiction 
                                                          
81
 Constant n(65) 225. 
82
 Constant n(65) 226.   
 87 
 
thereby providing them with long established networks and significant structural 
power.83  The ICT system at issue in this thesis is focused on the communications 
provided by phone and internet companies, with particular emphasis on mobile telephony 
and internet communications.  Mobile telephony and the internet have become the 
dominant modes of communication and therefore their role in the system is dramatically 
increasing.  The use of traditional post and land line telephones has significantly 
decreased.84   
It is necessary to establish what fall under the definition of communications service 
providers of internet and mobile communications to determine the significance of these 
organisational structures for the system.  In terms of mobile communications, traditional 
mobile phone service providers are CSPs for the purposes of this analysis.  In the UK, 
there are four dominant providers which account for 85% of mobile communications.85  
These providers facilitate communications by providing both phone and text services, as 
well as providing data packages which allow individuals to communicate using the 
internet.  As of 2016, 71% of adults in the UK owned a smartphone which enabled these 
communications.86  In fact, smartphones have overtaken laptops and home computers as 
the dominant computing device.  Similarly, providers of internet broadband fall under the 
category of CSPs.  In the UK, 86% of homes have internet access.87  Much like mobile 
phone service providers, there are four broadband providers which dominate the UK 
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market, accounting for 87% of all broadband services provided in the UK.88  As a result, 
it is difficult to communicate via mobile telephony or the internet without engaging with 
one of these services.   
The definition of CSPs does not only apply to these traditional communications entities 
however.  Non-traditional service providers may similarly be considered CSPs.  Social 
media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and Snapchat provide communications services 
over the top (OTT) of the traditional mobile and broadband services.  Indeed, these 
modes of communication are becoming increasingly prevalent.  In 2016, UK adults spent 
nearly half of their time on social media communicating using these over the top 
communications services.89  Messaging apps are frequently seen as substitutes in 
themselves for traditional telecoms services and are fast overtaking email and text as the 
primary modes of communication.90  The shifts in types of communications and their 
overall saturation in society will have a significant impact on the social norms assigned 
to this type of information.  Developments in the system which create new types of 
information, assign new roles to actors, or change the way the information is shared will 
be evidenced in the following chapters.  The subsequent analysis of the role of the 
organisational element of the system will demonstrate areas for prescriptive changes in 
order to better ensure privacy where communications data is collected and processed.  
Any assessment of the organisational role of CSPs must look at how they dictate the 
development of the system and determine what their responsibilities should be to ensure 
adequate protections of fundamental rights.   
                                                          
88
 OFCOM n(84) 151.  These are respectively BT with 32%, Sky at 23%, Virgin at 19%, and TalkTalk at 
13%.  
89
 OFCOM n(84) 185. 
90
 OFCOM n(84) 182. 
 89 
 
The position of the organisation is privileged.  Organisations both facilitate 
communications and provide the structure through which the communications data can 
be caught by the established legislative mechanisms.  The inability to communicate 
without potentially engaging at least one of these CSPs is significant.  Even if it is 
possible to avoid communicating with one, the scope of the CSPs is so exhaustive that it 
is likely the communication will be caught by another.  Arguably, this is the principal 
reason that the CSPs have been co-opted into the law enforcement processes.  These 
entities offer a logical target for the criminal justice process; they can act as a point of 
control to collect and filter information and process it in a manner most useful to law 
enforcement aims.91  As the market becomes increasingly dominated by a smaller 
number of large companies, the ability to employ legislative mechanisms to regulate it 
increases.92  However, this ability can be frustrated by jurisdictional issues as the 
increasingly globalised nature of CSPs means that providers of the OTT services (i.e. 
Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, etc.) are based overseas making it difficult for the UK 
enforcement agencies to obtain the data.93  The organisational element of the system 
thereby must interact with the legislative to guarantee the required access and control.     
c. Technical Artefacts 
Here the technical refers to artefacts in the system (both with physical and non-physical 
forms) that function as components and interact with the other elements to satisfy the 
common system goal.  These artefacts ͚embed key human rights and relevant decision-
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making capacities͛.94  For the application of investigatory powers within the ICT system, 
the principal artefact of analysis is classed as communications data generated by mobile 
telephony and internet communications.  This data interacts with other artefacts such as 
the retention systems, analysis technologies, and access procedures.  The aim here is to 
provide an overview of the artefacts employed in the investigatory powers instruments 
which are embodied in the ICT system for retaining, providing access to, and analysing 
communications data.  
Communications data is the principal constituent artefact of the system and provides the 
information which then interacts with other system elements.  Organisational structures 
and legislative mechanisms concern themselves with this data and its relation to the other 
components of the system.  Communications data has been a constitutive element of 
information communications technology throughout the development of the system, 
enabling law enforcement agencies to discover the who, where, when and how of 
communications.  Traditional methods such as postal communications classed this 
information as envelope data, i.e. the information written on the outside of an envelope 
which concerned who sent and received the communication and the relevant addresses of 
the parties.  Similarly, in the context of telephone communications, police utilised 
techniques such as metering to obtain records of numbers dialled from a phone, without 
the consent of the subscriber.95  The data generated through these traditional 
communication methods was facilitated by an organisational structure which required the 
retention of this information for private purposes.  David Anderson noted this in his 
analysis on communications data: ͚historically, there has been a high availability of the 








communications data that investigators required.  Typically the subscriber to a telephone 
number and the call log that went with it were the information needed; these were also 
the basis for the service provider to charge their customer͛.96  The needs of the 
organisation and law enforcement complemented one another and therefore the ICT 
system was able to incorporate these considerations in the treatment of communications 
data.   
However, fundamental requirements set out in legislation, organisational changes, social 
changes, and technological advances to the structure mean the traditional processes 
employed are no longer fit for purpose.  The system has been transformed by the growth 
in service providers, changes in traditional modes of communication, fragmentation of 
services, changing business models, and jurisdictional issues.  This has been coupled 
with changes in the nature of the communications data itself as a result of the inclusion of 
data generated by internet and mobile phone communications.  Communications data is 
now broadly classed into three areas: traffic data, location data, and subscriber 
information.  Many of these categories overlap with the traditional categories of data 
captured, however, due to the scale and scope of the ICT system, the implications of this 
data are far greater.   
Traffic data is that which can be used to identify the person, device, location, or address 
from which a communication is transmitted.97  It is also used to identify the technical 
system which enabled the transmission of the communications.98  This means that traffic 
data incorporates not just information on individual users, but information on the 
components of the system more generally.  Arguably, this element was present in the 
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traditional communications data provisions as phone companies were able to note the 
user of the phone, the address of the account, and what network they used to facilitate the 
communications.  However, the data in the current ICT system goes farther than this 
analysis by also providing for the capture of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.  Yet IP 
address capture does not enable the same goals of identifying users and devices as 
traditional traffic data did.  The technology which enables the capture of IP addresses 
does not necessarily provide an accurate and consistent location as companies assign the 
same IP address to multiple users.99  Nor is the person who holds an internet account 
necessarily the one using a particular device in a particular location.  This is particularly 
apparent in the case of publicly available Wi-Fi networks wherein many users will use 
the same account, making it difficult for law enforcement to utilise this information to 
achieve their aims.  When IP addresses are able to be tied to an end user, the effect on the 
user is much more substantial than when that information was gathered in the rather 
circumscribed manner through traditional telephony and postal means.  Daniel Solove 
highlights the issue: ͚although who you call on the phone can be quite revealing, how you 
browse the Web exposes even more of your private life, for it reflects what you͛re 
thinking and reading͛.100  The legislation requires that the technology develop to permit 
the capture of this data.  However, the norms of the ICT system must develop as well to 
incorporate these concerns rather than applying established norms to this new and 
potentially more revealing category of data.   
Location data is another element of communications data that forms a crucial component 
of the ICT system.  Broadly speaking, this data concerns the movement of individuals 
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which is elicited from mobile and connected devices.  The traditional mechanisms for 
gathering such data would have been through targeted active surveillance by law 
enforcement or through the use of devices such as GPS trackers attached to vehicles.  
These powers were limited by practical concerns; it was not possible to follow a person 
everywhere.  Location data has altered this, creating a new source of data through the 
functions of mobile phones which accompany the individual the majority of the time.  
Location data is further enhanced by individuals͛ use of over the top services such as 
Twitter and Facebook which can reveal the user͛s location.101   
Service use and subscriber information represent the third category of communications 
data.  Service use information relates to the frequency and time a person used a service 
and which service they used.  This information parallels that found in an itemised phone 
bill and doesn͛t depart dramatically from traditional data types in that regard.  Where the 
difference lies is in the business models at the organisational level which no longer 
require this type of information.  Subscriber information relates to all the other 
information that the customer provides, such as their address, telephone number, email 
address, etc. which is necessary in order for them to receive the service.  
These technological developments concerning communications data possess implications 
for the traditional mechanisms employed and therefore call into question the 
effectiveness of the current system infrastructure. The development of the capabilities 
concerning communications data, through increased collection, retention, access, and 
analysis capabilities can therefore be classed as a reverse salients of the system, as the 
data has fallen out of sync with the original functions of the system.  Data plays an 
increasing role in society.  The systems which concern this data do not merely collect 
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information but create comprehensive records whereby associations can be tracked, 
personal interests identified, and personality characteristics revealed.102  The growth and 
development of the system is enabled by the mobility of information.  To an extent, this 
is an inevitable consequence of the development of the system.  Cybersecurity expert 
Bruce Schneier refers to the ͚smog of data͛ as a natural by-product of technology, ͚data is 
the exhaust of the information age͛.103  The creation of data is a consequence of the 
technologies and the needs of CSPs and Governments to be able to interact with those 
technologies.104  The organisational and technological advances have created a resource 
for the State to utilise.  A problem therefore presents when the other aspects of the 
system (particularly those in the legislative subsection) fail to keep pace with the 
changing nature of the data.  This creates the need to change the system.   
Communications data interacts with other artefacts in the system through a variety of 
mechanisms.  The first of these interactions is classed as the collection and retention 
processes which are necessitated by legislative demands and installed and managed 
through the organisational entities.  The objective of these systems is to provide ͚a 
general technique for representing data and processes in a manner that can be stored, 
retrieved, and reproduced͛.105  Retention therefore collects and collates the data to 
facilitate the abilities of the police, following access procedures, to trace acts and events.  
Brighenti notes that the need to introduce traceability for the data reflects a variety of 
institutional aims and enables the possibility of retrospective investigations.106   
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Retrospective investigations are a crucial element for law enforcement and one of the 
principal aims of these mechanisms.  Under previous instruments, organisations could 
only retroactively retain data for limited business purposes; this data was not necessarily 
the data most useful for law enforcement, nor was the retention standardised across the 
industry.107  This meant that collection of communications data could only begin once a 
crime was committed and a suspect identified.  It therefore couldn͛t be used to provide 
evidence of locations at the time of the crime which could be used to confirm or disprove 
alibis or to establish connections between suspects at the time of or preceding the 
offence.  The broad collection and retention has thereby enabled the end of the 
ephemeral.  Technology enables the recording and dissemination of activities, regardless 
of where it occurs in physical space.108  As Gary Marx observed, ͚With modern 
technologies, elements of the past can be preserved and offered up for visual and auditory 
consumption͛109 thereby enabling the investigative powers of law enforcement.   
Once the information is collected and retained, the data can interact with other 
components of the system through the analysis procedures applied by law enforcement to 
the data.  The changes in the nature of the data and inclusion of collection and retention 
processes in the system mean that this data can be searched easily, collated, cross-
referenced, and correlated with other information.110  This increases the value of the data 
and its potential to facilitate legislative aims.  Helen Nissenbaum remarked on the 
significance of this, ͚information begets information: as data is structured and analysed it 
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yields implications, consequences, and predictions͛.111  Much like it enables retrospective 
investigations, the technology similarly promotes proactive policing through the 
meanings it can derive from this information.  As Judith Rauhofer notes the development 
of proactive policing is accompanied by trends towards the use of more technical 
surveillance devices by law enforcement agencies.112  
Therefore the ability to process and analyse communications data is valuable to the 
legislative mechanisms of the system.  The question is to what extent is that aim 
sufficient to overrule other considerations concerning limitations on the processing and 
use of communications data.  In his piece on ͚Dataveillance͛ Roger Clarke identifies 
issues with processing data which has been collected and retained in this aggregated 
manner and discusses the importance of knowing the context of the data in the 
analysis.113  Interpreting and analysing the data removes it from its original context 
wherein it is simply the by-product of using a service.  It is used to construct meanings 
about the data, which go beyond what the data was originally meant for thereby 
introducing a reverse salient into the ICT system.  Where individuals͛ data is increasingly 
subjected to inclusion and processing through the system, the impact on individuals͛ 
rights affected must also be accounted for; too often, these rights do not keep pace with 
the development of the technology.114 
Technical artefacts are not the only component of the system that should be considered 
here.  Individuals can also be classed as components necessary for the system to function.  
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For example, a phone which enables communications does not only require the device 
and the communication; humans are needed as well.  There can be no communications, 
and therefore no communications data, without individuals present to transmit and 
receive them.  As Haggerty and Ericson note these individuals are more socially and 
spatially mobile and entangled with a wider range of institutions, and, notably for the 
purposes of this thesis, CSPs.115  Such entanglements are inescapable in the modern 
world and the sole choice of individuals is with the technical artefacts they chose to 
interact with.  However, individuals may also be classed as systems creators as they 
necessarily develop the technical elements of the system, create and develop legislative 
and organisational structures, and become the operators of the various entities.  These 
individuals incorporate normative elements into the artefacts in the system.116  It is 
therefore impossible to examine the creation of a technological system without 
discussing the norms and social structures that are incorporated into the system and 
informed by the normative elements of the system components.  It is to these elements 
that the discussion now turns.   
V. The impact of the information communications technology system on the 
social 
Legislative, organisational, and technical components are sufficient to create one 
technological system, but these factors have implications beyond their constructed 
elements; consideration must be given to the role of the social in the creation of the 
system.  The effect of this technological system can be found in the surveillance 
mechanisms it embodies, including the watching, monitoring, recording, and processing 
of information.  The development of the ICT system has affected the traditional 
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processes utilised by law enforcement for investigations and resulted in a shift in 
informational norms concerning privacy.  It is necessary to assess these norms against the 
development of the system itself as notions of acceptability co-evolve over time with 
social, cultural, and institutional settings.117  To begin to assess the impact, it is therefore 
necessary to examine the traditional norms which applied to police monitoring and 
analysis of personal information.  It is only in this context that the role of the system 
itself can be detected.   
Investigatory powers concerning communications data are associated with several 
elements of the criminal justice process.  Powers to access information operate in the 
context of ex post facto criminal investigations to establish what was done when and by 
whom.  The investigatory powers are also related to surveillance in the indiscriminate 
monitoring and tracking of individuals enabling elements of ex ante investigation.  Bruce 
Schneier succinctly describes surveillance under the old system.   
When surveillance was manual and expensive, it could only be justified in extreme 
cases.  The warrant process limited police surveillance, and resource constraints 
and the risk of discovery limited national intelligence surveillance.  Specific 
individuals were targeted for surveillance, and maximum information was collected 
on them.  There were also strict minimisation rules about not collecting information 
on other people.118   
Traditional mechanisms for surveillance therefore were limited in their capabilities and 
their scope; individuals were targeted and limitations enforced.   
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The investigatory powers regime governing communications data has the opposite effect.  
The distinction is described by Ben Bowling et al who perceive that ͚Contemporary 
surveillance is characterised by its lack of particularity in that it is an intelligence-
gathering tool used before the relevant law enforcement agency has any suspicion that a 
particular individual has been involved in a crime͛.119  Bowling goes on to discuss the 
͚mission creep͛ of technologies which occurs when techniques used for surveillance of 
individual suspects are developed into more general surveillance frameworks.  This 
͚mission creep͛ can be influenced by a variety of factors which are external to the 
technology, including crises and unexpected threats to the security of the State.  Such 
factors lead to the blurring of traditional distinctions between crime and terrorism and 
whose remit investigations in those areas should fall under.  Legislative actions tend to 
react decisively and unilaterally when such events occur, resulting in powers that do not 
comport to traditional limitations and oversight.120  As Cass Sunstein argues, ͚in a 
democracy, officials, including lawmakers, are particularly quick to respond to public 
alarm͛.121 This leads to the widening of surveillance powers and the approval of more 
invasive technologies for monitoring and tracking.   
In many instances, monitoring and tracking is not the direct aim but rather an inadvertent 
consequence of some other goal for which the system was designed.  The facilitation of 
communications allows for the consequences of surveillance.  For example, ͚Whereas 
monitoring in an unstructured three-dimensional physical space requires significant 
engineering intervention͙monitoring online activities requires relatively minor 
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adaptations of existing functional features͛.122  Often, the monitoring capabilities are 
secondary uses of the data which was originally captured for advertising, profiling, or 
other business purposes.  This is particularly true as private companies who have a vested 
interest in personal information and its processing are increasingly co-opted into the 
surveillance process.123  
The extension of surveillance activities under the investigatory powers instruments is 
enabled by the nature of the components described in the preceding section.  The 
computerisation of data, together with the processing systems for collection, retention, 
and analysis, allow for more data to be captured and applied in an efficient manner.  ͚This 
efficiency is made possible by the technology which permits searches that before would 
have been far too burdensome and invasive͛.124  This is coupled with a greater reliance on 
private parties in collecting and managing the information which thereby reduces the 
burden on the police.  All of this comes without any additional burden being placed on 
the individual. 
The expansion of surveillance is exacerbated by the scope of the technology which is 
demonstrated by the inability to communicate without the technologies.  It is difficult for 
anyone living within ordinary society to avoid the monitoring.125  For CSPs, the 
architecture and business models, scale and reach of operations, and number of users, 
result in a market which is dominated by a few large organisations which account for the 
majority of communications in the UK.126  There is a lack of choice for the individual but 
to accept the collection, retention, and later processing of their data.  Often, individuals 
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do not understand how information is processed and used and to what extent it can be 
used to make decisions concerning them.127  Sociologist Valarie Steeves notes that, ͚Even 
when people do understand the commercial models of [web]sites and accept the terms of 
use, they do so because it is the only way they can access the socio-technical spaces that 
they increasingly rely on for social connectedness.128  The modes of communication 
facilitated by the organisational components of the ICT system are of fundamental 
importance to society and therefore there exists little opportunity to evade the monitoring 
mandated by the system.  As these large organisational structures continue to develop, 
there is the potential for them to crowd out and eliminate previous social structures which 
limited monitoring.  This is a trend identified by Langdon Winner: ͚It is not merely that 
useful devices and techniques of earlier periods have been rendered extinct, but also that 
patterns of social existence and individual experience that employed these tools have 
vanished as living realities͛.129     
The acceptance by the individual of technologies which increase monitoring reinforces 
the value of these systems, particularly as the role of the individual often serves to 
reinforce or even shape the meaning assigned to the system.  As Tarleton Gillespie 
observes, ͚Once technologies are offered to the public ͙ users make them their own, 
embedding them in their routines, imbuing them with additional meanings that the 
technology provider could not have anticipated͛.130  The role of both the individual and 
the organisation in incorporating the technology into society reinforces Hughes͛s 
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argument for technological momentum, as the system develops and expands beyond the 
control of any of its singular components.  This momentum is reinforced by the 
development of social systems and practices that then come to rely on the data in the 
system and further motivate its development.131 
The expansive scope of the system and its technological momentum enables social 
control.  The focus on social control can be contrasted with traditional surveillance 
theories based on the writings of Jeremy Bentham and Michel Foucault which focus on 
disciplinary societies and the panopticon.  The effect of the panopticon was, according to 
Foucault, ͚to induce ͙a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the 
automatic functioning of power͛.132  This would result in changes in behaviour which 
conformed to broader social objectives.  However, computers have fundamentally altered 
the nature of surveillance, arguably moving away from the traditional panoptic 
conception of social discipline.  ͚[T]he conceptualisation of surveillance has expanded 
from keeping watch over prisoners and other unfortunates to pervasive systems 
employing a wide range of technologies for manipulating social behaviour and, as a 
consequence, impacting social values͛.133  Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari argue that 
this indicates a shift from societies of discipline to societies of control.134  In the 
disciplinary societies of the panopticon, spaces were static and visibility unidirectional.135  
Individuals passed from distinct enclosures where they were observed to ensure explicit 
behavioural norms, set by those in power, were followed.136  Societies of control 
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acknowledge that people exist in several coexisting states; disparate arrays of people, 
technologies, and organisations interact across fields and traditional structures of 
visibility wherein the powerful observe the masses are increasingly being altered and 
levelled.137  
The shift to societies of control is a result of technological advances.  As Gary Marx 
observed: ͚Control is now better symbolised by manipulation than coercion, by computer 
chips than prison bars, and by removable and invisible filters than by handcuffs and 
straightjackets͛.138  The development of technologies introduced monitoring techniques to 
identify parties in areas that would previously have been unwatched.139  Disciplinary 
societies would not be able to fulfil this function unless the individuals passed within the 
bounds of their constrained system.  This control is similarly being shifted to the 
technical elements of the system through processes like automated filtering which assigns 
values to communications and flags elements for further investigation.140  Control 
through the system eliminates the human element, decreases costs, and removes 
discretionary elements which can be challenged.141  Technologies which promote this 
control are therefore increasingly incorporated into the system, and those that do not 
meet these aims are phased out.   
Similarly, the nature of the system now enables control across traditional spatial bounds 
impacting on social structures.  Didier Bigo argues that this removal of bounds is 
demonstrated by the ability of control and surveillance to occur through time and 
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distance, regardless of the traditional structures between the State and society.142  
Technologies create new methods for identifying and monitoring behaviour.  This is 
enabled by the capabilities of the systems due to their scope and social saturation to trace 
data subjects ͚through and between once-distinct social realms͛.143  Traditional 
boundaries, whether they are domestic or foreign, public or private, or national or 
international, no longer limit these powers.  ͚Data can now be captured, stored, 
processed, and accessed readily and economically, even when the facilities and their 
users are physically dispersed͛.144  This leads to a levelling of the powers of surveillance, 
as it can be undertaken and imposed by a wide variety of organisations and impact 
equally on individuals.   
These elements inform the argument that the traditional social structures of surveillance 
are converging to the point that there is a surveillant assemblage which demonstrates the 
various arrays of people, technologies, and organisations which have become 
connected.145  The principal foundation for the surveillant assemblage can be found in the 
works of sociologists Kevin Haggerty and Richard Ericson: ͚The assemblage operates by 
abstracting human bodies from their territorial settings and separating them into a series 
of discrete flows.  These flows are then reassembled into distinct ͚data doubles͛ which 
can be scrutinised and targeted for intervention͛.146  Much like the technological system, 
these assemblages are composed of multiple heterogeneous objects that come together 
and ͚work͛ as a functional entity.147  It is possible therefore to utilise the concept of the 
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surveillant assemblage to demonstrate the effects of the ICT system͛s components on the 
social structures which relate to surveillance practices.  The relevance of the surveillant 
assemblage is demonstrated by the nature of the system which provides for the 
multiplication of sites of surveillance, deterritorialisation, automation, and changes in 
visibilities.   
In the panopticon, the gaze of the watcher was unidirectional.  Now these sites of 
surveillance have increased, thereby rupturing the unidirectional nature of the gaze that 
existed in the panopticon.148  This is not to say that confined realms where there is a 
unidirectional gaze are no longer present in societies, but rather that this model is but one 
element in a larger field of concrete assemblages.   With the surveillant assemblage 
͚[s]urveillance becomes methodical, systematic, and automatic, rather than discontinuous, 
as was the case with the disciplinary technology͛149 associated with the panopticon.  This 
reflects the Deleuzian idea that in a society of control the individual inhabits several 
metastable states at the same time.150   
Similarly, this shift away from the disciplinary mechanism of the panopticon to a 
surveillant assemblage, is reflected in the evolution of a surveillant system which is 
deterritorialised.  In addition to the lack of traditional territorial boundaries, the 
digitialisation of surveillance has deconstructed the traditional notions of bounded space 
that existed within the panopticon.  As William Bogard notes, in the surveillant 
assemblage, ͚what differs from the panoptic assemblage is the mechanic architecture, 
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which is now engineered to manipulate data objects in digital networks rather than 
physical bodies in confined spaces͛.151   
Furthermore, technological growth has enabled the levelling of surveillance undermining 
and altering traditional hierarchies of visibility.  ͚Surveillance is not directed exclusively 
at the poor and dispossessed, but is omnipresent, with people from all segments of the 
social hierarchy coming under scrutiny͛.152  This includes those groups which were 
previously exempt from routine surveillance procedures.153  The technological system 
which enables the surveillant assemblage allows for the body to be seen outside the 
traditional form.  Indeed, ICT does not focus on the ͚individual͛.  Rather, the focus is on 
data through which relevant information can be derived.  Individuals are therefore broken 
down into discrete data packets and become ͚dividuals͛.  As Vincent Miller summarises,  
A ͚dividual͛ is not a discrete self, but something which is made up of aggregates of 
features of discrete selves.  Endlessly divided and subdivided, they are a series of 
features removed from an individual self, placed with aggregates and reconfigured 
according to various criteria of interest by whatever body has access to the data.154   
This is indicative of what Bogard calls a ͚shift to virtual forms of control͛ as observation 
now occurs through the decoding and recording of information.155  Such a system enables 
the derivation of meaning from data thereby removing the need for the whole individual; 
when an individual is targeted by the system for surveillance, it is because of these 
discrete ͚dividual͛ traits.   
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The elements which enable the convergence of social structures into a surveillant 
assemblage are clearly present in the ICT system which has been discussed in this 
chapter.  The intensification of the capabilities of these technologies results in a radical 
transformation of the traditional surveillance structures, shifting from a hierarchically 
situated, unidirectional panopticon, to a levelled system of interconnected nodes of 
surveillance composed of heterogeneous elements.  The proliferation of digitalisation and 
technology in field of law enforcement has fundamentally changed the role of the police.  
Such developments therefore require an examination of the impact of the system. 
VI. Conclusion  
The aim of assessing the impact of the development of the ICT system on the social is to 
clearly identify norms and values which are impacted by the technology.  The 
transformations of the socio-technical system as a result of technological developments 
often impose changes upon people and societies without a careful evaluation of the harms 
and benefits, changes in values, and necessity of the developments.156  This thesis argues 
that this has occurred in the development and adoption of the ICT system by the police 
for investigative purposes.  However, there has not been a concomitant development in 
privacy in line with the changes in values and norms occasioned by these technological 
developments.  The ICT system herein represents the context within which privacy will 
be assessed using the contextual integrity decision heuristic developed in the preceding 
chapter.  The norms and values identified here are now discussed in the context of the 
particular element of the system to which they relate: retention, access, and analysis.  
This discussion will allow for a careful evaluation of the ascribed context relative 
informational norms and resultant impact on privacy.
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CHAPTER 3: COMMUNICATIONS DATA RETENTION 
I. Introduction 
In order to assess how the use of communications data by law enforcement alters 
informational norms associated with ICT in a manner that results in a privacy violation, it 
is necessary to examine the processes within which this information is used.  This chapter 
is the first of three which examines those processes.  The focus here is on the collection 
and retention of communications data.  Since the attacks in 2001 there has been an 
increased focus on terrorism and threats to national security leading to legislative 
developments in the field of data retention.  These laws have become pervasive and 
expansive. Communications data retention in this regard has become an effective and 
accepted law enforcement tool in the United Kingdom.  This is in part due to the 
significance of communications data for investigations.  ͚Communications data has 
played a significant role in every Security Service counter-terrorism operation over the 
last decade and has been used as evidence in 95% of all serious organised crime cases 
handled by the Crown Prosecution Service͛.1  Its retention enables law enforcement to 
have access to a large quantity of information which it can use to further its 
investigations making it useful for the prevention, detection, and prosecution of crime.2  
However, this does not mean that data retention represents a legitimate limitation on 
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privacy, particularly when its expansive scale and indiscriminate scope are considered.3  
Criticisms of these powers have been accompanied by judicial rulings which refute the 
legitimacy, necessity, and proportionality of this law enforcement mechanism and result 
in changes to the legislation.   
Data retention is a core function of the ICT system at issue in this thesis.  This chapter 
will be comprised of three parts.  Part I will proceed by setting out the elements which 
enable data retention.  Part II will then trace the evolution of data retention in legislation, 
paying particular attention to the technological advances and social changes which 
contributed to this evolution.  Finally, in Part III, using the contextual integrity decision 
heuristic set out in Chapter 1, discussion will then turn to whether the changes 
demonstrated through the development of this component have resulted in a breach of 
privacy.  This is exhibited through an analysis of how the changes in actors, information 
types, and transmission principles have altered the end values of retention.  This analysis 
will substantiate the argument that data retention as provided for in the investigatory 
powers instruments breaches contextual integrity and represents a prima facie privacy 
violation.  
II. Elements of the system which enable data retention 
Before proceeding with further discussion as to its significance, it is instructive to briefly 
define what is meant by data retention.  In this context, data retention is the collection 
and storage of information generated through telephone and internet usage.  The data 
therein can take several forms but may be classified into two primary categories: content 
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data4 and communications data.  The focus is on the latter.  Communications data can be 
separated into three categories: traffic data, location data, and data used to identify the 
subscriber.  In essence, communications data covers all aspects of data except the actual 
content of the communication; it is the principle artefact of the ICT system at issue in this 
thesis.  This data is generated through the use of services run by providers of public 
electronic communications networks and/or providers of public electronic 
communications services.    
Retention then, is the storing of all communications and transactions for a set period of 
time.  This time period is longer than the period for which the data would be kept purely 
for billing and engineering purposes.5  Retention in this regard is the addition of an 
obligation on service providers to retain data longer than they would for business 
purposes, in order to facilitate access by approved agencies.  Retention is required by any 
CSPs who are placed under notice by the Secretary of State when he has deemed it 
necessary and proportionate to satisfy a number of legitimate aims, including national 
security and preventing or detecting crime.6  It is irrelevant if the data is ever accessed; it 
is merely the possibility that it may be which means retention is required.  Further, it 
encompasses all service users.  It is a blanket measure which occurs irrespective of 
individual suspicion or judicial authorisation. This aspect can be contrasted with the 
concept of data preservation which typically occurs upon the issuance of a warrant or a 
subpoena requiring a service provider to keep particular data about a specified individual 
for a set period of time. 
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The data must be retained securely by the CSP by instituting several levels of security to 
ensure the protection of the data and prevent unauthorised access.7  This includes access 
by the company after the period during which the data would have been kept for business 
purposes.  CSPs may receive some compensation for the implementation of these 
processes, but in practice they absorb the majority of the costs on their own initiative.8  
The notices requiring retention must be kept under review to ensure that they remain 
necessary and are subject to a formal review every two years.9  After the review, a 
determination is made as to whether the retention remains necessary, and therefore the 
notice is continued; or whether there is need for a variation or revocation of the notice.  A 
variation may occur for several reasons.  For example, a CSP launching a new service or 
generating new categories of data which might be of interest to law enforcement will 
require an amended notice.10  Similarly changes in the needs of law enforcement to have 
access to additional data may require a variation.11  If retention is no longer required, the 
notice can be revoked and therefore the CSP will no longer be required to retain the data 
for any purposes or periods of time outside their ordinary business use.12 
The communications data retained in the aforementioned manner is the principal artefact 
of this component of the ICT system.  Organisational components in the form of CSPs 
and legislation interact with this data.  Both the organisational and legislative elements 
have specific aims in retaining the data which lend themselves to different objectives.  
The legislative aims focus on the value of the retained data for law enforcement and 
national security.  ͚Retained data enables the construction of trails of evidence leading up 
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to an offence and they are used to discern, or to corroborate other forms of evidence on 
the activities and links between suspects͛.13  CSPs on the other hand, retain data to 
facilitate business functions; any data that does not satisfy this objective is unnecessary.  
Both the legislative and organisational components play a significant role in the 
interactions with the artefact, and these interactions define how this element of the 
overall ICT system is created and utilised.  The subsequent section will analyse how 
these elements interact by tracing the development of data retention through legislation.   
III. The evolution of data retention 
Data retention has undergone several legislative iterations.  The social, political, and 
technological factors which motivate the development of the legislation play a significant 
role in its construction and scope.  Discourses around retention frame it as a mechanism 
to increase security without significant downsides; proponents use language to moderate 
the debate around data retention framing it in non-controversial terms which liken it to 
nothing more intrusive than a phone bill.14  However, the changing nature of the data and 
the retention system challenges this classification.  The evolution of the powers of data 
retention, and the myriad factors which contribute to their development, must be 
addressed in order to determine how to account for these factors in future legislation.  
The following traces the evolution of data retention powers in the UK with regard to 
these relevant factors in order to address how, in this context, privacy is violated by these 
practices.  
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a. Data Protection Act 1998 and Privacy and Electronic Communication 
Regulations 2003 
The earliest statutory provisions regarding data retention in the United Kingdom can be 
found in the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) and subsequently in the Privacy and 
Electronic Communication Regulations 2003 (PECR).15  It is important to note that this 
Act only covers retention for the private business purposes of companies; it does not 
provide for retention for law enforcement which is the primary focus of this chapter.  
However, it is instructive to see how retention is treated in private law and important to 
note that without the developments of subsequent legislation, this Act, and the 2003 
Regulations,16 would be the primary mechanisms through which the data would be 
retained.  These Acts thereby form the guiding principles which organisations use for 
private data retention. 
These instruments require that data is only retained for as long as necessary for business 
purposes, after which it must be destroyed or deleted.17  Data may only be used for 
legitimate commercial reasons; any other use will give rise to liability.18  These 
requirements, along with other core data protection principles,19 limit the utilisation of 
data.  Retention under the DPA and PECR is thus restricted to the legitimate uses of the 
company; it is not meant to be accessed by outside parties.  The instruments do however, 
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provide for exemptions to these limitations for national security purposes.20  Similarly, 
they provide for exemptions from the information principles of fair and lawful processing 
and the requirements to inform data subjects when their data has been processed when 
the data is accessed or processed for legitimate law enforcement purposes.21   
However, these instruments do not provide for a mandatory retention regime or for the 
retention of such data for longer than is necessary for ordinary business purposes; it 
remains at the discretion of the company to retain data subject to the aforementioned 
limitations.  This lack of retention which fulfilled law enforcement and national security 
aims is classed as the reverse salient of this development; it was a problem identified by 
the relevant social group necessitating changes to the system.  As law enforcement 
cannot compel the retention of additional categories of data or retention for longer 
periods to facilitate investigations in these instruments, there is a gap in the capabilities 
of law enforcement to access relevant data.  As communications data became an 
increasingly practical law enforcement tool due to technological developments, the need 
for more data retention to allow for more access was recognised, resulting in legislation 
to require retention by CSPs.   
b. Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001(ATCSA) 
As a result of the capability gap between data retained by CSPs during their ordinary 
business dealings and data desired by law enforcement, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime, and 
Security Act (ATCSA) 2001 was enacted, under which a voluntary code was introduced 
to allow CSPs to retain communications data for periods longer than necessary for 
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business purposes in order to facilitate law enforcement and national security operations.  
The relevant provisions under the Act stated that the Secretary of State may make a 
voluntary code of practice relating to the retention of communications data by CSPs and 
enter into arrangements with these companies in regards to such retention. 22  The 
primary purpose of enabling retention under ATCSA was to ensure that such data could 
be retained for later access for the purpose of safeguarding national security or for the 
prevention or detection of crime or prosecution of offenders which may relate to national 
security, either directly or indirectly.23  
This statute represented a move toward a more expansive data retention regime oriented 
at facilitating law enforcement and national security aims.  Its context is particularly 
important.  ATCSA was passed following the events of September 11th and largely in 
response to those events.  Indeed, in its explanatory memorandum, it was noted that: ͚The 
purpose of this Act is to build on legislation in a number of areas to ensure that the 
Government, in the light of the new situation arising from the September 11 terrorist 
attacks on New York and Washington, have the necessary powers to counter the threat to 
the UK͛.24  The motivating factors were a result of increased demands for security to 
counter these threats; the existing technological capabilities of companies presented an 
attractive mechanism to enable these aims.  However, the voluntary nature of the code of 
practice and requirement to retain here meant these mechanisms were not as effective as 
the policy intended.  Furthermore, economic concerns were raised over the potential risk 
of CSPs relocating servers outside of the jurisdiction in order to avoid legal and 
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regulatory requirements arising from any retention obligations.25  As such, the voluntary 
nature of the retention under ATCSA was found to be inadequate to meet the needs of 
law enforcement, resulting in further changes.   
c. Directive 2002/58/EC 
In addition to domestic legislative developments, there were moves at the EU level to 
ensure that retention was permitted and harmonised across member states.  Much like 
domestic law, at the EU level retention was first found in general data protection law.  
Prior to 2002, data retention at the EU level was governed by the General Data Protection 
Directive 95/46/EC which, like the domestic Data Protection Act, limited data retention 
to business uses; and Directive 97/66/EC on the protection of privacy and personal 
information in the telecommunications sector.  The latter was meant to complement 
Directive 95/46 and ensure that fundamental rights were protected in the processing of 
data.  Directive 97/66 provided for the possibility of Member States adopting legislative 
measures for the protection of public security, defence, or public order when the 
measures at issue were for the enforcement of criminal law.26 Directive 97/66 was 
subsequently amended by Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal 
data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector.   
The purpose of this Directive was to harmonise provisions of the Member States in order 
to ensure the confidentiality of communications and related traffic data in national 
legislation.27  Directive 2002/58 prohibited the interception and surveillance of 





 Directive 97/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 1997 concerning the 
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 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the 
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communications and related traffic data by persons other than users, unless done with 
their consent.28  This provision arguably ensured protection for personal data and 
communications and prevented indiscriminate access.  However, these provisions were 
qualified by Article 15(1) of the Directive which stated that ͚Member States may restrict 
rights if necessary, appropriate, and proportionate within a democratic society to 
safeguard national security, defence, public security, the investigation, detection and 
prosecution of criminal offences, or the unauthorised use of the electronic 
communication systems͛.     
The Directive however, was not meant to create a law enforcement mechanism.  This 
was explicitly excluded from its remit.29  The core aim was to place telecommunications 
providers on an equal footing and ensure that the data thereby generated was subject to 
retention. This retention remained limited and only encompassed that data storage 
deemed necessary for the provision of the telecommunication service or for billing.30  
The capabilities of law enforcement regarding this data remained ambiguous.  The 
provisions regarding the inapplicability of the Directive to law enforcement demonstrated 
that it wasn͛t the primary focus of the bill; yet arguably, the provisions set forth were 
frequently used in a manner that aided law enforcement.  However, the limitation on the 
powers with regard to law enforcement within the Directive meant that it was an 
ineffective mechanism for ensuring that law enforcement could achieve its objectives in 
this field.   
 




 Directive 2002/58/EC n(27) Art 1(3). 
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d. Directive 2006/24/EC 
In the years following the passage of Directive 2002/58, Europe experienced terrorist 
attacks, with the Madrid train bombings in 2004 and the 7/7 attacks in London in 2005.  
These attacks prompted the European Union to extend powers of retention, with the 
institutions noting that establishing rules on the retention of communications data was a 
priority, particularly due to its beneficial uses in the investigation and prevention of 
terrorism and ͚serious crime͛.31  These rules took the form of Directive 2006/24/EC, also 
known as the Data Retention Directive.  Stakeholders involved in the passage of the Data 
Retention Directive noted that given the strong atmosphere of anti-terrorism at the time, 
there was essentially no resistance offered to the proposed powers, enabling the measure 
to be passed with ease.32 Notably, Recital 11 of the Directive acknowledged the 
significance of data retention for law enforcement:  
Given the importance of traffic and location data for the investigation, detection, 
and prosecution of criminal offences, as demonstrated by research and the practical 
experience of several Member States, there is a need to ensure at European level 
that data that are generated or processed, in the course of the supply of 
communications services, by providers of publicly available electronic 
communications services or of a public communications network are retained for a 
certain period, subject to the conditions provided for in this Directive.   
Directive 2006/24 created a substantive regime to legislate for the retention of data.  
Articles 1(2) and 3(2) detailed the categories of data to be retained. Namely the data 
necessary for identifying: the source, destination, date, time, duration, and types of a 
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communication, and the equipment and location of the equipment used to transmit the 
data.  The Directive also extended to unsuccessful call attempts.  However, ͚the Directive 
was careful to note that communication service providers were not required to collect 
information they do not already collect͛.33  Article 5 covered the periods of retention, 
requiring Member States to provide for retention for no less than 6 months and no more 
than 24 months.   
Yet despite clearly setting out the role and aim of retaining this data for law enforcement, 
the Directive was put forward as an internal market measure, with the primary purpose 
identified as harmonising policies across service providers in order to remove limitations 
to the market.34  As justification, the Commission argued that:  
The legal and technical differences between national provisions concerning the 
retention of data for the purpose of prevention, investigation and prosecution of 
criminal offences presents obstacles to the internal market for electronic 
communications; service providers are faced with different requirements regarding 
the types of traffic data to be retained as well as the conditions and periods of 
retention.35  
In choosing to classify the Directive as an internal market measure rather than a law 
enforcement tool, the Commission further argued that previous legal instruments had 
been based on this legal basis, and therefore subsequent Directives regarding CSPs 
should as well.36  However, the overall goal of the Directive was arguably the promotion 
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of law enforcement rather than harmonisation.  Indeed, the goal of harmonisation was to 
make the data more readily accessible to law enforcement,37 not for the promotion of any 
particular economic interest of the CSPs.   
The legal basis to the Directive was challenged in the case of Ireland v the Parliament 
and the Council wherein Ireland asked the Court of Justice of the European Union to 
annul the Directive.  Ireland submitted: ͚that the sole objective or, at least, the main or 
predominant objective of that directive is to facilitate the investigation, detection and 
prosecution of crime, including terrorism͛.38  Therefore, they argued that the Directive 
should have been adopted under Title IV of the EU Treaty.  The Court did not agree.  
The Court noted that according to recitals 5 and 6, the Commission had acknowledged 
there were legal and technical disparities in Member States concerning the retention of 
data and these policies varied greatly imposing extra costs on service providers who were 
required to enact them.39  The Court held that, ͚In the light of that evidence, it is apparent 
that the differences between the various national rules adopted on the retention of data 
relating to electronic communications were liable to have a direct impact on the 
functioning of the internal market and that it was foreseeable that that impact would 
become more serious with the passage of time͛.40  The Court further acknowledged that 
the Directive did not harmonise law enforcement procedures nor in itself permit access to 
the relevant data.41  The Court therefore held that the Directive did primarily relate to the 
functioning of the internal market and dismissed the claim.   
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Under Directive 2006/24/EC it is possible to see the different motivating factors of both 
the organisational and legislative elements of the system.  For CSPs, the lack of 
harmonisation in policies placed an additional burden on service providers operating in 
multiple jurisdictions to alter their systems across borders and imposed additional 
financial costs.  Further, differing requirements could place some providers at a 
competitive advantage over others depending on what the specifics of the domestic 
retention law required.  However, there was also a clear law enforcement objective which 
guided the passage of this legislation and provided a repository of data for investigative 
aims.  However, despite these motivating factors, the Directive merited criticism.  It 
lacked specifications of the data to be retained and had limited provisions governing any 
subsequent access to the information.  Such issues would be brought to the fore in 
subsequent legal challenges and lend themselves to the eventual invalidation of the Data 
Retention Directive.   
e. Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2007 and Data Retention (EC 
Directive) Regulations 2009 
Following the enactment of Directive 2006/24, the United Kingdom issued the Data 
Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2007 to implement the provisions of the Directive 
domestically.  These regulations covered the retention of data from fixed and mobile line 
telephony.  The Regulations created an obligation to retain data generated in the process 
of supplying communications for a period of 12 months.42  The 2007 Regulations did not 
require CSPs to retain data ͚derived from internet access, internet e-mail, or internet 
telephony͛.43  The UK issued a declaration pursuant to Article 15(3) of Directive 2006/24 
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that they would postpone provisions regarding internet data retention.44  These provisions 
were enacted in the Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009.   
The Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009 brought fixed and mobile telephony 
and internet communications under the same legislative umbrella.  The principal 
difference between these regulations and the previous regime was the inclusion of 
internet, email, and VoIP content (i.e. Skype), even where these data types do not readily 
translate into the categories listed.45  The 2009 Regulations must be distinguished 
however in that they were the first statutory instrument in the UK to mandate retention 
for both telephone and internet data.  A positive obligation was imposed on those 
companies to retain data generated by ordinary purposes beyond what they retained in the 
normal course of events, solely to facilitate law enforcement activities; failure to do so 
could result in civil proceedings being initiated by the Secretary of State.46   
f. Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-549/12 Digital Rights Ireland v Minister 
for Communication & Ors and Seitlinger & Ors 
The 2009 Regulations remained in effect until after the case of Digital Rights Ireland 
which resulted in significant changes to data retention and resulted in legislative 
amendments.  The case occurred as a result of a challenge to Directive 2006/24/EC.  
Directive 2006/24 was highly criticised for being too expansive in its scope and 
interfering with fundamental rights.  In several Member States, laws implementing the 
Directive were postponed or overturned due to perceived conflicts with fundamental 
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rights.47  Challenges in domestic courts questioned the compliance of the Directive with 
the requirements of necessity, proportionality, and foreseeability under relevant human 
rights instruments.  However, the Directive continued to stand until the case of Digital 
Rights Ireland (DRI) which challenged the validity of the directive before the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU).   
The applicants in Digital Rights Ireland originally brought a legal challenge before the 
Irish High Court concerning the direction for telecommunications service providers to 
retain telecommunications data.  The applicant possessed a mobile phone and had used 
that phone since the provisions regarding retention under Directive 2006/24/EC and the 
relevant domestic law48 were enacted.  They alleged that the implementing measures 
instituted by Ireland to ensure compliance with the Directive allowed the named 
defendants to exercise control over data relating to the plaintiff and other users of mobile 
phones.  Specifically, the applicants argued that the obligation on telecommunications 
service providers to retain data permitted control of and access to the data in violation of 
fundamental rights obligations.   
The applicant argued that such an order was incompatible with Articles 7, 8, 11 and 41 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 8 ECHR.  In holding to refer the issues to 
the CJEU, McKechnie J. in the Irish High Court noted: 
Given the rapid advance of current technology it is of great importance to 
define the legitimate legal limits of modern surveillance techniques used by 
governments, in particular with regard to telecommunications data 
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retention; without sufficient legal safeguards the potential for abuse and 
unwarranted invasion of privacy is obvious.  Its effect on persons, without 
their knowledge or consent, also raises important question indicative of a 
prima facie interference with all citizens͛ rights to privacy and 
communication.49 
The significance of these developments and the potential for their interference with 
fundamental rights necessitated further judicial scrutiny. The CJEU examined three 
principal areas to determine whether the Directive was valid: its compatibility with the 
right to privacy set out in Article 7 of the Charter and Article 8 ECHR; compatibility 
with Article 8 of the Charter concerning the protection of personal data; and 
compatibility with Article 11 of the Charter concerning freedom of expression.  In 
determining whether there had been an interference, the Court took note of the 
capabilities of communications data, finding that:  
Those data, taken as a whole, may allow very precise conclusions to be drawn 
concerning the private lives of the persons whose data has been retained, such as 
the habits of everyday life, permanent or temporary places of residence, daily or 
other movements, the activities carried out, the social relationships of these persons 
and the social environments frequented by them.50   
In doing so, the CJEU accepted the extensive nature of communications data and its 
ability to interfere with individual rights.  The CJEU found that such retention policies 
amounted to an interference, and held that ͚the interference with the fundamental rights 
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laid down in Articles 7 and 8 is wide-ranging and it must be considered particularly 
serious͛.51 
However, an interference, regardless of its seriousness, may be justified if it satisfies the 
requirements under Article 52 of the Charter, principally that any limitation with the 
rights laid down in the Charter is in accordance with law, in the general interest, 
necessary and proportionate.  The CJEU found that the provisions regarding retention 
were in accordance with the relevant national law and accepted that ͚the retention of data 
for the purpose of allowing the competent national authorities to have possible access to 
those data, as required by Directive 2006/24, genuinely satisfies an object of general 
interest͛.52  The objective of the fight against ͚serious crime͛ and terrorism was accepted 
as a legitimate aim: 
As regards the necessity for the retention of data by Directive 2006/24, it 
must be held that the fight against ͚serious crime͛, in particular against 
organised crime and terrorism, is indeed of the utmost importance in order 
to ensure public security and its effectiveness may depend to a great extent 
on the use of modern investigation techniques.  However, such an objective 
of general interest, however fundamental it may be, does not, in itself, 
justify a retention measure such as that established by Directive 2006/24.53 
Yet, in light of the role of personal data and the right to respect for private life, the Court 
found that the EU͛s discretion to interfere should be reduced and general review of that 
discretion should be strict.54 The failure to circumscribe the retention of data meant that 
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the Directive was not balanced.  The Court recognised that data retention could be a 
valuable tool, acknowledging that it may be appropriate for obtaining objectives relating 
to criminal investigations,55 but qualified this observation by noting that data should be 
limited to that data pertaining to a particular time period, geographic zone, particular 
circle of people likely to be involved, or of persons whose data would likely to contribute 
to the prevention, prosecution or detection of offences.  The Directive was declared 
invalid.  As a result, domestic laws which implemented the provisions were liable to 
legal challenges on the basis of the precedent set in DRI.  This presented a potential 
obstacle to the mandatory retention systems in the UK enacted under the 2007 and 2009 
Data Retention Regulations.   
g. Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 
Following the CJEU ruling in the Digital Rights Ireland case the UK passed emergency 
legislation to ensure that law enforcement could maintain their abilities in order to meet 
the growing threats of serious organised crime and terrorism.56  Then Home Secretary, 
Theresa May, in noting the importance of this legislation, stated that: ͚There is no greater 
duty for a Government than the protection and security of their citizens when we face the 
very real and serious prospect that the police and intelligence agencies will lose vital 
capabilities that they need in order to do their jobs͛.57  The legislation now took the form 
of the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act (DRIPA).  DRIPA effectively 
replicated previous previsions on data retention which had been embodied in the Data 
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Retention Regulations 2009 and placed the requirement of retention by CSPs into a 
primary legislative instrument.  Specific implementing measures and detailed obligations 
for CSPs were set forth in the Data Retention Regulations 2014 following the passage of 
the Act.58 
Part 1 of this Act replaced the 2009 regulations and reinforced the types of data,59 matters 
that may be provided for,60 periods of retention,61 and access to data.62 In determining 
whether to require a CSP to retain data, the Secretary of State could take a number of 
factors into account: the size of the CSP, their speed of growth, the number of requests 
for data typically received by the CSP from law enforcement, whether a CSP operated a 
specialised service, and whether they operated in a specific area, particularly if they are 
the sole provider of that service in that particular geographical location.63  As a safeguard 
to ensure that data retention was not required indiscriminately, the Secretary of State was 
also required to consider whether such retention is ͚necessary and proportionate͛ for one 
or more of the purposes set out under s 22(2) RIPA,64 which include national security, 
the purpose of preventing or detecting crime, public safety, and so on.   
In assessing the necessity and proportionality of the notice, the Secretary was required to 
consider a number of criteria.  First, she must consider the likely benefit of the notice;65 a 
strong case would be made for the retention of categories of data which are known to be 
of considerable use to law enforcement.  Second, the likely number of users who will be 
affected must be considered.66  A large customer base increases the volume of data and 
                                                          
58
 Data Retention Regulations 2014, SI 2014/2042. 
59
 Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 (DRIPA) s1(1). 
60DRIPA n(59) s 1(4). 
61
 DRIPA n(59) s1(5). 
62
 DRIPA n(59) s1(6). 
63
 Home Office, Retention n(7) s 3.3. 
64
 DRIPA n(59) 2014 s1(1) 
65
 Home Office, Retention n(7) 
66
 Ibid.  
 128 
 
its potential usefulness for law enforcement.  However, it also represents a greater 
intrusion.  These two competing interests must be balanced.  Further, the technical 
feasibility and cost to the CSP needed to be contemplated.67  The requirements should be 
affordable and represent value for money in terms of benefits received without placing an 
undue burden on the CSP.  Finally, the Secretary of State had to take into account what 
data was required and for how long and assess whether such retention was necessary for 
the stated purpose.  If, on balance, the Secretary of State found that the cumulative effect 
of these considerations was that retention was necessary and proportionate to the 
legitimate aims, she could proceed with the process. 
If it was provisionally decided that the data must be retained, the Secretary of State 
would then ideally consult with the CSP, during which the CSP could voice any concerns 
with the required retention.68  However, there were no rights of redress for a service 
provider who believed a notice to retain was disproportionate or requested the 
cancellation of a notice.69  Furthermore, at times this consultation process would not be 
possible, for example when a new technology was released with short notice or there was 
a new threat that required greater retention.  Following the consultation, the Secretary of 
State communicated the decision regarding the retention of relevant data by issuing a 
notice to the CSP.  The CSP was then required to begin retaining data without undue 
delay. 
DRIPA demonstrates how the relevant social group composed of law enforcement and 
politicians solved a potential problem in the retention system so that it met their 
objectives.  The ruling in DRI meant that retention may no longer be permitted and 
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therefore they would lose access to a resource they considered valuable.  They utilised 
the legislative process to ensure that they were able to maintain data retention 
capabilities.  Other elements which interacted with the primary artefact of 
communications data were similarly affected by this shift but their interests were 
arguably not represented to the same degree.  For example, the organisational elements 
embodied in CSPs were able to voice concerns with the obligations being placed on 
them, but there is no indication that these concerns were able to supersede the dominant 
interest of law enforcement and the State in retaining the data.  Further, individual users 
were also impacted by the retention of their data and the potential interference with 
privacy that resulted, but they were not effectively represented in the development of this 
iteration of the retention component.   
h. Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 
Following the enactment of DRIPA, the Government passed the Counter Terrorism and 
Security Act (CTSA) 2015, section 17 which altered the data retention regime in two 
substantive ways.  First, the CTSA imposed an obligation on CSPs to retain data which 
was not already generated or processed in the course of their normal business operations.  
The CTSA imposed this requirement ͚by mandating certain types of communications 
data that companies must generate and store, regardless of whether this is data which is 
usually retained for business purposes͛.70  This provision placed a positive obligation on 
companies to create and maintain facilities for data storage for broad categories of data.  
CSPs became de facto databases for relevant data for law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies.  Second, CTSA changed the definition of internet data to any communications 
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data which: related to an internet access service or an internet communications service, or 
may be used to identify or assist in identifying which IP address or other identifier 
belongs to the sender or recipient of a communication.71  This meant that the CTSA 
aimed to enable law enforcement to link specific devices and accounts to users, even 
when the equipment or accounts were not specifically registered to that individual.  As 
Liberty recognised: 
The information required to be retained is defined very loosely, even extending to 
information linking an individual not to an IP address but to any ͚other identifier͛, 
such as an email address or social media account handle.  This provides the 
opportunity to link different online accounts and internet usage with one device or 
individual.72   
The CTSA thereby expanded the retention policies and the utilisation of communications 
data.   
Theresa May acknowledged that the primary aim of the retention requirements set out in 
this Act was to assist law enforcement.   
Companies generally have no business purpose for keeping a log of who 
used each address at a given point in time, which means that it is not 
possible for law enforcement agencies to identify who sent or received a 
message.  The provisions will allow us to require key UK companies to 
retain the necessary information to enable them to identify the users of their 
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services.  That will provide vital additional capabilities to law enforcement 
in investigating a broad range of ͚serious crime͛, including terrorism.73  
The overall development of the data retention regime in CTSA demonstrates a distinctive 
shift in policy toward blanket retention and more expansive categories of data; a shift that 
the Government argued was necessary for the protection of the public interest in the 
investigation, detection, and prosecution of crime and the fight against terrorism.  The 
requirements of CTSA, particularly with regards to the change in the definition of 
internet data, are a result of shifting social elements precipitated by technological 
development.  People possess multiple devices and use separate devices depending on the 
context.  One might use a mobile phone for work and another for home; the one for 
personal use will likely possess subscriber information directly linkable to the owner 
whereas the one for work may be owned more generally by the company without any 
personally identifying information linked to the account.  The provisions in CTSA 
recognise this type of situation and legislate for it so that additional information can be 
retained so as not to diminish the abilities of law enforcement.   
i. Investigatory Powers Act 2016 
The current statute regarding communications data retention in the UK is the 
Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA).  The IPA arose due to the sunset clause which was 
attached to DRIPA which placed its expiration on the 31st December 2016.  There was no 
legal challenge nor radical technological development that precipitated the passage of the 
IPA at the time it was passed.74 
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As it stands, the IPA replicates the previous retention measures which dictate the 
categories of data with the notable addition of the retention of Internet Connection 
Records (ICRs).  ICRs are communications data which records which internet services a 
device connects to.75  These records may establish which websites, applications, 
messengers, or other internet services are used; when they are used; how they are being 
used (i.e. mobile phone or other device); and be able to link a specific device to an online 
communications service.76  This additional category of data is not one which is retained 
by CSPs for business uses, nor do they have any reason for doing so.  The principal 
function of this type of retention is to benefit law enforcement.  The Home Office stated 
this in their operational case concerning ICRs, 
 Rapid technological change means that law enforcement͛s inability to access 
online CD is significant and will only get worse if it continues to be impossible to 
require communications companies to retain ICRs.  More and more 
communications are taking place over the internet and as this happens it follows 
that an increasing proportion of CD will be unavailable when it is needed.77   
Therefore the inability to retain ICRs was seen as a problem which needed to be 
addressed in the development of the system; it was done so to effectively incorporate the 
aims of law enforcement.   
In order for retention to occur, CSPs must be served with a retention notice.  Notably, 
under the IPA, a retention notice, and any associated requirements or restrictions which 
result, may relate to conduct and persons outside of the United Kingdom.78  This includes 
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the positive duty on CSPs who are issued with a notice to comply with the provisions 
contained therein.79  This means that the powers contained in the IPA may be applied to 
non-UK operators and require those operators to take action to give effect to a notice.  
Such a legislative development represents a significant expansion of jurisdiction beyond 
the borders of the UK.  Companies who provide a service to individuals in the UK can be 
subject to retention requirements.  Much like the process under DRIPA, the Secretary of 
State must determine that the serving of such a notice meets the threshold for necessity 
and proportionality.   
In assessing the need for a notice, the Home Secretary should take steps to consult with 
the CSP.  In this process the company may request the assistance of the Technical 
Advisory Board (TAB).80  The Board is composed of members from both industry and 
Government and is meant to be an impartial mechanism to consider the impact of a 
notice and offer advice.81  However, the validity of the TAB is undermined by several 
practical limitations.  First and foremost, there is no requirement that the Home Secretary 
amend, vary, or revoke if the TAB determines that it would not be in the CSPs interest to 
be served with a notice.  The TAB͛s role is solely advisory and their advice and guidance 
does not have to be followed.  Furthermore, the efficacy of the TAB can be undermined 
by the limitations of the Board itself.  The TAB meets infrequently; as of February 2017, 
the TAB had yet to meet since the IPA received royal assent in 2016.82  The impartiality 
of the chair can also be called in to question.  Despite Regulations requiring that the chair 
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not serve the interest of either CSPs or law enforcement and national security agencies, 
the current chair Jonathan Hoyle previously worked as DG of Information Security and 
Assurance at GCHQ before moving on to the private sector.83  This does not in itself 
demonstrate any bias with the board, however, it can create the appearance of unfairness 
and call in to question the reasoning which underpins the advisory decisions.   
Whilst the TAB does not represent an effective and impartial resource in the evaluation 
of retention notices, the IPA did institute an oversight procedure which aims to improve 
the legitimacy of the process.  Under the IPA, the decision to issue a notice to retain data 
must be approved by a Judicial Commissioner.84  In deciding whether to approve the 
Home Secretary͛s decision to give a notice, the Commissioner must apply the same 
principles as would be applied by a court on an application for judicial review and have 
due regard for privacy.85  Where the Judicial Commissioner refuses to approve the notice, 
the matter may be referred to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.  The full powers 
of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner (IPC) will be addressed in Chapter 6, 
however, it is important to note here that a refusal by the IPC precludes the issuance of a 
notice to a CSP.  The institution of a process of independent administrative approval for 
notices does demonstrate a significant development in the overall safeguards for data 
under the IPA.  However, as will be addressed in Chapter 6, this remains insufficient to 
ensure an effective protection of privacy.   
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j. Joined Cases C-203/15 Tele2 Sverige AB v Post-och telestyrelsen and C-
698/15 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Tom Watson & Ors 
The final element to be considered in the evolution of data retention in the ICT system is 
the Tele2 case.  This case challenged, among other things, the obligations relating to the 
general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data under DRIPA and their 
conformity with EU precedent.  The case was not decided until after the passage of the 
IPA; however, as many of the provisions from DRIPA were replicated in IPA it is worth 
examining the case.  There were two conjoined cases at issue here.  The first was the 
Swedish case of Tele2 wherein a CSP stopped retaining data pursuant to the ruling in 
DRI; they were then informed that they were in breach of national legislation and ordered 
to recommence data retention.  The applicant alleged that the obligation to retain data 
was a breach of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter.  The question referred to 
the court was whether a ͚general obligation to retain traffic data covering all persons, all 
means of electronic communication, and all traffic data without any distinctions, 
limitations, or exceptions for the purposes of combating crime, was compatible with Art 
15(1) Directive 2002/58/EC, taking into consideration Articles 7, 8, and 52(1) of the 
Charter?͛.86  If not, could retention be permitted where access was limited, data 
protection and security were provided for, and data was only retained for six months and 
then subject to deletion.87 
Like the proceedings in Tele2, Watson & Ors alleged that the retention was incompatible 
with Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter and Article 8 ECHR.  The High Court held that the 
judgment in DRI had established that legislation which imposed ͚a general body of rules 
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for the retention of communications data is in breach of the rights guaranteed by Articles 
7 and 8 of the Charter, unless that legislation is complemented by a body of rules for 
access to the data, defined by national law, which provide sufficient safeguards to protect 
those rights͛.88  The judgment was challenged and the Court of Appeal referred the matter 
to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.   
In considering the issues, the CJEU noted the broad scope of the legislation and the 
expansive nature of the information retained.89  The Court acknowledged the ability of 
the information to allow ͚conclusions to be drawn concerning the private lives of the 
persons whose data has been retained, such as everyday habits, permanent or temporary 
places of residence, daily or other movements, the activities carried out, the social 
relationships of those persons and the social environments frequented by them͛.90  As a 
result, the Court held that the interference with fundamental rights was considered 
particularly serious.   
The Court had to determine whether this interference could then be justified.  The CJEU 
held that the seriousness of the interference could only be justified for the purposes of 
fighting crime where it was used the fight けserious crimeげ, and in particular, organised 
crime and terrorism.91  Blanket and indiscriminate retention could not be justified.  
Further, the Court went on to discuss the comprehensiveness of who was potentially 
caught by the retention provisions noting it ͚applies even to persons for whom there is no 
evidence capable of suggesting that their conduct might have a link, even an indirect or 
remote one, with serious criminal offences͛.92  Nor were there any restrictions on the data 
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in relation to location, time, or persons likely to be involved in ͚serious crime͛.  
Therefore, the Court found the retention exceeded what was strictly necessary and the 
interference could not be justified.   
In the implementation of the CJEU ruling, the Court of Appeal granted declaratory relief, 
holding that s 1 DRIPA was inconsistent with EU law to the extent it allowed access to 
retained data where the objective was not limited to ͚serious crime͛ nor subject to prior 
review by an administrative authority.93  The ruling was confined to the context of the 
prevention, detection, and prosecution of criminal offences.94  Notably, the ruling 
referred specifically to the access requirement, not the retention of data itself.  Indeed, in 
the judgment, Lord Lloyd Jones, specifically addressed whether the ruling in Tele 2 and 
Watson was intended to require retention only for serious criminal offences.  In holding it 
did not, he accepted the conclusion of the Divisional Court that the CJEU ͚cannot have 
meant that [CSPs] can only lawfully be required to retain the communications data of 
͞suspects or persons whose data would contribute to the prevention, detection, or 
prosecution of serious criminal offences͟ as such a restriction would be wholly 
impracticable͛.95  However, this does not sit well with the text of the CJEU judgment in 
Tele2 & Watson which specifically discussed the need for limitations on the retention 
component of the system.   
The subsequent case of Liberty v SSHD concerned the compatibility of the IPA with the 
ECHR and EU law following Watson and its application by the Court of Appeal.  In this 
case the claimants asked the Court to make an ͚order of disapplication͛ in respect of Part 
4 IPA on the retention of communications data.  In so doing, the claimants submitted that 
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the blanket retention of communications data was incompatible with EU law as it 
provides for general and indiscriminate retention.96  The Court disagreed and accepted 
that the current statutory regime governing retention was sufficient to ensure that the 
retention was necessary and proportionate.97  The claimants further submitted that the 
retention did not meet the necessary ͚seriousness͛ threshold required following Tele2 and 
Watson.  The High Court here agreed with the Court of Appeal͛s reasoning in the 
implementation of Watson and found that the absence of a requirement for ͚serious crime͛ 
did not invalidate the IPA͛s provisions regarding retention.   
The failure to apply the CJEU͛s ruling to the retention components arguably goes against 
the text of that judgment.  The focus on access rather than the process of retention itself 
fails to take into account the reasoning of the CJEU on the blanket and indiscriminate 
nature of the provisions which represents a serious interference with fundamental rights.  
However, like the Court of Appeal in Watson, the High Court in Liberty did agree that 
the absence of a ͚serious crime͛ requirement and prior judicial review for access meant 
the IPA was incompatible with EU law.  The significance of these rulings in the context 
of access will be discussed in Chapter 4.   
The legal challenges to the data retention regime indicate the contentious nature of these 
powers.  Whilst useful to law enforcement, the wide scope and the scale at which the data 
is collected and retained raises concerns for individuals and society.  It is therefore 
necessary to look to the shifts in informational norms occasioned by the development of 
retention capabilities to determine the impact on privacy.   
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IV. Applying Contextual Integrity to Data Retention 
Having established how data retention in the ICT system has evolved, the contextual 
integrity heuristic set out in the Chapter 1 will now be applied to determine whether these 
developments have shifted informational norms in a manner which interferes with 
privacy.  Jurisprudence in the field of data retention has accepted that the mere retention 
and collection of the data triggers a privacy interest.98  This privacy interest exists 
irrespective of whether the data is subsequently used.99  As technologies generate 
increasing amounts of data and enable the collection and retention of that data at scale, 
the threat to privacy becomes more significant.  The question is not, however, whether a 
privacy interest is triggered by this retention, but whether privacy is interfered with in an 
unjustifiable manner. The contextual integrity decision heuristic allows for an analysis of 
this by looking at the various elements which have been altered as a result of the 
development of the data retention regime and whether those changes have fundamentally 
altered normative expectations in a manner that requires subsequent action.  In order to 
determine this, the following section establishes that the extant actors, information types, 
and transmission principles in the data retention process have been altered as a result of 
technological developments.  Consequently, prescriptive measures are required to ensure 
that the retention process comports with social norms and future technological 
developments.  
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In determining whether an informational norm has shifted in a manner that breaches 
contextual integrity, it is important to consider the context in which the change has 
occurred.  As Nissenbaum notes,  
The nature of alterations varies across systems and practices as each affect, in 
different ways, the range of recipients, the types of information, and conditions 
under which information is transmitted from one party to another.  Whether the 
alterations amount to transgressions, and whether these transgressions are morally 
and politically legitimate depends, of course, on the contexts in which they 
transpire and how they bear on relevant ends and purposes.100   
Shifts in information types, transmission principles, and actors must be evaluated within 
the context of the retention component of the system.  
Information types have changed; the evolution of the data retention legislation 
demonstrates a need to retain greater categories and quantities of data than before.  
Within this data, the nature and attributes of the retention has changed.  This is 
particularly evident in the increased collection of internet data.  The infrastructure which 
provides access online does not require data retention in the same way as traditional 
telecommunications.101  While some of the categories of data can be comparable to their 
analogue counterparts (i.e. emails instead of letters, VoIP instead of phone calls), new 
categories of information are also being generated as a result of the provision of different 
services (i.e. geo-location data which is generated through the use of cell phones).  The 
categories of data to be retained are defined loosely.102 As a result, the developments in 
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categories of communications data which have occurred throughout the evolution of 
retention law have altered the nature of the information.  It is no longer basic data 
concerning a limited suspect pool.  It has become a database of the communications of 
the masses; no distinctions are made between those whom law enforcement has a reason 
to investigation and those passive users of communications services.  Law enforcement 
sees the increase in the information and the development in its attributes as a valuable 
tool for investigators.  ͚As communications technologies have advanced and diversified, 
the pool of evidence potentially available to investigators has grown ʹ and so has the 
Government͛s desire to access it͛.103   
In introducing the Investigatory Powers Bill in 2015, then Home Secretary, Theresa May 
noted the significance of expanding the categories of data for achieving law enforcement 
aims.  Drawing particular attention to the capabilities that existed for mobile phone 
information but not for the same type of information generated by non-traditional 
methods, such as social media or communications apps, May put forth the argument that 
new categories of data must be retained.104  While such a method may satisfy a legitimate 
aim for law enforcement, there is also a normative impact which occurs from 
categorising data as potentially valuable.  Tarleton Gillespie explains that 
͚[c]ategorisation is a powerful semantic and political intervention: what the categories 
are, what belongs in a category, and who decides how to implement these categories in 
practice, are all powerful assertions about how things are and are supposed to be͛.105  The 
                                                          
https://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/sites/default/files/2018.01.18%20liberty%20consultation%20respo
nse%20FINAL.pdf> accessed 4 Feb 2018 12.  
103Clive Walker C, 'Data retention in the UK: Pragmatic and proportionate, or a step too far?' (2009) 25 
Computer Law & Security Review 325. 
104
 HC Debates vol 587 col 970, 4 November 2015. 
105
 7DUOHWRQ*LOOHVSLHµ7KH5HOHYDQFHRI$OJRULWKPV¶LQ*LOOHVSLH%RF]NRZVNLDQG)RRWHGVMedia 
Technologies: Essays on Communication, Materiality, and Society (MIT Press 2014) 167, 171. 
 142 
 
impact of the changes and increases in types of information must be assessed with 
respect to the norms they embody and the values they promote.   
In addition, the transmission principles associated with private retention have been 
transformed.  The negotiated relationships between individuals and companies have been 
altered.  There are now more ways to communicate as people no longer utilise the same 
CSP for all their services; companies no longer need to keep as much information about 
their customers, mainly as a result of companies providing fixed rate tariffs rather than 
billing on individual usage (i.e. charging per minute or per text); anonymization is 
increasing whereby people no longer use directly attributable personal information when 
signing up for services; more and more services are based abroad; and communications 
data is increasingly fragmented as it is sent across multiple platforms using various 
devices.106   
Actors in the form of CSPs reflect these changing capabilities and attitudes by expanding 
their functions.  Traditionally, companies were passive intermediaries, connecting two 
parties.  ͚Historically, members of our society have taken for granted that we know more 
about our lives than any third party could, and this knowledge has been vital to our sense 
of ourselves͛.107  However, increasingly everything that individuals undertake in their 
everyday lives involves some form of communication and consequently there is little that 
remains unknowable by the companies which collect and process this information.  
Despite this shift, the treatment of CSPs has remained static in the legislation.  This 
means that outdated informational norms are being applied to new technologies.  Finally, 
the retention systems themselves have become an important element in the investigative 
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process.  These systems are not only access points, but they are the predominant sources 
of information.  As long as these retention systems serve a critical function as a 
repository of information for law enforcement, privacy interests will be triggered.  This 
indicates that there has been a fundamental shift in the role of CSPs in the retention 
process, moving it from private actor to public authority.  This shift has altered the 
informational norms and consequently resulted in a breach of contextual integrity.   
V. Conclusion 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates the evolution of the retention component of the ICT 
system for communications data.  The development of this element shows that the roles 
of key actors have been altered, information types expanded, and transmission principles 
altered.  The developments here can therefore be classed as a privacy violation using the 
contextual integrity framework.  This violation must be accounted for in any proposed 
changes to address the privacy issues triggered by data retention.  As Ian Brown notes, 
͚Given the rapid advance of current technology it is of great importance to define the 
legitimate legal limits of modern surveillance techniques, in particular with regard to 
telecommunications data retention; without sufficient legal safeguards, the potential for 
abuse and unwarranted invasion of privacy is obvious͛.108  Retention clearly triggers 
privacy violations; however, it is not the sole component of the system which results in 
such intrusions. The following chapter looks to the access element of the ICT system and 
considers privacy therein.   
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CHAPTER 4: ACCESS TO COMMUNICATIONS DATA 
I. Introduction 
The data retention discussed in Chapter 3 provides the repository of information on 
which subsequent access and analysis is based.  Access and analysis interact with the 
retention component by utilising data that is retained and processing it in a manner that 
allows for law enforcement to achieve its stated objectives of investigating, detecting, 
and preventing crime.  The focus of this chapter will be on the access element, 
specifically, who can access the information and for what purposes.  The ability to access 
communications data is not a new power.  Historically, investigators would acquire 
required information through an application to the service provider who could choose to 
disclose the data.  The information sought was that retained by the company for billing 
purposes.  Changes in technology created issues with this process.  As David Anderson 
noted in his reviHZRILQYHVWLJDWRU\SRZHUVµ3roliferating methods of communication, 
the fragmentation of providers, difficulties in attributing communications, changing 
business models, and increasing use of overseas service providers have all tended to 
PDNHGDWDPRUHGLIILFXOWWRDFFHVV¶1   Technology in this regard limited the capabilities 
of law enforcement to access relevant data.  Concurrently, technological developments in 
communications data enabled it to become more expansive, in both the actions it covers 
and the time periods available.  This increased the potential value of the data for law 
enforcement in investigating not only µVHULRXVFULPH¶ but, as the Police Service of 
Northern Ireland noted, µDQHVVHQWLDOWRROLQLQYHVWLJDWLQJHYHQWKHPLQRUYROXPHFULPHV
that are key indicators of police performance and public FRQILGHQFH¶2   
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As demonstrated in the following, as more information is generated through individuals 
using technologies, the desire of law enforcement to access this information 
simultaneously increases.  These requests are incorporated into the legislation without an 
adequate assessment of how they will impact on privacy.  The passage of such legislation 
is typically justified by noting that law enforcement agencies are bound by relevant 
human rights principles when they access the data and they cannot contravene these 
obligations.  Further, communications data is treated as secondary information, less 
intrusive than content, and therefore the regimes are more permissive and the oversight 
less rigid.3  However, such an assessment fails to take into account the nature of the data 
and the limitations of extant protections for individuals when it is accessed. 
To determine the extent to which access to communications data, as dictated by the legal 
and policy regimes, constitutes an interference with privacy which is not responsive to 
the nature of the technology and consequently impacts on informational norms, the 
analysis will proceed as follows.  Part I establishes the key elements of the ICT system 
which enable access to communications data by law enforcement.  Part II then assesses 
how these elements have evolved following technological advances and social changes.  
Finally, in Part III discussion will turn to how the changes to these methods and 
processes have violated contextual integrity thereby resulting in a disproportionate 
privacy violation which cannot be reconciled with the values of the system.   
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II. Elements of the system which enable access to data 
Retention and access are inextricably linked as data is only retained for the purpose of 
making that data later accessible, in this context, by law enforcement.4  The principal 
artefacts at issue remain the retention system and communications data which is collected 
and kept on that system.  The organisational component, in the form of CSPs, acts as a 
facilitator in the access element.  CSPs collect and store the information; they are also 
responsible for its generation through the technologies used by their customers.  
Legislation seeks to expand the role of CSPs in this regard by requiring the creation of 
new access capabilities by these private actors.  The resultant data pool then becomes the 
primary focus of law enforcement and consequently a legislative target.  The latter seeks 
to ensure that the data will be readily available for law enforcement by instituting legal 
regimes which both require retention and provide for access.  In this way, law 
enforcement and the legislature act as system builders, shaping the environment by 
requiring CSPs to build infrastructure which they can utilise.5  This is in turn coupled 
with technological developments which increase efficiency,6 and allow for information to 
be extracted which goes far beyond what would accessible to the unaided senses.7 
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III. The evolution of access to communications data 
The elements of the system are considered through an analysis of the evolution of the 
access requirements for communications data by law enforcement.  In doing so, it is 
necessary to establish the factors which led to legislative changes, including 
technological advances that increased desired data pools, and changes in social and 
policy aims which increased law enforcement powers.   
a. The Post Office and the case of Malone v United Kingdom  
Despite the lack of centralised computer databases of information which exist today, data 
concerning the who, where, how, and when of communications was historically 
accessible to law enforcement.  What was lacking was any legal underpinning for the 
access.  The historical approach to acquiring this data occurred through a process known 
DVPHWHULQJ,QWKLVDGHYLFHNQRZQDVDµPHWHUFKHFNSULQWHU¶ZDVDWWDFKHGWRDSULYDWH
VXEVFULEHU¶VWHOHSKRQHE\WKH3RVW2IILFH8  This printer was used for business purposes, 
such as ensuring billing was correct, investigating issues with quality, and checking 
against possible misuse of the phone system.  The information collected showed the 
numbers dialled and the duration of calls, but not what was said.9  7KHµPHWHUFKHFN
SULQWHU¶SURGXFHGDSULQWHGWDSHZKLFKFRQWDLQHGWKHLQIRUPDtion and could be accessed 
by the police.  There were no statutory provisions concerning how the police could 
access the metered information; it occurred through negotiated discussions with the 
relevant service providers.  During a brief discussion on the practice in the House of 
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Commons in the 1970s, the Home Secretary at the time, Merlyn Rees, noted that the 
information may be provided if: 
 The information is vital to pROLFHLQTXLULHVLQDPDWWHURIµVHULRXVFULPH¶DQGFDQQRW
be obtained from any other sources, or where the police are investigating calls made 
by fraudulent methods with intent to avoid due payment to the Post Office, or 
offences under Section 78 of the Post Office Act 1969 ± which includes, for example, 
indecency, menacing, and annoyance.10 
The process of metering was challenged in the case of Malone v United Kingdom.  The 
FDVHFRQFHUQHGWKHLQWHUFHSWLRQRI0U0DORQH¶VWHOHSKRQHFRQYHUVDWLRQV0DORQH
alleged that at the request of the police, his correspondence had been intercepted and his 
telephone had been tapped and metered in breach of his Article 8 and 13 rights under the 
ECHR.11  On the issue of interception, the ECtHR held that there was an interference by 




reasonable clarity the scope and manner of exercise of the relevant discretion conferred 
RQSXEOLFDXWKRULWLHV¶12  Therefore, the necessary minimum degree of protection for 
citizens under the rule of law was lacking.  As the interception was found nRWµLQ
DFFRUGDQFHZLWKODZ¶WKH&RXUWGLGQRWFRQVLGHULWQHFHVVDU\WRH[DPLQHZKHWKHUWKH
LQWHUIHUHQFHPHWWKHUHTXLUHPHQWRIEHLQJµQHFHVVDU\LQDGHPRFUDWLFVRFLHW\¶13 
                                                          
10
 Home Secretary Merlyn Rees in HC Debates vol 944, cols 760-1W 23rd Feb 1978. 
11
 Malone v United Kingdom App No 8691/79 (ECtHR, 2 Aug 1984). 
12
 Malone n(11) para 79. 
13
 Malone n(11) para 81. 
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As regards the metering, the Court noted that metering must be distinguished by its very 
nature from interception.  The Court acknowledged the fact that the meter is legitimately 
provided by the telephone service provider and is used for commercial reasons.  The 
&RXUWKHOGWKDWWKHSULYDWHLQWHUHVWLQPHWHULQJPHDQWLWVKRXOGµEHGLVWLQJXished from 
interception of communications, which is undesirable and illegitimate in a democratic 
VRFLHW\XQOHVVMXVWLILHG¶14  This interpretation implies that the Court saw the collection 
and potential release of communications data as a socially acceptable practice, in contrast 
with the interference with intercepted content.  However, that does not mean that the data 
collected from this metering cannot result in an interference with Article 8.  Indeed the 
&RXUWKHOGWKDWµ7KHUHFRUGVRIPHWHULQJFRQWDLQLnformation, in particular the numbers 
dialled, which is an integral element in the communications made by telephone.  
Consequently, the release of that information without the consent of the subscriber also 
amounts, in the opinion of the Court, to an interference with a right guaranteed by Article 
¶15  ,QGHWHUPLQLQJZKHWKHUWKLVZDVµLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKODZ¶WKH&RXUWQRWHGWKDWV
of the Post Office Act 1969 allowed for the provision of information to persons holding 
office under the crown, but they were not required to disclose this information.16 The 
primary guiding principles for when this information should be provided were simply set 
out in answers to parliamentary questions.  However, the Court found that there were no 
                                                          
14
 Malone n(11) para 84.  This line of thought is largely reflected in the development of legislation 
surrounding communications data.  The idea that the data is generated from private functions is put forward 
as one of the principal arguments as to why law enforcement should not be seen as interfering with privacy 
rights when utilising that data.  The argument that it is socially acceptable to examine this data but not data 
that is directly intercepted by law enforcement is tenuous at best and a distinction that cannot hold in light 
of technological developments as will be demonstrated throughout this thesis. 
15
 Malone n(11) para 84.  
16
 Post Office Act 1969 s 80 states: A requirement to do what is necessary to inform designated persons 
holding office under the Crown concerning matters and things transmitted or in the course of transmission 
by means of postal or telecommunication services provided by the Post Office may be laid on the Post 
Office for the like purposes and in the like manner as, at the passing of this Act, a requirement may be laid 
on the Postmaster General to do what is necessary to inform such persons concerning matters and things 
transmitted or in the course of transmission by means of such services provided by him. 
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legal rules concerning the scope and manner of exercise and discretion of public 
DXWKRULWLHVDQGWKHUHIRUHWKHSUDFWLFHZDVQRWµLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKODZ¶ 
While not substantially discussed in the main judgment, it is worth noting the concurring 
opinion of Judge Pettiti who recognised the potential intrusiveness of metering data.  
Judge Pettiti noted the comprehensive nature of the data obtained regarding telephone 
FRPPXQLFDWLRQVLQFOXGLQJWKHLURULJLQGHVWLQDWLRQDQGGXUDWLRQDQGQRWHGWKDWµZKHQ
effected for a purpose other than its sole accounting purpose, albeit in the absence of any 
VXFKLQWHUFHSWLRQDVVXFK>WKHPHWHULQJ@FRQVWLWXWHVDQLQWHUIHUHQFHLQSULYDWHOLIH¶17  
Regardless of the fact that the service provider had an interest in obtaining the data, the 
fact that it could then be used for other purposes was enough for it to be classed as an 
interference with private life.  Judge Pettiti further noted how the nature of the data 
HQKDQFHGWKHDELOLWLHVRIODZHQIRUFHPHQWµ2QWKHEDVLVRIWKHGDWDWKHUHE\REWDLQHGWKH
authorities are enabled to deduce information that is not properly meant to be within their 
NQRZOHGJH¶18  Despite occurring before the widespread use of computerised databases 
DQGWHFKQRORJLFDOGHYHORSPHQWVVXFKDVWKHLQWHUQHW-XGJH3HWWLWL¶VFRQFXUULQJRSLQion 
sets out two key issues regarding communications data which remain relevant to this day: 
the role of the private actors who generate and possess the data, and the ability of law 
enforcement to make inferences and judgments based on the data.  Even as early as 
Malone it was recognised that the nature of the data and the role of private actors were 
factors in determining whether interference with this information represented a violation.  
However, much of the subsequent legislation fails to take this into consideration.   
Following Malone, the Interception of Communications Act 1985 was enacted.  This 
statute provided for the process of interception of communications following the issuance 
                                                          





of a warrant when the Secretary of State considers it necessary for limited purposes such 
as national securLW\RUSUHYHQWLQJRUGHWHFWLQJµVHULRXVFULPH¶7KHUHZDVQRH[SOLFLW
discussion of information such as that obtained by metering in the Act and the practice 
remained unregulated.  As such, access to communications data by law enforcement 
remained outside legislative mechanisms until the Regulation of Investigatory Powers 
Act 2000.    
b. Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000  
Prior to 2000, the only provisions concerning the access of communications data by law 
enforcement were found in the Data Protection Act 1998.  Under this Act, an exemption 
from data protection requirements existed for companies who processed personal data for 
the prevention or detection of crime and the apprehension or prosecution of offenders.19  
This data could then be disclosed for these same purposes.20  Under these provisions 
however, it was for the CSP to decide whether the law enforcement request complied 
with the stated exemptions; if they believed it did not, they could refuse to disclose the 
information.  This meant that under these provisions, law enforcement may not be able to 
access the information which they believed was necessary to satisfy their investigative 
duties.   
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 changed this policy by providing 
public authorities with the ability to access data in cases where disclosure is permitted by 
law.  The authorities could access communications data which took the form of traffic 
data or subscriber data.21  The data could be accessed for a range of purposes where the 
relevant investigator believed it was necessary to obtain communications data.  Such 
                                                          
19
 Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) s 29(1)(a) and 29(1)(b). 
20
 DPA n(19) s 29(3). 
21
 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) s 21(4). 
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access could be granted, for example, in the interest of national security or for the 
purpose of preventing or detecting crime or of preventing disorder.22  Access may also be 
granted in other instances, H[WHQGLQJDVIDUDVIRUµDQ\SXUSRVH¶ZKLFKZDVGHHPHG
necessary by an order made by the Secretary of State.23  Communications data under 
RIPA could therefore be accessed for a wide range of reasons; there was no requirement 
that the crime involved be serious.  In making a request under RIPA, the investigator did 
not have to tightly define what information was sought; only that a broad category of 
communications data was required.24  This allows, for example, for a request for all IP 
addresses that accessed a website, or all phone numbers that called a particular 
individual.  The impact of this was that a large amount of data could be accessed; there 
was no requirement that collateral intrusion into this data be minimised. 
This data must be sought for one of the specified purposes in RIPA s 22(2). However, 
these categories were interpreted broadly by those involved in granting access, 
principally, the designated person.  The designated person was an established individual 
within a public authority who authorised applications made by investigators to access 
communications data.  In law enforcement, this individual tended to be a superintendent 
or an inspector.  As a general guideline, the designated person who authorised 
applications for communications data should have been separate from the investigation 
but this was not always practicable.25  The designated person should have only granted an 
authorisation where he believed it was necessary and proportionate to the aim which was 
sought to be achieved.26 While this legislation provided for a statutory underpinning for 
                                                          
22RIPA n(21) s 22(2).  
23
 RIPA n(21) s 22(2)(h); The broad nature of these provisions meant that RIPA ended up being used for a 
ZLGHUDQJHRISXUSRVHVZKLFKZHUHQ¶WWKHDLPRIWKHOHJLVODWLRQVXFKDVGRJIRXOLQJIO\-tipping, and 
school catchment enforcement. 
24RIPA n(21) s 23(2)(b). 
25
 Anderson n(1). 
26RIPA n(21) S 22(4).  
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the access of communications data by law enforcement, the provisions were very broad 
and made the data readily accessible.  This raised concerns, particularly where access 
was being permitted to data in instances where it may be disproportionate to do so.  For 
H[DPSOHLWZDVQRWHGWKDWµLQDGGLWLRQWRWKHSROLFHLQYHVWLJDWLQJµserious crime¶DQGWKH
security services and the police investigating terrorism, other agencies, such as local 
DXWKRULWLHV>FRXOG@DFFHVVWKRVHGDWDIRUUHODWLYHO\PLQRUPDWWHUV¶27  The data was 
LQFUHDVLQJO\EHLQJVXEMHFWWRµIXQFWLRQFUHHS¶ZKHUHLQLWLVXVHGIRUSXUSRVHVEH\RQG
national security or the investigation of crime.28 
This was intensified by the significant number of authorities who could access the data 
under RIPA.  The list of relevant public authorities allowed to access communications 
data under RIPA included bodies normally engaged in national security or law 
enforcemeQWIXQFWLRQVVXFKDVSROLFHIRUFHVWKH1DWLRQDO&ULPH$JHQF\+HU0DMHVW\¶V
Revenue and Customs, and the intelligence services.29  However, it also included any 
other public authority which was specified following an order made by the Home 
Secretary.30  The ability of the Home Secretary to designate other authorities who could 
obtain this data was used expansively.  As of 2015, there were approximately 600 
organisations who could obtain communications data under the RIPA provisions.31  The 
capabilities under RIPA exponentially increased the accessibility of the information.   
It is worth noting that RIPA in its original iteration only applied to communications data 
collected for ex post facto investigations.  This was because there was no consistent 
retention policy so it was unknown what data would actually be retained by the CSPs and 
                                                          
27
 HL Debates col 373, 20 March 2008. 
28
 Clive Walker, 'Data retention in the UK: Pragmatic and proportionate, or a step too far?' (2009) 25 
Computer Law & Security Review 325. 
29
 RIPA n(21) s 25. 
30
 RIPA n(21) s 25(g). 
31
 Anderson n(1) 6.64. 
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therefore available for access.  This limited the ability of law enforcement to find out 
information relevant to their investigations.  The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and 
the police gave examples of how the inability to consistently access this data could 
KLQGHUWKHLULQYHVWLJDWLRQV7KH\QRWHGWKDWµFRQVSLUDWRUVEHFRPHPRUHJXDUGHGLQWKHLU
XVHRIFRPPXQLFDWLRQVGDWDDVWKHPRPHQWRIDFULPHDSSURDFKHV¶DQGWKHUHIRUHROGHU
data may be more useful.32  These interested parties argued that the data could tie 
relatively low level criminals to the higher ups in organisations by establishing patterns 
of communications using historic data.  They also cited delays which occurred between 
incidents and the investigations which meant that older data often needed to be 
accessed.33   
Increasing the accessibility of retained data mitigated this problem.  The ability of law 
enforcement to access retained data did improve after the passage of the Code of Practice 
under Part 11 of ATCSA discussed in the preceding chapter.  However, it is important to 
remember that Code only possessed a voluntary obligation to retain data.  Therefore, the 
amount of data that could be accessed would be dependent on the decisions of the CSPs 
to retain the data.  However, provided that information was retained, the Code could not 
place any restrictions on the ability of public authorities to access the data retained on 
condition that their authorisation for access satisfied the requirements set out in RIPA.   
The provisions under RIPA were enacted to deal with the inability of public authorities to 
access information that they felt was relevant.  The legislature guaranteed access in these 
provisions making the communications data under RIPA readily available to an 
increasing number of authorities and for a wide range of purposes.  However, by 
expanding access to communications data, CSPs were faced with new obligations and the 
                                                          
32
 Anderson n(1) 9.45. 
33
 Anderson n(1) 9.45. 
 155 
 
risk of privacy intrusions intensified.  CSPs had to facilitate access to the information 
required by the authorities, but were given no guidance or provisions on how to do so; 
nor were they entitled to challenge the requests made under RIPA.  Increased data pools 
and lower accessibility thresholds meant that both more relevant data could potentially be 
accessed and more individuals could be caught by a request, thereby increasing the 
interference with privacy and the risk of collateral intrusions.  These considerations 
informed critiques and judicial challenges to RIPA and drove subsequent legislative 
changes.  
c. EU Law: Directives 2002/58/EC and 2006/24/EC 
EU law in the field of data retention discussed in the previous chapter is largely silent on 
restrictions and provisions regarding access to the data by law enforcement.  The 
principal provisions enshrined in these Directives concerned unauthorised access which 
interferes with the confidentiality of communications and related communications data.34  
However, the Directives did recognise that data retention was linked to later access by 
law enforcement.  To that end, Directive 2002/58/EC required that providers establish 
procedures for responding to requests for access where those requests were issued by a 
competent national authority and in accordance with the legislative measures of the 
Member State.35  
 In amending Directive 2002/58, Directive 2006/24/EC similarly stressed the relationship 
between data retention and access and the importance of guaranteeing that the data be 
made available to law enforcement for a certain period but did not prescribe specific 
                                                          
34
 Directive 2002/58/EC states that measures should be taken to prevent unauthorised access to 
communications in order to protect the confidentiality of communications (Directive 2002/58/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of 
privacy in the electronic communications sector (2002) OJ L201/37).   
35
 Directive 2002/58/EC n(34) Art 15. 
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access conditions for the data.36  Rather, decisions regarding access remained with the 
Member States.  The Member States had to ensure that the data was provided only to 
competent national authorities in accordance with national law and set out procedures for 
accessing the data in accordance with the principles of necessity and proportionality.37  
There was no substantive or procedural guidance on the requirements that needed to be 
incorporated by Member States in so doing.  Nor did the Directive effectively place any 
limitations on access and use of the data or require any safeguards to ensure against the 
potential interference with Article 8 rights.  In mandating retention and providing for 
permissive access provisions these statutory instruments favoured the aims of law 
enforcement.  However, they were open, and indeed were, challenged for the same 
procedures in the case of Digital Rights Ireland. 
d. Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-549/12 Digital Rights Ireland v Minister for 
Communication & Ors and Seitlinger & Ors 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the case of Digital Rights Ireland precipitated several 
legislative changes.  The primary focus of the case was data retention systems provided 
for in the Directive.  However, as noted, these systems are inextricably linked to access 
provisions; this was demonVWUDWHGE\WKHDSSOLFDQW¶Vargument that the obligation to 
retain data thereby permitted control of and access to the data in violation of fundamental 
rights.  It is therefore instructive to examine the ruling of DRI as it relates to access.    
In its holding, the Court affirmed that access by competent national authorities 
constituted a further interference with the right to private life under Article 8 ECHR and 
                                                          
36Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and the Council on the retention of data generated or 
processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications networks 
(2006) OJ L105/54 Recital 9. 
37
 Directive 2006/24/EC n(36) Art 4. 
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Article 7 of the Charter.38  Consequently, the interference can only be justified if it is 
done in accordance with law and in a manner which satisfies the requirements of 
necessity and proportionality.  According to the Court, this required Member States to 
provide for domestic law which limited access and subsequent use of the data for the 
purposes of preventing and detecting precisely defined µserious crimes¶ and enabling the 
prosecution of those crimes.39  However, these µserious crimes¶ were not defined in the 
Directive but in national law.40  Indeed the Directive did not even impose a requirement 
that the data accessed was limited to the purposes of investigating and prosecuting 
µserious crimeV¶, only that access procedures, as established by the individual Member 
States, meet necessity and proportionality requirements.41  As a result, the Directive 
failed to circumscribe when the data could be accessed.   
Even though the Directive did require that data should only be accessed where necessary 
and proportionate, it did not lay down any objective criteria which would determine that 
the domestic access provisions met these requirements.  There was no limitation on the 
number of persons entitled to access the data, meaning that it could be accessed beyond 
what was strictly necessary.  Further, there was no requirement of prior review by a court 
or independent administrative body before access was authorised.  Such procedures 
would guarantee that access to the data was limited and the use of that data was confined 
                                                          
38
 This confirmed the precedent set in: Leander v Sweden App no 9248/81 (ECtHR, 26 Mar 1987) para 48 
ZKLFKVWDWHVµ%RWKWKHVWRULQJDQGUHOHDVHRIVXFKLQIRUPDWLRQ«DPRXQWHGWRDQLQWHUIHUHQFHZLWKKLVULJKW
to respect for pULYDWHOLIHDVJXDUDQWHHGE\$UWLFOH¶Rotaru v Romania App no 28341/95 (ECtHR, 4 
0D\SDUDµ%RWKWKHVWRULQJE\DSXEOLFDXWKRULW\RILQIRUPDWLRQUHODWLQJWRDQLQGLYLGXDO¶V
SULYDWHOLIHDQGWKHXVHRILW«DPRXQWWRDQLQWHUIHUHQFH¶DQGWeber & Saravia v Germany App no 
54394/00 (ECtHR, 29 June 2006) para µ)XUWKHUPRUHWKH&RXUW«WDNHVWKHYLHZWKDWWKHWUDQVPLVVLRQ
of data to and their use by other authorities, which enlarges the group of persons with knowledge of the 
personal data intercepted and can lead to investigations being instituted against the persons concerned, 
FRQVWLWXWHVDIXUWKHUVHSDUDWHLQWHUIHUHQFHZLWKWKHDSSOLFDQWV¶ULJKWVXQGHU$UWLFOH¶ 
39Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland v Minister for Communications & Ors and 
Michael Seitlinger & Ors [2014] 2 All ER para 61. 
40
 Directive 2006/24/EC n(36) Art 1(1). 
41
 DRI n(39) para 61. 
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to what was strictly necessary for the criminal justice objective pursued.42  While the 
primary result of the ruling in DRI was the invalidation of Directive 2006/24/EC, DRI 
also triggered changes in domestic legislation.  National laws were subject to challenge if 
they did not provide the protections set forth by the Court.   
e. Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2016 and the Code of Practice for 
the Acquisition and Disclosure of Communications Data 2015 
The UK recognised that DRI opened an avenue of potential challenge to the provisions 
regarding communications data.  The Government therefore sought protect the 
capabilities of law enforcement clarifying the obligations placed on service providers 
under RIPA.43  The clarifications under RIPA related primarily to rules regarding its 
extra-territorial effect wherein a CSP outside the jurisdiction of the UK could be 
obligated to obtain and divulge data to the UK upon issuance of a warrant.44  However, 
the statutory changes in DRIPA did not relate to the domestic access provisions under 
RIPA.  These changes were instead found in the amended Code of Practice for the 
Acquisition and Disclosure of Communications Data 2015 (hereafter the Code of 
Practice).45   
In essence the DRI principles required that access be restricted to situations where it is 
QHFHVVDU\IRUWKHSUHYHQWLRQGHWHFWLRQRUSURVHFXWLRQRIµserious crime¶where only a 
limited number of persons should be able to access and subsequently use the data for 
these purposes; and an independent administrative or judicial body is empowered to 
make decisions regarding access.  The Code of Practice incorporated some of the 
                                                          
42
 DRI n(39) para 62.  The safeguards and oversight regimes governing communications data are explored 
more fully in Chapter 6. 
43Explanatory Notes to the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014. 
44
 Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 s 4.   
45
 This Code of Practice was issued pursuant to Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 s 71(4).   
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principles, but its overall ability to ensure access does not interfere with fundamental 
rights is questionable.  In the first instance, the Code of Practice made no requirement 
that the powers of access only be XVHGZKHUHLWUHODWHVWRµserious crime¶5DWKHUWKH
Code stated that the access will be considered necessary so long as the application 
provides how the requested information is linked to an event under investigation; how 
the person whose information they are seeking links to the event; what type of 
communications data is required; and what its link to the event is.46  There was no 
UHTXLUHPHQWWKDWWKHµHYHQW¶EHDµserious crime¶.  Further, the application would be 
considered proportionate if it justified the interference, taking into account any collateral 
intrusion and the ability of less intrusive means to gather the information, and stated how 
the information would benefit the investigation.47  The provisions in the Code did not 
sufficiently limit access in the manner required by the DRI judgment. 
Additionally, the large number of authorities who could access communications data 
remained.  The one modification under DRIPA was the removal of the powers of access 
from thirteen authorities.48  This does not reflect the principles in DRI that access to this 
data should be limited to where it is strictly necessary.  Finally, under these instruments 
there was still no requirement of prior judicial authorisation or approval by an 
independent administrative body before access to the information was given.  The 
authorisation was approved by a designated person.  This individual was required to be 
independent from the operation and investigation for which the authorisation is given.49  
However, there were exceptions to this requirement of independence.  For example, 
where it was necessary to act urgently, where there were small specialist units, or where 
                                                          
46Home Office, Acquisition and Disclosure of Communications Data Code of Practice (March 2015) para 
2.37. 
47
 Ibid paras 2.39 to 2.45. 
48
 Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Communications Data) Amendment Order 2015 (SI 2015/228) 
49
 Home Office, Acquisition n(46) para 3.11. 
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there were issues which required confidentiality, the requirements that the designated 
person be independent could be waived.   
The provisions of the Code of Practice did not reflect the principles set forth in DRI.  Nor 
did they provide significant protections from the interference which can result from these 
powers.  Significantly, as a Code of Practice rather than a statutory instrument, there is 
OLWWOHELQGLQJOHJDOHIIHFWWRLWVSURYLVLRQV,QGHHGV5,3$QRWHVWKDWµIDLOXUHRQWKH
SDUWRIDQ\SHUVRQWRFRPSO\ZLWKDQ\SURYLVLRQRIDFRGHRISUDFWLFH«Vhall not of itself 
render him liable to any criminal or FLYLOSURFHHGLQJV¶7KH&RGHZDs therefore an 
ineffective means of ensuring that data was acquired in a manner compliant with 
fundamental rights instruments.   
f. Investigatory Powers Act 2016  
As discussed in Chapter 3, the Investigatory Powers Act was passed to allow for the 
continued procedures of retention, while similarly updating the access powers for 
communications data in RIPA and giving statutory effect to some of the provisions set 
forth in the aforementioned Code of Practice.50  Principally, the provisions under IPA 
deal with the issues which arose through the legal challenges.  However, it is important to 
note the technological developments here as well.  The increased production of data and 
limited categories which could be accessed according to legislation meant that law 
                                                          
50
 It is important to note that at the time of writing the Home Office, Acquisition n(46) remains the relevant 
code for these provisions.  An amended Communications Data Code of Practice was issued in 2018 [Home 
2IILFHµCommunications Data DRAFT Code of Practice (June 2018) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/724394
/CCS207_CCS0618947544-001_Home_Office_Publication_of_Codes_CLIENT_PRINTIN....pdf> 
accessed 7 July 2018].  It is envisaged that this Code will come into effect following the passage of The 
Data Retention and Acquisition Regulations 2018 [Draft SI 2018 No Electronic Communications The Data 
Retention and Acquisition Regulations 2018 
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2018/9780111170809/regulation/4> accessed 12 July 2018].  These 
Regulations have been laid before Parliament (as of 11th July 2018) but have not yet been made as a UK 
Statutory Instrument.  Where necessary, the provisions of the Draft Code, as they relate to the access 
procedures discussed in this chapter, will be noted in the footnote until such a time as they come in to 




LQIRUPDWLRQ¶XQGHUWKHROGODZ51  IPA therefore seeks to ensure that the access provisions 
UHPDLQZLWKRXWLPSRVLQJDQ\XQGXHOLPLWDWLRQVRQODZHQIRUFHPHQW¶VFDSDELOLWLHVLQWKLV
area, while simultaneously increasing the categories of information that can be collected.   
For example, the IPA retains the authorisation procedures of its predecessors.  Mainly, 
authorisation can still be granted by a designated senior official, where it is deemed 
necessary and proportionate.52  In adjudging proportionality and any threat of collateral 
intrusion that might arise from access, the considerations are based on the time the 
application is made, and prior to any interference.53  This imposes an element of 
temporality in the process and is significant to the context in which privacy interest might 
be triggered.  Whilst when an application is made these measures may satisfy the 
proportionality requirements, the act of the interference and the subsequent investigation 
may reveal that the access was indeed disproportionate and unnecessary.  This issue is 
exacerbated by the increasing tendency to access communications data as a preliminary 
route of investigation rather than one which only occurs once other investigative methods 
have been exhausted.  Whilst it is not possible to foretell all potential implications for 
privacy, these factors should be considered in making an application.   
In approving the application, the designated official cannot be involved in the 
investigation but this requirement can be waived in exceptional circumstances.54  The 
application must provide information relating to why and by whom the information is 
sought.55  Furthermore, additional reporting and recording requirements are imposed on 
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 Clive Norris and Gary Armstrong, The Maximum Surveillance Society (1999 Berg) 209. 
52
 Investigatory Powers Act 2016 s 61(1). 
53
 Stanley Burnton, Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner (2016, HC 297) 7.46.  
54
 IPA n(52) s 63. 
55
 IPA n(52) s 64. 
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the authorities who make access requests.56  The list of authorities who can access the 
data remains expansive but additional obligations are now required if local authorities 
require access.57  In practice, law enforcement agencies account for approximately 94% 
of access requests and investigating crime is the primary justification for access.58  
However, there remains no requirement that the data only be accessed for the 
LQYHVWLJDWLRQRIµserious crime¶2QFHDUHTXHVWLVDSSURYHGE\WKHGHVLJQDWHGSHUVRQLW
is communicated to a Single Point of Contact (SPoC) who is trained to facilitate the 
lawful acquisition of communications data and effective cooperation between public 
authorities and CSPs.  The SPoC performs an oversight role by advising applicants on 
the interpretation of the law and ensures that the application is free from errors and 
lawful.59  These provisions ensure the access capabilities of law enforcement are 
preserved in the new legislation.   
Whilst the access provisions have remained relatively static since 2000, the Act does take 
into consideration technological developments which have increased the amount of data 
available and attempts to ensure that this data is made accessible as well.  As discussed in 
Chapter 3, the IPA allows for the retention and then subsequent access of internet 
FRQQHFWLRQUHFRUGV,&5VZKLFKµDUHDUHFRUGRIWKHLQWHUQet services that a specific 
device connects to ± such as a website or instant messaging application ± captured by the 
FRPSDQ\SURYLGLQJDFFHVVWRWKHLQWHUQHW¶60  The IPA provides that public authorities can 
access this data to identify: the sender of a communication, which communications 
                                                          
56
 Home Office, Acquisition n(46) 6.1 sets the record keeping obligations concerning applications and their 
outcomes; urgent authorisation; and relevant information about the type of data to whom it relates.  CSPs 
must similarly retain records of the access requests received and the information they provided to comply 
(6.3).  
57
 IPA n(52) s 70 
58Burnton n(53). 85.8% of access request relate to preventing or detecting crime or preventing disorder.  
The largest proportion of crime types are drug offences at 24%; sexual offences 12%; theft 9%; and fraud 
and deception at 8%. 
59
 Burnton n(53). 
60Explanatory Notes to the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 s 87 para 265. 
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services a person has been using (i.e. apps on their phone), where the person accessed 
illegal content, or which internet service is being used and when and how often.61  The 
authorisation which grants access to the information for these purposes must be deemed 
necessary by the designated official.62  The authorisation can also be granted where it is 
necessary for the prevention or detection of crime where that crime is serious or classed 
DVµRWKHUUHOHYDQWFULPH¶63  It is not readily apparent why the Act distinguishes between 
preventing and detecting relevant FULPHDQGSUHYHQWLQJRUGHWHFWLQJµserious crime¶DV
the provisions concerning the two are the same.  Regardless, this new category of data 
potentially increases the investigative capabilities of law enforcement.    
However, the incorporation of this technological development into law enforcement 
procedures raises issues with the social norms typically ascribed to this sort of 
information.  ICRs have the ability to reveal a significant amount of information about an 
individual as they give a picture of, for example, the websites an individual visits on a 
particular day.  In order to minimise the intrusion by preventing the disclosure of content, 
the law limits the ability of the requesting authority to look beyond the first backslash in 
these records; so, for example, www.google.co.uk would be accessible but with 
www.google.co.uk\investigatorypowersact, the investigatory powers act would be 
omitted from the record as it is deemed content.64  This is relatively innocuous when 
examining basic websites like Google or Facebook but becomes much more personal 
                                                          
61
 IPA n(52) s 62(3) & 62(4). 
62
 IPA n(52) s 61(7) sets out when it will be necessary to obtain this data, such as in the interest of national 
security or for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime or of preventing disorder.   
63IPA n(52) s 62(5); other relevant crime here is crime which is not serious but where the offence, or one of 
the offences, which would be constituted by the conduct concerned is an offence for which the individual is 
capable of being sentenced to imprisonment for 12 months or more, or an offence by a person who is not 
an individual or which involves, as an integral part of it, the sending of a communication or a breach of a 
SHUVRQ¶VSULYDF\,3$QV 
64
 This distinction to prevent content of the website being disclosed does not function particularly well with 
WKHWHFKQRORJ\)RUH[DPSOHEEFFRXNQHZVZRXOGRPLWµQHZV¶DVFRQWHQWEXWQHZVEEFFRXNZKLFK
takes you to the exact same site, would not be deemed content because it comes before the first backslash.   
 164 
 
when it potentially concerns sites that have more descriptive domain names.  As a result, 
intrusive personal information can be garnered from ICRs.  This information can both 
identify potential targets for law enforcement and more broadly identify sites which 
µPLJKWEHVXJJHVWLYHRUFRUURERUDWLYHRIFULPLQDOLW\¶65  This is one of the reasons it is so 
valuable to law enforcement.  In permitting the retention and access to ICRs, the IPA 
extends the traditional powers of law enforcement to intrude into areas where it was not 
feasible before; this development has been facilitated by technology, but it also fails to 
take into consideration the wider social impact which results from treating this new and 
more intrusive category of data in the same manner as traditional communications data.   
The IPA seeks to go even further in providing access to law enforcement by requiring 
CSPs to create and install technical capabilities which provide for quicker access and 
process the data so that only relevant information is disclosed to the public authority, 
thereby removing the risk of collateral intrusions.  Previous provisions regarding the 
creation of such technical capabilities were undertaken under the powers of RIPA but 
only as regards interception.  The Investigatory Powers (Technical Capability) 
Regulations 2018 extend these powers to communications data as well.  The regulations 
aim to ensure that law enforcement can obtain communications data without undue delay, 
and requires CSPs to create, modify, test, and maintain systems which enable them to do 
so.66  CSPs are further required to only disclose, where practicable, the communications 
data which is authorised; no extraneous data should be disclosed.67   
                                                          
65
 Anderson n(1) 9.59. 
66
 Investigatory Powers (Technical Capability) Regulations 2018, SI 2018/353 Schedule 2. 
67
 IP Regulations n(66) Schedule 2 Part 1(8); It is worth noting that this raises a question as to whether it 
would absolve the public authority of any liability for a privacy violation resulting from a collateral 
intrusion of the data if the obligation was placed on the CSP to filter this out.  If so, is there any right to 
remedy which can be sought against a CSP who mistakenly discloses additional irrelevant information?  
This will be addressed in Chapter 6. 
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Further, CSPs are required to provide the information sought in an intelligible form and 
remove any electronic protections which have been applied to it.68  Essentially this 
provision requires that, where possible, encryption be removed from the data so that law 
enforcement can utilise it for criminal justice purposes.  However, depending on the 
encryption methods, it may not be possible to remove this protection to provide the 
police access to the desired information.69   Sir Thomas Winsor, HM Chief Inspector of 
Constabulary in his State of PoliciQJ5HSRUWFODLPHGWKDWµ7he wide availability of 
impenetrable end-to-end encryption services has made life easier for terrorists, 
paedophiles, and oUJDQLVHGFULPLQDOVDQGKDUGHUIRUODZHQIRUFHPHQW¶70  The provisions 
of the Regulations in this regard demonstrate how the needs of law enforcement have 
been incorporated into this secondary instrument as a result of technological 
developments which made encryption more accessible to everyday users and therefore 
the data more difficult to acquire and interpret.   
In addition, the Regulations make provision for the Secretary of State to require CSPs to 
install and maintain any apparatus provided by or on behalf of the Secretary so the 
operator can obtain or disclose communications data.71  This is billed as a 
FRPPXQLFDWLRQVGDWDDFTXLVLWLRQµEODFNER[¶ZKLFKLVGHVLJQHGDQGLPSOHPHQWHGE\WKH
Government rather than by private companies.  There is very little information provided 
about what these apparatuses might do, only that if so required the CSP will be required 
                                                          
68
 IP Regulations n(66) Schedule 2 Part 1(9) 
69
 This is the case with messages sent over WhatsApp, an over-the-top messaging service, which offers 
users end-to-end encryption for their communications.  This type of encryption means that it is not possible 
for law enforcement to access the content of those communications.  However, WhatsApp does not encrypt 
the metadata (akin to communications data), so LEA capabilities would not be hindered in this area. 
Thomas Fox-%UHZVWHUµ)RUJHW$ERXW%DFNGRRUV7KLVLVWKH'DWD:KDWV$SSDFWXDOO\+DQGVWR&RSV¶
(Forbes 22 June 2017) <https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2017/01/22/whatsapp-facebook-
backdoor-government-data-request/#64dda5141030> accessed 27 July 2018.  
70
 HMCIC, State of Policing: The Annual Assessment of Policing in England and Wales (2017) 
<https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/state-of-policing-2017-2.pdf> 
accessed 8 May 2018.  
71
 IP Regulations n(66) Schedule 2 para 10.   
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to place them in their system.  Finally, there is an obligation placed on service providers 
to inform the Home Office prior to any changes to their services or instituting any new 
technologies which may impact on these capabilities.72  CSPs may also be required to 
consider the requirements of the technical capability regulations in designing their 
products and services.  The effect of these regulations requires CSPs to perform further 
functions of a public nature by creating infrastructure which provides access and 
disclosure.  As a result, the provisions of the IPA regarding access intrude significantly 
farther than its forebears into the personal information of individuals.   
g. Joined Cases C-203/15 Tele2 Sverige AB v Post-och telestyrelsen and C-698/15 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v Tom Watson & Ors 
The final element to be considered in the discussion of access to retained data in the ICT 
systems is the Tele2 case.  As regards access, the applicants in Tele2 sought to determine 
whether: 1) access by national authorities can be permitted for the data retained under the 
general obligation imposed by Article 15(1) Directive 2002/58;73 and 2) whether the DRI 
judgment lays down any mandatory requirements applicable to Member StatHV¶GRPHVWLF
law for access in order to comply with Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter.74  In answering 
these questions, the Court had to first consider whether access fell within the scope of 
'LUHFWLYH,QWKLVUHJDUG0HPEHU6WDWHV¶ODZVLQWHUSUHWWhe scope of the 
Directive differently; notably, for the purposes here, the UK argues that it is only 
legislation relating to retention, but not access, which falls within the scope of the 
Directive.75  This viewpoint was supported by the Commission.  However, the Court 
                                                          
72
 IP Regulations n(66) Schedule 2 para 11. 
73Joined Cases C-203/15 Tele2 v Post-och telestyrelsen & C-698/15 Watson & Ors v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department (2016) ECLI 970 para 51. 
74
 Tele2 n(73) para 59 
75
 Tele2 n(73) para 65.  There is disagreement amongst the domestic law of several Member States as to 
whether national access legislation falls within the scope of the Directive.  Belgium, the Netherlands, 
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found that the scope of the Directive went farther and incorporated the legislative 
measures relating to access to the data retained as well:  
Further, since data is retained only for the purpose, when necessary, of making that 
data accessible to the competent national authorities, national legislation that 
imposes the retention of data necessarily entails, in principle, the existence of 
provisions relating to access by the competent national authorities to the data 
retained.76 
As access was held to fall under the Directive, the question then became to what extent 
there existed any requirements in national law to ensure that access provisions complied 
with relevant fundamental rights standards, and relatedly, whether the requirements of 
independent oversight and purpose limitation set out in DRI were mandatory.  In 
determining the question, the Court noted that the access provisions must satisfy the 
requirements of necessity and proportionality.  Therefore access must only occur where 
strictly necessary and be subject to adequate safeguards which clearly prescribe when 
access will be authorised.  Further, access must only be granted where necessary for 
WKRVHSXUSRVHVUHODWLQJWRµVHULRXVFULPH¶;77 QDPHO\ZKHUHWKDWDFFHVVUHODWHVµWRWKHGDWD
RILQGLYLGXDOVVXVSHFWHGRISODQQLQJFRPPLWWLQJRUKDYLQJFRPPLWWHGDµserious crime¶
RURIEHLQJLPSOLFDWHGLQRQHZD\RUDQRWKHULQVXFKDFULPH¶78  However, the precedent 
set here runs counter to the policies set out in the IPA wherein increasing categories of 
GDWDFDQEHDFFHVVHGZLWKRXWEHLQJOLQNHGWRDQ\µserious crime¶ 
                                                          
Denmark, Germany, Estonia, and Ireland believe that it does.  The Czech Republic believes that it does 
not.  
76
 Tele2 n(73) para 79. 
77
 Tele2 n(73) para 115. 
78
 Tele2 n(73) para 118. 
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The ruling serves to limit the amount of data that can be accessed and thereby the powers 
of law enforcement in this regard.  This is significant as the police have expressed views 
that communications data is valuable for even minor investigations.  In his report, David 
$QGHUVRQQRWHGWKDWµ&RPPXQLFDWLRQVGDWDPD\DOVREHQHHGHGLQRUGHUWRPHHWSXEOLF
expectations that the police will be able to solve even relatively low-level crimes.  Thus, 
ZKHUHVRPHRQHKDVWKHLUPRXQWDLQELNHVWROHQDQGVHHVLWDGYHUWLVHGIRUVDOH«
investigators may need to apply, at a minimum, for subscriber information to pursue the 
FDVH¶79  In limiting access, these lower level functions will not be permitted.  Proponents 
argue that this will hinder the overall abilities of law enforcement, however, such 
provisions serve to offer protections for individuals by reducing the potential collateral 
intrusions and guaranteeing that the data accessed is confined to that which is necessary.   
Domestically, the Court of Appeal case to apply the ruling in Tele2 and Watson agreed 
with the requirement that Section 1 DRIPA was inconsistent with EU law in that it failed 
to limit access to retained data solely for fighting µVHULRXVFULPH¶.80  Further, access was 
not made contingent on prior review by a court or an independent administrative 
authority.81  As a result, the Court of Appeal granted declaratory relief in this case.  The 
issue of access was subsequently raised in the High Court case of Liberty v SSHD 
wherein the access provisions under the IPA were challenged.  In this case, the claim for 
judicial review succeeded as retention under IPA was held to be incompatible with 
fundamental rights due to the fact that subsequHQWDFFHVVZDVQRWOLPLWHGWRµVHULRXV
crime¶QRUZDVLWVXEMHFWWRSULRUMXGLFLDORULQGHSHQGHQWDGPLQLVWUDWLYHUHYLHZ82  In 
                                                          
79
 Anderson n(1) 9.26. 
80
 Watson v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 70 para 13. 
81
 Watson n(80) para 27.  
82
 Liberty v SSHD [2018] EWHC 976 para 186. 
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consequence, the Court held that the legislation must be amended by the 1 November 
2018 to address the current inadequacies of the access regime.   
IV. Applying Contextual Integrity to Access 
In determining whether privacy has been violated as a result of access to communications 
data, it is necessary to determine the extent the informational norms have shifted, thereby 
breaching contextual integrity.  To this end, it is necessary to examine whether the norms 
associated with information types, transmission principles, and actors have been altered 
by the developments of the system.  In the context of the ICT system at issue, the 
attributes of communications data mean that far more information can be derived from it.  
This makes the ability to access that data a valuable tool for law enforcement.  
Legislative developments in this area reflect the desire to increase access and ensure that 
the information is available for the necessary purposes.  Concurrently, the increase in 
data poses an additional risk to the individual.  The information which can be accessed 
does not only concern basic data on communications (i.e. who called whom and when), 
but encompasses far more personal details, such as what websites an individual visits.  
The intrusiveness of this information would be recognised if it occurred in a different 
context.83  However, because these interferences occur in the digital realm, their 
intrusiveness is not recognised as such.     
 To assess whether the informational norms associated with access to communications 
data are breached, it is first necessary to construct these norms by looking at the 
information types, transmission principles, and actors involved.  With regards to the 
                                                          
83
 Consider for example targeted surveillance wherein an individual was followed to every location they 
visited throughout the day, who they spoke to in each location was noted, and the time they spent there was 
recorded.  Such an action would be subject to strict safeguards and oversight provisions which do not exist 
in the case of communications data.   
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information type, the question is whether the nature of the information has changed in 
some way which would alter the norms attributed to it.  In the legislative discourse, 
communications data is frequently likened to envelope information; this type of 
LQIRUPDWLRQH[SRVHVWKHLGHQWLWLHVRIDSHUVRQ¶VFROOHDJXHVDQGIULHQGVUHYHDOing 
associational ties.  Even this type of information raises concerns for privacy as in many 
instances, people may care more about concealing with whom they are talking than what 
they are saying.  However, beyond the mere nature of the data which can raise privacy 
issues, there is the issue of the technology which collects, maintains, and provides access 
to it.  The data is centralised, digitised, and structured; it is not mediated by human 
memory or relationships.84  Whereas in past, the information would be sought from 
human actors, the digitised information is stripped of its context and surrounding factors.  
It is a representation of fact but not necessarily meaning.  Furthermore, the information 
which law enforcement seeks to access is not constrained by previous temporal 
considerations; the data is not only forward looking but historic data as well.  It is access 
to multiple communications sources, reaching back in to the past, which can be used to 
track and monitor individuals.  Nor does the nature of the information neatly fit into the 
FRQILQHVRIWKHGHILQLWLRQRIµHQYHORSHGDWD¶7KLVGDWDLVH[SDQVLYHDQGSDUWLFXODUO\
with the inclusion of ICRs, reveals intimate and highly personal details.  Whilst the 
access provisions differ between content and communications data, in practice this 
distinction has become difficult to make.   
In addition to changes relating to the nature of the information, the development of the 
ICT system has altered norms associated with the transmission of information.  Notably 
for the access component, constraints on the flow of information have changed as a result 
                                                          
84
 /LVD$XVWLQµ7HFKQRORJLFDO7DWWOHWDOHVDQG&RQVWLWXWLRQDO%ODFN+ROHV&RPPXQLFDWLRQV,QWHUPHGLDULHV
DQG&RQVWLWXWLRQDO&RQVWUDLQWV¶7KHRUHWLFDO Inq L 451, 457.  
 171 
 
of legislative developments.  Jurisprudence concerning data has confirmed that 
communication of that data to a third party, including a public authority, constitutes an 
interference with the right to respect for private life, regardless of the subsequent use of 
the information.85  By granting access from these third parties to public authorities the 
norms associated with information flows have changed.  Furthermore, access is 
increasingly granted regardless of the traditional jurisdictional bounds which applied 
prior to the development of technology which enables the sharing and spread of data 
transnationally.  There is often a disconnect between the location of the entity seeking 
access and the intermediary who possesses the information.  The Government argues that 
it is the location of access, not the location of data, which is relevant to jurisdictional 
concerns,86 and this is reflected in the legislation.  Yet, the disconnect between access 
and data strips the data of any residual links to a community or society that might exist.  
As such, the meaning of the data becomes removed from the events from which it was 
derived.  Changes to the traditional flow of information associated with communications 
data are compounded by shifts in the roles played by the relevant actors in the system.  
Several actors are involved in the access processes of the ICT system and the roles they 
play also play a role in altering entrenched informational norms.  It is necessary to 
determine who is in charge of access as the attitudes, predispositions, and biases of those 
actors can fundamentally shape the process.87  The subjectivities of those who direct the 
choice of information accessed will be relevant to the value ascribed to that data.  As has 
                                                          
85
 CJEU, Opinion 1/15 on the Draft Agreement between Canada and the European Union on the transfer 
and processing of Passenger Name Record data, Opinion of the Court (Grand Chamber), 26 July 2017, 
paras. 124-125. 
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 -HQQLIHU'DVNDOµ7KH8Q-7HUULWRULDOLW\RI'DWD¶-2016) 125 Yale L J 326, 373; IPA s 85 states that 
an authorisation may relate to conduct or persons outside the UK.  
87
 Kevin Haggerty, 'Tear down the walls: on demolishing the Panopticon' in Lyon (ed), Theorizing 
Surveillance: The Panopticon and Beyond (Willan Publishing 2006) 33. 
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been noted in the legislation, certain public bodies have purpose limitations which apply 
to their access requests or the type of data they can access.88    
The CSP acts principally as a facilitator for access, providing the basic necessary 
infrastructure to be able to disclose the required information to investigators.  In this 
regard, the CSP acts as a conduit; information is collected and retained on their system 
and, in the same manner and form, it is passed on to investigators.  The delegation of this 
power to private entities has a considerable impact on norms associated with access.  
Notably, there exist immunities for companies who comply with legitimate access 
UHTXHVWVµ$VDUHVXOWWKHVHFRPSDQLHVDUHVXEMHFWWRQHLWKHUWKHEXUGHQRIWUDQVSDUHQF\
nor the constitutional constraintVLPSRVHGXSRQVWDWHDFWRUV¶89  Information which is 
incorrect or shared erroneously by the CSP will not give rise to liability under the 
Investigatory Powers Act.90  The requirement that CSPs act as facilitators here can enable 
the subversion of traditional protections concerning access.  Typically, a public body will 
be limited in the manner in which it can search through electronic information.  By 
requiring CSPs to do this, traditional limitations and protections for fundamental rights 
are more easily avoided.91 
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 For example, the power of officials in the Criminal Cases Review commission may only make requests 
relating to miscarriages of justice.  The Scottish Ambulance Board is limited to requests with the aim of 
preventing or mitigating injury or death.  JUSTICE, Freedom from Suspicion: Surveillance Reform for a 
Digital Age (2011) < https://2bquk8cdew6192tsu41lay8t-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/01/JUSTICE-Freedom-from-Suspicion-Surveillance-Reform-for-a-Digital-Age.pdf> 
accessed 25 Nov 2015 74.  
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 1DQF\.LPDQG-HUHP\7HOPDQµ,QWHUQHW*LDQWVDV4XDVL-Governmental Actors and the Limits of 
&RQWUDFWXDO&RQVHQW¶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Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act offers immunity from breach of contract claims when they share 
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703(e), 122 Stat 2436 (2008)] 
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liable for data breaches under the Data Protection Act 2018.  
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 Niva Elkin-.RUHQ	(OGDU+DEHUµ*RYHUQDQFHE\3UR[\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Additionally, more technical requirements are now being placed on CSPs to not only 
provide access, but to process the data in a manner that limits collateral intrusions and 
limits any delays for law enforcement in acquiring the information.  As Leenes and Koop 
recognised, the legislation has directed the technology providers to build in features 
related to legal norms, and industry has complied.92  The additional requirements placed 
on CSPs to process and interpret the data demonstrates a shift in the role assigned to this 
organisational element.  They are more actively involved in the criminal justice processes 
and the legislative developments indicate that this is an area where the requirements 
placed on them are likely to expand further in the future.  This is a fundamental shift 
which has altered the informational norms, as access is no longer solely in the purview of 
law enforcement, but has been expanded to CSPs as well.   
Concurrently with the increased role of CSPs in the process there has been a diminution 
of the role of the individual and an increase in the informational disparity between 
parties.  Individuals are prevented from having knowledge of access and how their 
information is used.  Companies, in deciding whether to comply or challenge an access 
request, can exercise their discretion in a manner that best comports with their own 
corporate interest, rather than any interest for the individual.  Austin argues that this sort 
RIFRRSHUDWLRQµLVIUHHRIWKHNLQGVRISHUVRQDOLQWHUHVWRUSUHMXGLFHWKDWUDises questions 
with other [parties].  However, it also seems to be free of other kinds of constraining 
VRFLDOQRUPVVXFKDVWKHOR\DOW\FKDUDFWHULVWLFRIYDULRXVVRFLDOUHODWLRQV¶93  As a result, 
changes in the roles played by the actors involved in the access process, along with 
alterations in the nature of information and its flow reflect shifts in informational norms.  
                                                          
92%HUW-DDS.RRSV	5RQDOG/HHQHV³&RGH´DQGWKH6ORZ(URVLRQRI3ULYDF\¶0LFK7HOHFRP
& Tech L R 335.  
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Such shifts are indicative that contextual integrity has been breached in the context of the 
access element of the ICT system.     
V. Conclusion 
For law enforcement, the access component of the ICT system has evolved to allow for 
the acquisition of more data.  The overall objective, of accessing communications data 
for the investigation of crime, has been preserved by legislative developments.  The 
organisational element, in the form of CSPs, has seen its role gradually increase as they 
take on more duties which facilitate the criminal justice processes.  Individuals have also 
seen a shift in their position, as the communications data they generate provides more 
information which can be accessed.  Technological developments have increased the 
generation of this data and enabled the creation of processes and methods whereby the 
CSPs can provide simpler and quicker access to law enforcement.  As a result, the 
informational norms associated with access to communications data have been altered.  
The changes to the access component have failed to incorporate these changes in norms 
and therefore there is a prima facie breach of privacy when communications data is 
accessed.  While access can be classed as a violation of privacy, it is also important to 
examine what is done with the accessed data.  How, and for what purposes is it analysed?  
The following chapter looks to the analysis of accessed communications data in the ICT 




CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS OF COMMUNICATIONS DATA 
I. Introduction  
In the ICT system, communications data, retained and accessed, requires analysis to 
determine the value of the information and how it can be best applied to meet criminal 
justice aims.  It is therefore necessary to establish what processes and methods are used 
to extract meaning from the information.  Technological growth is a key element in the 
development of these methods.  Analytical processes have improved significantly due to 
technological advancements in areas such as information science, information 
management, mathematical and statistical analysis, cryptography, and artificial 
intelligence.1  As demonstrated in the previous chapters, laws have similarly developed, 
requiring new methods of data capture, processing, and access, thereby providing more 
information to be examined.  The utility of communications data for investigations has 
motivated the development of increasingly sophisticated methods for interpreting the 
collected information.   
Similarly, the ability to analyse and use this information in an effective manner has, to an 
extent, altered the nature of policing, allowing investigators to eschew traditional 
techniques and take a more proactive approach.  Communications data can be used as a 
preliminary investigative tool which is then used to gather more persuasive evidence, as 
well as being a source of information to strengthen a case against an identified suspect.  
Provided meaningful information can be extracted from the communications data, the 
data then allows police to build applications for more intrusive investigative methods or 
                                                          
1
 Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context (Stanford University Press 2010) 37. 
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renders those measures unnecessary.2  The value of the data reaches into other areas of 
the criminal justice process as well.  For example, prosecutors can use the analysed 
information to demonstrate patterns of communications between conspirators.3   
The role of the data in the criminal justice system motivates the continuing development 
of processes which enhance analytical capabilities.  There are several broad categories of 
methods of analysis which are of significance for communications data and law 
enforcement.  Algorithmic processing, aggregation, and Big Data analysis are three of the 
principal ways in which meaning can be derived from the data.  The technology is used 
to create or extract information which goes beyond what can be found naturally or what 
is voluntarily reported.4   
The first category broadly refers to the use of computer algorithms to draw inferences 
from data.  This applies to communications data when it is used to infer suspicion or guilt 
based on the movements or contacts an individual has made.  It is particularly useful 
when attempting to discover information about a wider criminal network from the 
information provided by a relatively low level criminal.  As Ian Brown notes, ͚most 
people͛s communications behaviour patterns are extremely regular, and investigating a 
small number of carefully chosen individuals based on these patterns can reveal 
information about much larger networks͛.5  The use of algorithms which engage with 
automated processes, such as the ͚request filter͛ which will be discussed in this chapter, 
raises significant concerns for human rights.   
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 David Anderson, A Question of Trust: Report of the Investigatory Powers Review (Stationary Office 
2015) 9.30.   
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 Anderson n(2) 9.32; this is particularly useful in organised crime cases.   
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Behavioural Sciences (2 edn, Elsevier 2015) 735.  
5
 Ian Brown, 'Communications Data Retention in an Evolving Internet' (2010) 19(2) International Journal 
of Law and Information Technology, 101. 
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In addition, aggregation as an analytical process brings together various strands of 
information to allow determinations to be made.  The extensive nature of the data and 
technological developments which enable digital processing and analysis are much more 
powerful than previous capabilities which relied on human capacities.  More meaning 
can be extracted from the information using these digital processes as well.  As 
Nissenbaum notes, ͚Abetted by brute processing power, increasingly sophisticated 
mathematical and statistical techniques have made it possible to extract descriptive and 
predictive meanings from information that goes well beyond its literal boundaries͛. 6  In 
order to achieve this, the information that is aggregated needs to be rendered into 
recognisable data, with CSPs generating and retaining the data in a consistent manner.  
Even within setting the requirements for the consistent collection and processing of data, 
there are inscribed politics and social constructs which must be acknowledged.7 
Finally, and related to the two preceding methods, Big Data techniques allow for the 
creation of large scale data sets.  These data sets can aggregate data in the manner listed 
above, or offer pools of information to be analysed using algorithmic processing.  They 
also facilitate the creation and maintenance of databases which enable the sharing of 
information and the detection of patterns and correlations.  This allows individuals to be 
identified and their current actions linked to their biographical profile.8  This capability is 
important, as without bulk machine based techniques, it is much more difficult for 
investigators to link crimes to a person, discover the identity of individuals using a 
communications service, identify relevant locations, or separate communications data 
and content from one another.9  Such methods further enable pre-emptive policing 
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techniques in which large scale data sets are used to cluster data in such a way that 
information is inferred and predictions can be made.10 
The analytical techniques at issue in the ICT system possess the three preceding 
capabilities.  However, the analysis of the data goes beyond these three areas.  Whilst the 
analytical processes referred to above highlight how CSPs have been further co-opted 
into the law enforcement process through the additional functions imposed on them, it is 
also important to examine the analytical techniques of law enforcement themselves.  To 
that end, it is necessary to examine law enforcement use of, and subsequent downstream 
access provided to, data.  These processes must be judged against their impact on context 
relative informational norms and determine whether there has been a shift in these norms 
which represents a disproportionate interference with privacy.  This chapter proceeds by 
examining four methods of analysis which are embodied in the communications data 
provisions of the investigatory powers instruments: Part I will examine IP address 
resolution, Part II will address the interpretation of Internet Connection Records (ICRs), 
and Part III will analyse the ͚request filter͛.  Each of these methods is a result of 
technological advances which both motivated the development of a legal framework to 
provide law enforcement access and fundamentally shifted the social norms ascribed to 
the analysis of data.  Each element will be examined in turn.  Part IV will address the 
subsequent sharing and downstream use of this data to satisfy law enforcement functions.  
Such sharing occurs once the data has been analysed for its initial purpose and provides 
an additional information source for law enforcement.  Part V will then proceed by 
assessing the impact of these technological developments on the context relative 
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informational norms typically associated with the analysis of communications data to 
establish that there has been a breach of contextual integrity.   
II. The utility of communications data analysis in IP Address Resolution 
IP address resolution refers to the linking of IP addresses to a physical location.  
Proponents of IP address resolution erroneously cite its ability to enable law enforcement 
to link an individual to an IP address at a given time.11  Such a belief has motivated the 
inclusion of the retention of IP address information in the relevant legislation.     
a. Legislative Provisions Concerning IP Addresses 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the Data Retention Regulations 2009 were the first instrument 
to mandate the retention of internet access, internet e-mail and internet telephony 
communications data.  Under these regulations, CSPs were required to retain data 
necessary to trace and identify the source of a communication and the date, time, and 
duration of a communication.12  IP addresses fell under this category.  However, the 
retention of relevant information concerning IP addresses did not enable the law 
enforcement to link this data to individuals.  Additional information was needed to 
achieve this, leading to the legislative developments in the subsequent Counter Terrorism 
and Security Act.  
In order to facilitate the ability to link IP addresses to individuals, the CTSA extended the 
categories of information that needed to be retained to include any data that was 
necessary to achieve this goal.  The Explanatory Notes for the CTSA discussed the 
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IMC, Santa Monica, November 2016) 183.  
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 The Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 SI 2003/2426 Schedule 1 
Part 3 ss 11 and 13.  
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necessity of this provision, ͚An IP address is automatically allocated by a network 
provider to a customer͛s internet connection, so that communications can be routed 
backwards and forwards to the customer.  [CSPs] may share IP addresses between 
multiple users.  The providers generally have no business purpose for keeping a log of 
who used each address at a specific point in time͛.13  As a result, in the absence of 
specific statutory provisions, information which was of use to law enforcement in their 
investigations was being deleted.  The CTSA mandated retention of data that can be used 
to identify which IP address belonged to which individual.14  However, no specific 
additional categories of data which might assist in this were explicitly set forth in the 
legislation.  As such, it is questionable whether or not CSPs are under an obligation to 
retain this additional information as it lacks a statutory basis.  Without the retention of 
additional information, IP addresses possess little value for law enforcement, as will be 
shown below.   
b. Effective IP Address Resolution: Processes and Problems 
In order for IP addresses to be of use to law enforcement, the investigating bodies need to 
be able to link an individual or an account to the IP address involved in the potential 
illicit activity.  However, the current nature of IP addresses frustrates this aim.  Under the 
current system, also known as IPv4,15 there are a finite number of IP addresses.  As such, 
                                                          
13Explanatory Notes to the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill 2014 para 121. 
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 Notably, the legislation permits WKHUHWHQWLRQRIµRWKHULGHQWLILHUV¶WRHQDEOH,3DGGUHVVUHVROXWLRQ7KH
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Carrier Grade Network Address Translators (2013 MC/159) 7].  This can be contrasted with the case of 
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Parliament and the Council, Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU 
(Communication) 2017 JOIN 0450 final 14.]  As the UK has not adopted IPv6 to any significant degree, 
the analysis here focuses on the issues with IPv4 which are most relevant to this analysis.  
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CSPs have adopted technical means to share the limited number of IP addresses between 
their users. This process is known as Carrier Grade Network Address Translation 
(CGN).16  Essentially this technology enables IP addresses to be shared between multiple 
subscribers at the same time.  The sharing of IP addresses through this technology has 
serious implications for the ability of law enforcement to use the information.  As Rob 
Wainwright, Director of Europol noted when discussing the implication of CGN for 
policing: ͚It might mean that individuals cannot be distinguished by their IP address 
anymore, which may lead to innocent individuals being wrongly investigated by law 
enforcement because they are sharing their IP address with several thousand others ʹ 
potentially including criminals͛.17   
The use of CGN technology has direct implications for privacy.  As IP addresses are 
shared between many users, any request to access this information will disclose the data 
of a large pool of individuals.18  Such a process makes it difficult to limit collateral 
intrusions or interferences with the privacy.  Any subsequent analysis which involves 
processing this large data set to refine it further represents a privacy interference.  Due to 
this technology, requests for IP addresses actually require law enforcement to investigate 
many more people than would normally be necessary. In requesting the information, law 
enforcement will have to be very precise if this collateral intrusion is to be limited.  For 
example, the investigators must specify both the IP address and the time at which they 
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 Furthermore, it has been held that IP addresses constitute personal data where an individual can be 
identified from that information, even where a third party, including a public authority, must obtain 
additional data for the identification to occur. See: Patrick Breyer v Bundesrepublik Deutschland (C-
582/14) [2016] ECLI 770 para 49; Court of Cassation (Cour de Cassation), Arrêt No. 1184 du 
3 novembre 2016, 15-22.595, 3 November 2016 [France].  
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believed the relevant communication occurred.  The timing must be accurate; ͚if there are 
timing mismatches then a different subscriber could be using the IPv4 address than the 
one who needs to be traced͛.19  However, the ability to identify a time is frustrated by 
technical issues.  Frequently, servers where the relevant information is stored are not 
synchronised with their timestamps.  This means that the IP address captured at a specific 
data and time by, for example Facebook, may vary from the time used by Vodafone in 
the UK whose service accesses the site.20  This will result in the search parameters being 
widened and more results being returned which raises further concerns for privacy.   
There are implications for the companies required to retain the addresses as well.  If IP 
addresses are shared, there is no unique identifying information.  As Mackey et al note, 
͚using an IP address to identify a specific individual is problematic because there is 
nothing about the addresses themselves that make them personally identifiable.  IP 
addresses identify particular devices or groups of devices on the Internet, not people 
using the Internet͛.21  In order for a CSP to identify an account associated with an IP 
address, they would need to retain further information, such as a port number.  Such 
requirements make the technical analysis more involved.  As was noted in the OFCOM 
report concerning CGN,  
The only party with the relevant knowledge or control in a CGN scenario will be 
the ISP and this will likely increase the frequency and complexity of requests from 
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law enforcement or third parties, diving up costs for ISPs and potentially exposing 
them to legal liability arising from such decisions.22 
Even where the IP address resolution is not frustrated by processes such as CGN, errors 
are highly likely to occur.  Indeed, in his final report as Interception of Communications 
Commissioner, Sir Stanley Burnton noted that the most serious errors with acquiring 
communications data occurred with IP addresses.  Most of the errors are transcription 
errors which can occur when IP address numbers are transposed, the wrong date/time 
format is used, the wrong time zone is used, or the relevant address is misheard or 
misstated during an urgent oral application.  These errors can have potentially 
devastating impacts.  Burnton described the impact of these errors, ͚People have been 
arrested for crimes relating to child sexual exploitation.  Their children have been taken 
into care, and they have had to tell their employers͛.23  Further errors have resulted in 
individuals being wrongfully arrested and their home and devices searched.24  The 
potentially devastating impact of errors on individuals require further steps to verify 
offenders beyond linking them to an IP address.  
III. Generating meaning through the analysis of Internet Connection Records  
Where public authorities need to resolve IP addresses, frequently the only additional data 
that will be available to assist them in doing so will be Internet Connection Records 
(ICRs).  Internet Connection Records (ICRs) link not just the individual and their own IP 
address, but demonstrate what services they are connecting to or what IP address they are 
looking at and detail the connections made from a device to other online services.  This is 
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done to allow investigators to pursue all lines of investigation, both known and unknown, 
and examine information which would have previously been unavailable. 
a. Investigatory Powers Act 2016 
 The provisions in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 enable existing capabilities to be 
maintained and enhanced by permitting more data to be utilised, and thereby provide the 
additional information necessary for them to be able to properly perform their 
investigative functions.    In the context of IP address resolution, this takes the form of 
the inclusion of Internet Connection Records (ICRs).  As per the provisions in the act, an 
ICR is record held by a CSP about the services to which a customer has connected to on 
the internet.25  No single set of data constitutes an ICR; it will be different based on the 
service and the CSP concerned.  This can include not only the IP address linked to a 
particular sender, but also what address they connected to, for how long, and when, what 
port numbers were associated, and an account reference.26  This helps counteract the 
issues which arise due to the technical infrastructure wherein there are a limited amount 
of IP addresses and therefore they are difficult to link to individuals.  Full ICR retention 
for analysis enables IP address resolution and thereby the powers of law enforcement to 
conduct investigations.   
b. Internet Connection Record analysis: Processes and Problems 
Despite the value to law enforcement in more accurately tracking and identifying online 
users, the inclusion of ICRs in the most recent Investigatory Powers Act was widely 
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 Home Office, Operational Case for ICRs, (4 November 2015) < 
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criticised.  Indeed, previous attempts to retain data akin to ICRs had consistently failed as 
such a requirement was seen to be disproportionately intrusive.27  The fact that the 
information was useful was not seen to be sufficient to justify the obligation on CSPs or 
the additional interference with individual privacy which would result.28  However, 
technological developments which allow for communications to occur via new 
applications coupled with the use of CGNs which make identifying individual users 
associated with previous categories of retained data difficult spurred the inclusion of 
ICRs in the legislation.  The ability to access and interpret ICRs potentially enables the 
translation of data into real world investigative leads.29  However, due to the highly 
revealing nature of the information generated by ICRs, there is a concomitant additional 
threat to privacy which results from the inclusion and analysis of this additional category 
of data.  
IV. Analysing communications data using the けrequest filterげ 
The ͚request filter͛ seeks to improve the abilities of law enforcement to establish 
connections between different people and events by analysing substantial amounts of 
communications data,30 and then filtering that information to only provide the relevant 
data to investigators.  The communications data can then be assessed to determine links 
between suspects, provide exculpatory evidence, prove or disprove alibis, and so on.  For 
example, if there had been multiple murders, this tool could be used to determine what 
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devices were in the different locations at the relevant times, thereby narrowing down 
substantially the suspect pool for investigators.   Without the ͚request filter͛ investigators 
would have to approach each service provider individually, with a separate authorisation, 
and request the relevant data.31  This traditional data request would disclose, not only the 
relevant data, but all other data that met the criteria of the application as well.  The 
investigator would subsequently have to analyse all of this data to find the information 
needed.  The ͚request filter͛ therefore offers a way to simplify this complex search 
practice, and arguably limits the collateral intrusions into the data, to those which are 
necessary for the limited purposes of the investigation. 
a. Draft Communications Bill 2012 
It is apparent that this tool is of use to law enforcement and therefore easy to see why 
provisions for a ͚request filter͛ have been a recurrent theme in discussions concerning 
communications data up to and including the passage of the Investigatory Powers Act 
2016.  For example, in 2008, a central government database of retained data was 
envisaged which would compile all the information into one easily searchable location. 
The communications data would be provided by CSPs but it would be stored on a 
Government owned and operated database.32  This proposal was met with widespread 
criticism and was never implemented,33 but the idea remained.  In 2012, when 
considering the Draft Communications Bill, the ͚request filter͛ was once again brought 
into the debate.  The filter would similarly allow for the complex search of the retained 
data following a single request, but it would not be stored in a central database.  ͚So the 
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same data is being stored about the same people and it is being stored in databases which 
are accessible to public authorities given powers under the Bill.  The difference is that 
instead of one database there are many and they are privately owned͛.34 However, even 
though the databases would have been privately owned, the information held therein, 
including its format, data types, and retention length, would have still been dictated by 
the Government.  This led some critics to argue that the provisions in the 2012 Bill were 
therefore a distinction without a difference; the filter could still be equated to a federated 
database.35   
In order to access the ͚request filter͛ as proposed by the Draft Communications Bill, a 
specified process needed to be followed.  Namely, the investigator would submit a 
request for the filter to examine the data from multiple CSPs͛ databases and 
automatically analyse the returns, providing investigators with only the relevant data.  
The Secretary of State would control the filter but it would be for the CSPs to design and 
implement their own systems to accommodate the requests.  Once this was completed, 
only the details of the devices active in both relevant locations would be sent back to the 
investigating officer.  All other data would then be deleted.  The general maintenance and 
design of this system was left to the individual CSPs as the databases required specialist 
skills to build, update, and maintain.  This system arguably ensured that the issues 
present in the 2008 proposal, namely of placing the information in a central, government 
run database, were mitigated.   
However, the proposed request system, like much of the ill-fated Draft Communications 
Bill, was heavily criticised.  In spite of its value as a mechanism to diminish the amount 
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of data transferred to public authorities and thereby reduce levels of intrusion and protect 
privacy,36 the proposals were rejected.  Critics questioned the ability of the filter to truly 
provide an independent and impartial check on the processing of data when the system 
itself remained a function, delegated or otherwise, of the Home Secretary who was also 
responsible for issuing warrants and notices concerning the data.37  Impartial governance 
of the system was necessary to ensure independence.  Similarly, concerns were raised 
over the abilities enabled by the filters, particularly due to the scale and scope of the data 
involved.  Within this system, data was collected from a wide variety of sources 
including internet, mobile, and traditional telephony and related to not only persons, but 
locations, and times as well. The potential abuse of the system could enable investigators 
to go on ͚fishing expeditions͛; the risk of this was not mitigated by the safeguards 
provided.  
 Demands were made for independent audits of the use of the filter by the Interception of 
Communications Commissioner (IOCCO) and more stringent requirements of necessity 
and proportionality before the filter could be used.38  Similarly, ͚the necessity and 
proportionality tests need to be applied not just to the individual data streams as supplied 
by CSPs but to the likely effect when they are assembled together͛.39  The ability of the 
data to create inferences about individuals was amplified by the comprehensive nature of 
the data collected and retained.  This could not be neutralised by the fact that the data 
solely related to context rather than content of communications.  Professor of media and 
communications, Robin Mansell, in her evidence to the Joint Committee examining the 
Draft Communication Bill, noted that ͚Even if conventional content is separated from 
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other forms of information which have meaning, the expansion of opportunities for 
authorities to draw inferences about citizens͛ intention or behaviour from patterns 
emerging from electronic tracing of their activities is growing exponentially͛.40   
These problems were further compounded by the lack of clarity concerning the 
implementation and transparency of the system used for the filtering.  The algorithms 
used for filtering the data and provisions regarding their design and development were 
purposefully opaque.  An element of transparency and scrutiny of the technical means 
would be required to ensure that the mechanism was being implemented appropriately.  
͚In the absence of clarity about this issue, authorities requesting and processing data will 
be continuously open to charges of biases͛.41  The problems highlighted in the 
development of the ͚request filter͛ in the Draft Communications Bill remain under the 
provisions in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA) to which the discussion now 
turns.   
b. Investigatory Powers Act 2016 
Despite the failure of the 2012 Bill, the need for a system for law enforcement to search, 
analyse, and connect relevant communications data to facilitate investigations and 
prevent collateral intrusions into personal data remained.  Concurrently, criticisms of the 
data retention regime by the Courts mandated that greater safeguards were required to 
ensure these regimes limited the intrusions into privacy and personal data.  These two 
factors informed the development of the ͚request filter͛ in the IPA.  Sections 67 to 69 
consider the method, authorisations, and limitations of the ͚request filter͛.  Principally, 
the method employed to use this system is the same as that under the 2012 Bill.  Section 
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67 provides for the powers to establish arrangements for the lawful, efficient, and 
effective obtaining and processing of communications data under the filter.  The filter 
can be accessed by any listed public authority, when the test for granting access to that 
data has been met.42  The filter has a limited function and can only process specified 
communications data as a result of a targeted communications data authorisation.  A 
request is sent to the filter which acquires the data from the relevant CSPs and then 
discloses the data to those authorised to see it.  The Home Office evidence for this 
provision attempted to distinguish it from its predecessors, noting that it would not 
enable those ͚fishing expeditions͛ which were of concern in previous iterations. ͚The 
͚request filter͛  is not a data mining tool or a search engine, as it can only operate on 
limited sets of authorised data using specified and authorised processing steps͛.43   
This authorisation process consists of an application made and approved by a designated 
senior officer of at least the rank of inspector.44  This officer will consider the necessity 
and proportionality of the application and determine whether to grant access to the filter.  
In assessing this, the officer must confirm that the authorisation is necessary to obtain the 
data for a public protection purpose or for the purpose of a specific operation, and that 
the conduct is proportionate to the aims of the investigations.45    Considerations of 
proportionality must take into account future evidential requirements including whether it 
will be possible to evidence records disclosed by the filter through subsequent 
communications data authorisations.46   
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Additional safeguards are guaranteed in the Act to ensure that no communications data 
can be obtained or processed for any additional purposes outside of those for which the 
authorisation is given.  Once the information has been provided to the relevant 
investigator, all additional data relating to the request will be deleted.  The Act further 
puts provisions in place to allow for oversight of the process, along the lines of those 
requested in the 2012 Bill.  Data must be made available to the Investigatory Powers 
Commissioner (IPC) for their functions of audit and oversight.47  Any errors in the 
release of information processed by the filter must be reported to the IPC as well.  
Security of the system is required and provisions regarding the maintenance, testing, and 
development of the mechanism have also been included, however, there is very little 
explicit detail as to the format and structure provided.48  These specifications are aimed at 
ensuring that the filter is subject to rigorous control.   
However, many of the flaws inherent in the proposals for the ͚request filter͛ in the 2012 
Bill have been maintained in the IPA.  The Secretary of State remains responsible for the 
establishment and maintenance of the system.49  Similarly, the evidence offered by the 
Home Office that the authorisation procedure would prevent any misuse of data along the 
lines of the ͚fishing expeditions͛ is not supported; this problem is compounded by the 
expansive nature of the data and relatively large pool of authorities who have access to 
the filter.  ͚Public authorities will have a permanent ability to access the ͚request filter͛, 
which will make it an enticing and powerful tool that could be used for a broad range of 
statutory purposes.  The ability to conduct the complex queries that the ͚request filter͛ 
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will allow for could increase the temptation͙to sift data in search of relationships and 
infer that consequences are meaningful͛.50  Similarly, the farming out of the retention 
systems, thereby removing it from a centralised Government control, does not necessarily 
mitigate the potential risks from the filter.  This concern is exacerbated by the fact that 
there remains a lack of transparency both in the development of the filter and in the 
governance of the mechanism itself.  Further, issues with oversight remain, as despite the 
inclusion of the audit and error powers for the IPC, there is no requirement of judicial 
approval in the authorisation process.  The issues with the process, authorisation, and 
oversight provisions in the IPA are amplified by the nature of the data and the filter itself.   
The ͚request filter͛ is only able to meet its aims by sifting and analysing large quantities 
of communications data and interpreting that data to determine whether it satisfies the 
criteria of the requests.  It can be broadly classified as a ͚Big Data͛ tool, wherein Big Data 
refers to the use of large data sets for predictive analysis.51  Big Data itself is a product of 
technological, analytical, and cultural elements.  The technological aspect accounts for 
the development of systems and algorithms to gather, link, and compare data.52  The 
analytical components then use the data compiled to draw inferences and establish 
patterns.  The cultural elements inform these interpretations and form the foundation for 
the inferences which are obtained from the processing and analysis of the data.  For the 
purposes of the ͚request filter͛ here, the important elements are these analytical 
capabilities.   
 
                                                          








V. Subsequent Analysis by Law Enforcement 
Whilst requirements exist that must be satisfied prior to law enforcement being provided 
with access to relevant communications data, there are far fewer limits placed on the 
subsequent analysis and use to which that data is put.  As opposed to the preceding 
sections which discuss the processing obligations placed on CSPs to analyse the data for 
law enforcement, the focus of this section is on the analysis and use of that data once it 
enters the possession of the public authority.  As such, the rules governing this type of 
analysis do not fall under the remit of the investigatory powers instruments.  Rather, in 
this type of data use, law enforcement agencies are bound by the Data Protection Act 
(DPA) 2018, Part 3.   
Part 3 of the DPA was passed to give domestic effect to the provisions of Directive 
2016/680 which governs the processing of personal data for law enforcement purposes, 
including the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or 
the execution of criminal penalties.53  Under Part 3, law enforcement may process data so 
long as it is in accordance with law and constitutes a necessary and proportionate 
measure in a democratic society with due regard for the legitimate interest of the natural 
person concerned.54  Such processing must be for specific, explicit and legitimate law 
enforcement purposes.  However, as long as the data was initially processed for such a 
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legitimate purpose, it may then be processed for a different law enforcement purpose, so 
long as that additional processing is deemed necessary and proportionate.55   
As such, law enforcement may continue to process data, beyond the scope of the original 
application for the data, so long as it still satisfies this law enforcement aim.  The 
wording of the legal provisions surrounding this use is ambiguous and offers broad 
justifications for processing by law enforcement.56  Whilst the general obligation that 
such downstream data processing meet basic legal requirements offers some safeguards 
for its future use, the lack of concise provisions governing this processing creates further 
FRQFHUQVIRULQGLYLGXDOV¶ULJKWV)RULQVWDQFHXQGHUWKLVIUDPework, communications 
data provided to authorities following a legitimate application for one investigation may 
be repurposed or used for a separate investigation, provided that the subsequent 
investigation still pursues a legitimate aim.  When the information is shared in this 
manner, there are no provisions within the IPA which require that the subsequent 
processing be reauthorized.  It is only under the DPA that such processing must be 
justified; however, such justification is an internal process and not subject to independent 
judicial scrutiny.  Such concerns are compounded by the lack of a framework governing 
the sharing of the information between domestic law enforcement bodies.57   
The result of this is that there exist very few controls or oversight over both the 
subsequent processing of communications data by the same law enforcement body and 
the sharing of that information between law enforcement bodies.  This means that there is 
a significant risk that the accessed communications data will not be subject to the 
necessary safeguards which guarantee it complies with fundamental rights obligations.  
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Such a risk will become even more significant as law enforcement increases their data 
VKDULQJFDSDELOLWLHV1RWDEO\LQWKHSDUOLDPHQWDU\UHSRUWµ3ROLFLQJIRUWKH)XWXUH¶ERWK
the heads of the National Crime Agency and of the Metropolitan Police Force highlighted 
the need for increased data sharing as a policing priority.58  Without additional 
guarantees regarding the use of this data, the risk to fundamental rights is significant.   
One way to potentially mitigate the concerns which may arise from the use of this data 
would be to provide for increased information to be given to data subjects whose 
information is accessed and analysed by the police.  However, under both the Directive 
and the DPA, these rights are limited.  Data subjects whose information is processed for 
law enforcement purposes do not have the same subject access rights or rights to 
rectification, erasure, or restriction of processing that exist under the private processing 
provisions.59  These rights may be restricted where informing the data subject would risk 
prejudicing the investigation.60  Even once the investigation has finished and informing 
the data subject may no longer compromise the investigation, there is no requirement that 
the data subject be informed.61   
The lack of notification for data subject is particularly problematic when the potential for 
further uses of the data is considered.  Despite the ICO recognising that it is good 
practice to tell the individual as soon as possible once the risk of prejudice to the 
investigation has passed,62 the Home Office has refused to incorporate any provisions 
regarding notification under the investigatory powers instruments.  Indeed, the Home 
Office has gone so far as to cite the widespread processing of this data as a justification 
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different authorities who are able to use these powers, and de-conflicting everyone 
involved in one investigation with all other investigations run by all public authorities, 
LQFOXGLQJWKHVHFXULW\DQGLQWHOOLJHQFHDJHQFLHVZRXOGEHSUDFWLFDOO\LPSRVVLEOH¶63  Far 
from justifying the lack of notification guarantees, such a statement by the Home Office 
highlights the widespread use of the data and the lack of sufficient safeguards.  If it is not 
possible to tell who is utilising the data at any one time, then it is unlikely that there is 
any check that the powers are being exercised in a manner which complies with the 
requirements of necessity and proportionality.  As such, the data may be analysed in a 
manner which is inconsistent with the rights of individuals; yet individuals themselves 
would not be aware of nor have any opportunity to challenge such analysis.  Further, the 
oversight mechanisms which do exist, namely in the form of the Investigatory Powers 
Commissioner, do not have the remit to examine these downstream access procedures.  
There is no requirement that the IPC be notified of any subsequent uses to which the data 
is put.  This type of analyses thereby presents a particular risk to individuals.  
Notification for individuals whose data is accessed and analysed would be a significant 
safeguard.  The policy recommendations for incorporating this into future changes in the 
legislation will be explored in the concluding chapter.   
VI. Applying Contextual Integrity to Communications Data Analysis 
Having set out the mechanisms used for analysis, it is necessary to determine what the 
impact of these processes is on privacy.  Relevant to this is the consideration of whether 
the analytical tools have altered the norms associated with data analysis for the purposes 
of criminal investigations.  In this regard, it is important to recognise that it is not just 






technological capacities that are increasing, but the ability to generate meaningful data.  
As a result, the data gathered about people is more extensive, easier to aggregate, and 
able to be analysed in increasingly sophisticated and complex ways.  As Helen 
Nissenbaum states, these powers ͚make it possible for large troves of information to be 
reliably, efficiently, and meaningfully organised and accessed; to be effectively moved 
into massive aggregations and disaggregated into usable chunks; and to be transmitted to 
sites when needed͛.64   
The context in which this information is analysed is significant and contributes to the 
determination of whether the analysis is done in violation of informational norms.  The 
context here is the defined social spheres relevant to the ICT system wherein these 
mechanisms operate.  Changes in the information type, transmission principles, and 
actors involved in the analysis of the data represent challenges for the established 
informational norms. 
With regard to the information types with which the analysis engages, the development 
of the technical capabilities have altered the nature of the information.  Largely, these 
analysis mechanisms now operate in the digital environment.  Removing information 
from traditional physical boundaries alters its nature.  The amount of information which 
is generated in the digital sphere far exceeds that of its physical counterparts and can be 
aggregated.  Whilst individual pieces of data may possess little revealing or relevant 
information, an assemblage of the data will be highly informative.  When these 
assemblages are coupled with the large scale data sets derived through permissive data 
retention policies and advanced processing methods even more can be revealed.  When 
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the data is merged together it generates further data and inferences, which can potentially 
be quite different from the original information.65   
Similarly, the removal of the link to an individual from the process by breaking up 
information into communications data packets means that investigations using this 
information can no longer occur in the same manner.  ͚Digital footprints are neither 
observable nor readily identifiable as ͞belonging͟ to a particular person͛.66  Investigators 
cannot easily identify suspects using this information without some form of further 
analysis; the information provided through communications data requests is often 
incomplete.  The data generated and retained is only done for law enforcement in limited 
instances.  It is far more typical for the data to be generated for a commercial value and 
law enforcement use is secondary.  The context of the data often changes as a result.   
It is important to acknowledge that systems themselves are able to change the context of 
the data.  This is significant as context is important in analysing data; meanings will 
change depending on the situation.  Communications data can be used to draw 
meaningful inferences about peoples͛ connections to one another, about their movements, 
even about the strength of their relationships, but these interpretations need to be 
understood in a particular context to be persuasive.  It is only within the known contexts 
that the analytic elements will be effective.  Roger Clarke, posing his theory of 
dataveillance, described the importance of context for data.  ͚When the data are used 
outside their original context, the probability of misinterpreting them increases greatly.  
This is the reason why information privacy principles place such importance on relating 
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data to the purpose for which they are collected or used͛.67  When the data is removed 
from the context in which it was generated, processed, and collected, it means that the 
patterns and meanings derived are incomplete or lost.68 Daskal similarly recognises the 
issue of context when data is collected en masse: ͚the sheer quantity of data collected 
necessitates the use of presumptions as a basis for establishing identity.  The vast 
quantity of data collected means that even a low error rate will yield large quantities of 
data associated with misidentified users͛.69 
Yet, in the processing of data sets, this change of context is often necessary for the 
system to be able to function.  For example, in order for the ͚request filter͛ to operate 
effectively, the data needs to be in a standardised format.  This standardisation applies to 
the collection, analysis, and interpretation procedures.  However, different business 
procedures and the lack of a proscribed format in the legislation mean that each CSP can 
retain the data in their own manner.  This will necessarily result in the data being altered 
so that it can be processed in the format required by the ͚request filter͛.  As the processing 
of this information is a secondary use for data collected by the CSPs, there will remain a 
question of who the analysts are truly accountable to in the development of the systems, 
their own company or the Government.70  It is therefore important to recognise the issues 
which arise by altering the context of the data.  As Crawford notes, ͚Data are not generic.  
There is value to analysing data abstractions, yet retaining context remains critical, 
particularly for certain lines of inquiry.  Context is hard to interpret at scale and even 
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harder to manage when data are reduced to fit into a model͛.71  By allowing the context of 
the data to change, there is the risk that the potential for further profiling techniques 
which unnecessarily intrude into individual rights will be amplified.     
The transmission principles which constrain the flow of information generated through 
the ICT system have similarly advanced alongside the development of analytical 
techniques.  Typically, when users consent to having data collected and processed, they 
do so believing that the data will be used for specified purposes.  Where individuals 
accept that there may be secondary uses to the data, such as its use by law enforcement, 
there would still be a violation of entrenched norms if the context and therefore the 
meaning of the data were changed by facilitating this use.  Here this is evidenced by the 
way information is used and disseminated.  Gillespie argues that, ͚Algorithms are now a 
key logic governing the flows of information on which we depend, with the power to 
enable and assign meaningfulness, managing how information is perceived by users͛.72  
These algorithms needn͛t be software; in a broad sense they can be those logics which 
transform input data into its desired output.73  For example, law enforcement may use 
such technology for analysis which identifies relationships between individuals by 
sorting lists of telephone calls.  In this manner, large lists of calls, their times, and 
durations will be input data which is then processed, typically utilising software, and 
turned into ͚output͛ data which can be used in investigations.74  Techniques such as this 
work because individuals͛ communication patterns tend to be regular, and following 
these patterns can provide valuable information about their network and contacts.75 
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Notably, in the analysis of information for investigative purposes, law enforcement are 
no longer the predominant actors.  Rather, technological developments have resulted in 
CSPs being the primary mechanisms through which both the systems to analyse data are 
created and the information is actually assessed.  This results in an organisational entity 
with powers to control and make determinations about an individual without being bound 
to the same standards as a State actor.  In a way, this is necessary due to the technology.  
As McIntyre states, ͚The growth of filtering, with its focus on intermediaries, is 
pragmatic in the sense that it frequently enrols actors who have knowledge and/or 
capacities for control which the government does not have͛.76  These actors have 
specialist skills and training which enable them to examine the information effectively.77   
However, there are issues with using intermediaries to run what is effectively a law 
enforcement mechanism. For example, in their original form, analytical capabilities 
created by private actors likely had some specified business purpose as their primary aim.  
Frequently, the systems were originally built for security measures or targeted 
advertising.  Solove notes that this type of development may be ill suited for achieving 
law enforcement aims.   
The problem, however, is that just because data mining might be effective for 
businesses trying to predict consumer behaviour, it isn͛t necessarily effective for 
government officials trying to predict who will engage in terrorism.  A high level 
of accuracy is not essential when data mining is used by businesses to target 
marketing for consumers, because the cost of error to individuals is minimal.78   
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While the provisions requiring the resolution of IP addresses, the retention of ICRs, and 
the creation and use of the ͚request filter͛ are now set forth in statute, there are no specific 
technical requirements which set forth how these capabilities are to be created.  It may 
remain up to the CSP to determine how to fulfil these aims.  Therefore, in retaining and 
later processing the data, CSPs are essentially fulfilling a public interest objective but are 
not subject to the same limitations a public authority would be in fulfilling this role. 
The technologies which are utilised for analysis alter traditional roles in other ways as 
well.  Automated processing of data such as occurs through the ͚request filter͛ removes 
the human element from the process.  The role of large scale data sets allows these 
processes to fall under the category of a Big Data mechanism for these purposes.  One of 
the promises of Big Data is that it allows for the removal of the subjective element in 
analysing and processing information and therefore allows for an interpretation based 
solely on ͚facts͛.  Chris Anderson clearly stated this principle in 2008: ͚Who knows why 
people do what they do?  The point is that they do it, and we can track and measure it 
with unprecedented fidelity.  With enough data, the numbers speak for themselves͛.79  
When the ability for individuals to interpret the information is removed, proponents 
argue that the system itself can make informed analysis without the risk of bias.  The 
power of the Big Data mechanisms is that their increasingly sophisticated techniques 
allow for the development of exact descriptive and predictive meanings from seemingly 
unrelated points of information.80  This analysis therefore purportedly allows for an 
objective and purely informational mechanism.  Within the ͚request filter͛ this element is 
promoted as a safeguard; it keeps individual investigators from abusing the powers of the 
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filter and making inferences about the data that are informed by their own biases.  If the 
information can be filtered without the need for human inputs and interpretation, all that 
will be released will be impartial and factual results which the authorities can then use in 
their investigations.   
However, it would be incorrect to imply that the human element can ever be fully 
removed from this type of data processing.  All decisions, from the development of the 
system, to the request for access, incorporate a human element, whether it is in the design 
or the interpretation of the results.  As such, ͚data sets are not, and can never be, neutral 
and theory free repositories of information waiting to give up their secrets͛.81  This 
interpretation is critical to rebutting the presumption that automatic processing of data 
reduces the intrusions into private lives.  As Lawrence Busch found: ͚even the most 
apparently obvious results require (1) a degree of interpretation (in the formation of 
cases, in data collection, and analysis), and (2) the weaving of a master narrative around 
the data͛.82  When the data is interpreted, there is an implicit decision which favours a 
certain type of facts or elements over others.  Within the ͚request filter͛, this is manifest 
even in the forms and processes themselves; applicants can specify that they want to 
search for one type of information over another (e.g. mobile over internet) or examine 
data for certain locations but not others.  To an extent this interpretation is necessary in 
order to ensure that the filter can function in an efficient manner.  The data must be 
circumscribed at some stage, and the human input into which data to search makes this 
possible.  However, it does mean that the promise that the data is objective and based on 
͚pure facts͛ cannot stand; if interpretation is incorporated into the decisions on what to 
search, certain facts will be weighted more heavily than others.  Furthermore, removing 
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the human element from the process removes a vital element of transparency and 
oversight.  Feedback mechanisms can be utilised to determine the effectiveness of a 
process and its impact.  In removing these mechanisms it is difficult to determine 
whether the processing is occurring in a fair and effective manner.83   
The shift in investigative functions to CSPs and the increased automation of the system 
which removes the objective human element demonstrates a shift in the traditional roles 
associated with law enforcement analysis of personal information.  Coupled with the 
changes in information types which result from technological developments which have 
changed the nature of the information and shifts in information flows as a result of 
analytical processes, the analysis of communications data which embodies these 
processes has changed the core elements of the informational norms and thereby 
breached contextual integrity.   
VII. Conclusion  
This chapter set out to determine the extent to which the communications data analysis 
methods pursue criminal justice aims, and the implications of these processes for privacy.  
The generation of data has increased exponentially through the incorporation of 
technologies into every aspect of modern life.  Communications devices, whether they 
are telephonic or internet based contribute to this expanding data pool.  Every 
communication which occurs via these devices leaves behind a digital trail of 
information.  For law enforcement, that information can be a valuable resource in the 
investigation of crime.  However, in order for it to provide the necessary information, the 
data must be analysed.  This analysis allows for meaning to be derived.  In the context of 
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communications data analysis occurs through the resolution of IP Addresses, ICRs, the 
͚request filter͛, and subsequent use by law enforcement.  The use of these analytical tools 
raises serious concerns for privacy as they represent a shift in the information types, 
transmission principles, and actors traditionally associated with analysing investigative 
information.  The informational norms regarding data analysis have been altered in a 
manner which is inconsistent with the values of the system.  This breaches contextual 
integrity and thereby privacy.  The extent to which this breach, along with those 
identified in the retention and access processes, can be minimised through oversight 





CHAPTER 6: OVERSIGHT  
I. Introduction  
Whilst the existence of privacy violations in the three preceding chapters is clear, it 
remains to be seen whether such intrusions can be offset through oversight mechanisms 
which enable them to strike an appropriate balance between privacy rights and law 
enforcement objectives. It is therefore necessary to examine the extant oversight regime 
in the investigatory powers mechanisms to ascertain whether it mitigates the privacy 
intrusions that result from the retention, access, and analysis of communications data.  
The significance of sufficient oversight has embodied much of the discourse surrounding 
the development of these powers.  To this end, when introducing the Investigatory 
Powers Act, Theresa May promoted the Act as one which would ͚establish world-leading 
oversight to govern an investigatory powers regime which is more open and transparent 
than anywhere else in the world͛.1  Such a claim is a direct result of the legal challenges 
to the investigatory powers regime, wherein the courts cited the lack of appropriate 
oversight as a key factor in holding that the interference with privacy resulting from these 
Acts was disproportionate.  Following each of these cases, ͚the law was amended to 
protect the surveillance powers of the police and the intelligence services, either by 
providing a necessary legal footing for those powers, or by bringing existing systems of 
authorisation and oversight into line with the demands of European law͛.2  This is by no 
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means a phenomenon which is limited to the powers used in the United Kingdom; other 
jurisdictions similarly amended their communications data safeguards and oversight as a 
direct result of legal judgments.3  The creation and strengthening of these oversight 
mechanisms through each subsequent iteration of the investigatory powers regime 
indicates the ability of these tools to permit these powers to withstand legal challenges.  
They are also promoted as critical instruments to ensure the rights of individuals who are 
subjected to the use of these powers.  However, the nature of the communications data 
processes presents a challenge for oversight.   
As a result, specialised supervisory bodies exist with responsibility for overseeing the 
collection, retention, access, and analysis of communications data.4  This chapter 
analyses the role of these bodies in order to determine their effectiveness as measures 
which adequately balance privacy rights with the demands of the State.  In order to do so, 
this chapter will be composed of six parts.  Part I proceeds by first addressing the 
importance of oversight through a review of the relevant literature and case law which 
sets forth the significance of oversight as a check on the power of the state.  Oversight 
ensures that the actions prescribed by the state comport with the necessary rule of law 
values crucial in a democratic society.  The analysis will focus on how a balance can be 
struck between the aims of law enforcement and the fundamental privacy rights.  
Questions of oversight and accountability will help to dictate how that balance can be 
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struck and the appropriate standards which must be met when exercising powers 
concerning communications data.   
Once the relevant criteria for effective oversight mechanisms which enshrine rule of law 
values and protections for fundamental rights are identified, discussion then turns to how 
oversight is currently administered in the investigatory powers instruments.  Four key 
supervisory bodies will be examined.  Part II will assess the role of the Information 
Commissioner in the communications data oversight process.  Part III will focus on the 
(now defunct) office of the Interception of Communications Commissioner.  Part IV 
examines the role of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, created after the passage of 
the IPA.  Part V will examine the judicial mechanisms for oversight in the form of the 
Investigatory Powers Tribunal.  The aim of this analysis will be to identify how each 
body purports to meet the requirements necessary to protect fundamental rights as 
established by the case law of the ECtHR and CJEU.  The shortcomings of each of these 
bodies are identified and critiqued with the aim of identifying areas in need of reform.  
This critique argues that the current oversight regime is insufficient to protect privacy in 
the context of communications data retained under ICT systems.  Finally, Part VI will 
establish that the violation of contextual integrity in the ICT system resulting from the 
retention, access, and analysis of communications data is not diminished by the existing 
oversight and safeguards.  Prescriptive measures are needed to amend the oversight 
provisions as they concern communications data in order to better reflect these changes 
and ensure that the vital privacy interest violated by the investigatory powers instruments 





II. The importance of oversight for the rule of law 
The use of communications data by law enforcement demonstrates an expansive 
governmental power and must therefore be subject to the rule of law lest it violate 
fundamental rights disproportionately when seeking to promote the aims of a democratic 
society.  In order for these powers to accord with the rule of law certain requirements 
must be met.  Any measures which interfere with fundamental rights must be assessed 
against the principles of legality, necessity, and proportionality.  To ensure these 
provisions comport with the principle of legality, the legal rules justifying the 
interference must be accessible, clear, and precise, as discussed by the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Privacy, Joseph Cannatacci.5  Similarly, the interferences must be 
necessary; there must be limits on the use of discretion or ͚exceptionalism͛ in the use of 
these powers by state authorities.6  Notably, for the purposes of this chapter, Bigo et al 
argue that ͚there must be mechanisms of accountability and supervision by an 
independent judiciary at the heart of the system͛.7  Any measures that interfere with these 
rights must further be balanced against the alleged benefit that can be derived from the 
interference; in other words, they must be proportionate.  In the absence of such 
safeguards, the collection and processing of communications data will be fundamentally 
contrary to the rule of law and incompatible with core fundamental rights principles.  In 
order to assess whether the oversight mechanisms employed for communications data 
meet these standards, it is necessary to first establish the extent to which these powers 
satisfy these requirements of legality, necessity, and proportionality.  The extent to which 
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the current mechanisms satisfy these requirements will help determine the effectiveness 
of the current oversight and areas for future development.   
a. Legality  
For an interference with fundamental rights to be justified it must be found to be in 
accordance with law.  As such, any provisions which enable the communications data 
powers discussed in this thesis must be adequately provided for in law.  The law must be 
accessible and foreseeable, thereby enabling the individual to identify, with sufficient 
precision, when their conduct might be caught by the regulation.  With regard to 
surveillance, precedent requires that, µThe domestic law must be sufficiently clear in its 
terms to give citizens an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which and the 
FRQGLWLRQVRQZKLFKSXEOLFDXWKRULWLHVDUHHPSRZHUHGWRUHVRUWWRDQ\VXFKPHDVXUHV¶8  
This does not require that individuals be provided with detailed information about the 
surveillance regimes utilised to capture their data for law enforcement purposes.  Where 
providing individuals with information might frustrate the intended purpose of the 
legislation, (i.e. by giving suspects detailed information on when their communications 
data may be targeted), disclosure may be limited to ensure the aims of national security 
and the prevention and detection of crime.9             
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 See: Malone v United Kingdom App No 8691/79 (ECtHR, 2 Aug 1984) paras 66-68; Rotaru v Romania 
App no 28341/95 (ECtHR, 4 May 2000) para 55; Amann v Switzerland App no 27798/95 (ECtHR, 16 Feb 
2000); Kruslin v France App no 11801/85 (ECtHR, 24 April 1990) para 27;  Lambert v France App no 
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2003) para 45; Dumitru Popescu v Romania (no 2) App no 71525/01 (ECtHR, 26 April 2007) para 61; 
Association for European Integration and Human Rights and Ekimdzhiev v Bulgaria App no 62540/00 
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Established case law requires that such mechanisms which permit interferences with 
fundamental rights by enabling the collection and processing of information must be 
governed by precise rules pertaining to the scope and application of the measures, as well 
as safeguards regarding access, usage, procedures, and destruction.10  However, the 
requirements for investigatory measures to be ͚in accordance with law͛ in line with the 
relevant jurisprudence does not require the precise rules and safeguards to be explicitly 
set forth in statute.  The Courts have accepted that the Executive has discretion to provide 
for these elements in secondary instruments rather than the substantive law.11  
Administrative orders, Codes of Practice, and guidance are accepted mechanisms for 
ensuring these powers are ͚in accordance with law͛.12   
In accepting these instruments as sufficient, the Court will look at the availability of the 
information to the public and the process by which it came in to force.  The ability of 
individuals to access information about the procedures which may be applied to them is 
crucial for the rule of law; individuals must know what laws they are bound by and when 
they may fall foul of those laws.  The Court will also look to the effect that the 
instrument has on governing the actions of the relevant public authority.  In the UK, the 
validity of the Codes of Practice relating to the investigatory powers regime was called in 
to question in Kennedy v United Kingdom.  Therein, the Court held that the Codes of 
Practice under RIPA were sufficient to meet the requirements of foreseeability.13  The 
current Codes of Practice under the investigatory powers regime are likely to similarly 
                                                          
10
 Kruslin v France App no 11801/85 (ECtHR, 24 April 1990) paras 33 and 35; Rotaru v Romania App no 
28341/95 (ECtHR, 4 May 2000) para 55; Weber & Saravia v Germany App no 54394/00 (ECtHR, 29 June 
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Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland v Minister for Communications & Ors and 
Michael Seitlinger & Ors [2014] 2 All ER  para 99. 
11Malone n(8) para 68. 
12
 Liberty n(8) para 61.  
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 Kennedy v United Kingdom App no 26839/05 (ECtHR, 18 May 2010) para 157. 
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satisfy these requirements.  Thus, provided the Codes give adequate indication of the 
scope and powers of the public authorities and provide for specific safeguards, they will 
satisfy the requirement that the communications data powers are ͚in accordance with law͛ 
for the purposes of justifying an interference with fundamental rights.   
b. Necessary in a democratic society 
Regardless of the legality of the provisions regarding communications data, the 
processing and collection of such information will violate fundamental rights where the 
powers are not deemed necessary.  The ruling in the case of S and Marper v United 
Kingdom requires that in cases where the interference is with individuals͛ personal data, 
and involves the use of potential cutting-edge technologies to invade privacy, the criteria 
of ͚necessary in a democratic society͛ must be interpreted as strict necessity.14  Strict 
necessity requires that the power is necessary for ͚safeguarding the democratic 
institutions, and moreover,͙, for the obtaining of vital intelligence͛.15  In the context of 
communications data, the case of Tele2 Sverige confirmed that national legislation must 
abide by the requirements of strict necessity to justify any interference with privacy.16  
Similarly, any data collection policies, undertaken through secret means, which concern 
persons not suspected of involvement in a specific crime or posing a threat must be 
subject to a strict necessity test to justify the interference with a fundamental right.17 
Concomitant with the requirement that the powers be strictly necessary is the condition 
that they be proportionate to the aim to be achieved.  The requirement of proportionality 
                                                          
14
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is particularly important when considering the communications data tools as they 
indiscriminately relate to large swathes of the population in the absence of any 
reasonable suspicion that they have been involved in a crime.  Settled case law requires 
that due regard must be had for the principle of proportionality when derogating from 
and limiting fundamental rights.18   
In determining whether a provision goes beyond what is strictly necessary, the courts will 
take several factors into account, including the existence of effective safeguards and 
guarantees against abuse.  Such an assessment will examine the existence of judicial 
scrutiny, the independence of authorisation procedures, and the affected parties͛ rights to 
remedy and redress for alleged violations of the right.  As a general principle, 
interference with individuals͛ rights should be assured by independent judicial scrutiny.  
͚The very existence of effective judicial review designed to ensure compliance with 
provisions of EU law is inherent in the existence of the rule of law͛.19  It is this 
independent review which ensures that these powers are not abused and provides public 
trust in the system.  In the absence of such a check on the powers of authorised bodies, 
questions will arise over the validity and proportionality of their actions.  Such a level of 
scrutiny is accepted as necessary in spite of arguments that accessing communications 
data is less intrusive than its content counterpart.  As Joseph Cannatacci succinctly states, 
͚Legislation that does not lay down clear and precise rules governing access even to 
metadata, and legislation that does not provide for ͞effective judicial protection͟, cannot 
                                                          
18
 C-73/07 Tietosuojavaltuutettu v Satakunnan Markkinapörssi and Satamedia (C-73/07) [2008] ECLI 727 
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& Ors [2014] 2 All ER para 52. 
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be necessary or proportionate to the legitimate aims of crime prevention or national 
security͛.20   
Yet, these requirements are not absolute, and the Court can find that a combination of 
mechanisms, short of formal judicial control, is acceptable, in particular if ͚initial control 
is affected by an official qualified for judicial office͛.21  Where authorisations of the 
processes are approved by a non-judicial body, the Court must be assured that said body 
is independent of both the Government and the interested parties.22  In determining 
whether the communications data regime meets human rights standards, it is necessary 
therefore to examine the existing bodies and their powers to determine the extent to 
which they comply with the rule of law.  The discussion will now turn to analysing the 
bodies involved in supervising and overseeing the communications data regime, 
beginning with the Information Commissioner.  
III. The oversight role of the Information Commissioner: technical 
requirements and data security 
The Information Commissioner has a limited remit with regard to communications data, 
focusing principally on technical capabilities and enforcement of retention notices.  As 
such, the discussion of her powers herein will be brief.   
a. Function and Powers of the Information Commissioner  
With regards to communications data, the Information Commissioner has oversight 
power regarding retention notices and the storage and use of the retained data.  These 
powers only relate to the handling of the data once the notice has been issued and the 
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data retained; the ICO does not have access to what is retained nor a role in determining 
what should be retained.23  Once a CSP is issued with a retention notice, this, along with 
any other relevant information, will be communicated to the ICO.  The ICO is then 
responsible for overseeing the security, integrity, and destruction of retained data.24 The 
ICO has audit powers of these technical system requirements and may issue reports on 
how the CSPs are complying with their obligations.   
However, it is important to note that the publication of information concerning 
inspections of retention notices by the ICO will not occur if the confidentiality of those 
notices will be compromised by publication.  As a result, these reports will be redacted to 
protect the identity of companies which are subject to a notice.25  The inability of the ICO 
to fully publish the results of their inspection raises questions over transparency and 
accountability.  It is an instance where the Home Office is perceived to be ͚marking their 
own work͛ by obfuscating the results of the ICO audits, as they can dictate what elements 
of the reports are subsequently disclosed.  The ICO further suffers from a lack of 
statutory powers regarding retention notices and compliance requirements.   
In addition to her role in overseeing the integrity, security, and destruction requirements 
of data retained by CSPs, the ICO has additional powers under the Data Protection Act 
2018 (DPA) with regard to the subsequent processing of the data.  Her competencies with 
regard to law enforcement processing may be engaged in two ways.  First, when data is 
collected and processed for law enforcement.26  Second, when the data is initially 





 Home Office, Retention of Communications Data Code of Practice (March 2015) Chapter 7. 
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 Ibid.  
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 Directive 2016/680/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection 
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes 
of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal 
penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 
2008/977/JHA (2016) OJ L119, Recital 11.  
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collected for a non-law enforcement purpose and then further processed by law 
enforcement authorities.27  Both scenarios require that the law enforcement authorities 
adhere to the requirements of Part 3 of the DPA.   
The provisions of this part of the Act apply to all competent authorities who will, as part 
of their functions, process personal data for law enforcement purposes.28  These purposes 
include the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the 
execution of criminal penalties.29  In utilising data in the fulfilment of these purposes, the 
authorities must comply with six data protection principles which relate to the fair 
processing of data.30 Authorities must implement the appropriate measures to comply 
with these principles, maintain documentation as to how they have done so, and where 
appropriate, appoint data protection officers and/or implement measures with regard to 
data protection by design and data protection by default.  The ICO does not play a direct 
role in instituting these procedures at the level of the public authority but offers guidance 
for these organisations in doing so.   
The ICO has more direct powers where data breaches have occurred in the discharge of 
these law enforcement functions.  Yet these are to some extent limited.  As opposed to 
data breaches by private organisations which must be reported to the ICO, data breaches 
resulting from law enforcement processing must only be communicated to the 
commissioner where there is a likely risk to the rights and freedoms of individuals if left 
unaddressed.31  If the authority fails to notify the ICO of a breach when required to do so 
they can be subject to a fine.  However, there are areas of overlap between this 
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requirement and those under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016.  Notably, where a data 
breach may also be classed as a relevant error under the IPA, the requirements governing 
the communication of a personal data breach do not apply.32  Where this is the case, 
errors must only be reported to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner (discussed 
below) who will then consider whether they have resulted in any errors which should 
then be reported to the ICO.  Further, no disclosures can be made to the ICO where doing 
so would be prohibited under the IPA.33  As a result, the powers of the ICO with regard 
to data provisions under the IPA are considerably more limited than her powers under the 
DPA.  The restrictions on the ICO with regard to the powers under the IPA are, to some 
extent, then covered by the IPC.  However, this remains insufficient to effectively 
guarantee the rights of individuals whose data is processed.   
b. Criticisms of the powers of the Information Commissioner  
One of the primary powers of the ICO rests in her ability to audit companies͛ data storage 
and security infrastructure.  Under the early investigatory powers instruments, the 
Commissioner lacked specific audit powers.34  However, following the passage of the 
IPA 2016, the Information Commissioner is now imbued with powers to audit 
requirements or restrictions imposed regarding communications data.35  This has placed 
on statutory footing the ability of the Commissioner with regard to oversight of the 
integrity, security, and destruction of data retained under a notice.   
Yet even when the Commissioner is able to audit the relevant functions of the CSP, much 
will actually depend on the content of the retention notice.  The ICO can only audit the 
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mechanisms of retention provided for in the notice.  ͚This means that the provisions of 
the retention code itself and the notice are of crucial importance to delivering the 
intended safeguards and the Commissioner͛s role in ensuring these are applied in 
practice͛.36  The Commissioner͛s inability to consult on these notices prior to their 
issuance mean her power is circumscribed.  There is no requirement that the ICO be 
consulted on the contents or specifications of a notice however, they may be consulted by 
the Home Office if that notice is later subjected to review, variation, or revocation.37  In 
addition, even when an audit of the technical requirements imposed by a retention notice 
is undertaken by the ICO, much will depend on the cooperation of the CSP. ͚The 
requirement to have the consent of the data controller before conducting an inspection 
limits proactive oversight and the deterrent effect of possible inspection in areas where 
there may be real risks to compliance͛.38  The Commissioner would be better equipped to 
deal with issues regarding data retention if she was empowered to compel audits for 
CSPs.  Her inability to do so represents ͚a significant limitation on her ability to 
investigate, identify problems, and prevent breaches͛.39  
Moreover, the Information Commissioner is not consulted when measures that engage 
areas within her competence concerning communications data are brought before 
Parliament.  This reduces her ability to ensure adequate safeguards exist within the 
legislation and promote privacy and data protection.  Indeed, the Commissioner͛s office 
notes that the recommendations that she be consulted in the legislative process were 
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͚founded on the need to ensure that as relevant developments occur in future, data 
protection and privacy interests are considered at the very earliest stage͛.40  Failing to 
take these concerns into consideration during the drafting of legislation and secondary 
instruments means that they are not afforded the necessary protections.   
Additionally, even when the privacy and data protection concerns of the ICO are taken 
into account, such consideration may not occur until well into the process, as it is 
unlikely the primary goal of the legislation is the protection of such interests.  ͚This can 
have the potential result of safeguards being implemented at a late stage as a 
compromise, and possibly more expensive, inadequate solutions͛.41  In addition, the 
Commissioner should be allowed to scrutinise the legislation post enactment, following a 
report on its deployment, the supposed value of any data retained, and the continued 
necessity of the measures.42  The limited powers of the Information Commissioner with 
regard to audits and consultation diminish its efficacy as an oversight mechanism for the 
investigatory powers instruments.  Not only does the minimal role of the Commissioner 
call into question whether adequate safeguards are considered in the implementation of 
policy, but also whether such safeguards, when included in legislation, can be 
satisfactorily enforced.   
IV. The role of the Interception of Communications Commissioner (IOCC): 
overseeing communications data use  
Whilst the Information Commissioner plays a relatively minor role in the oversight of 
communications data, overseeing only technical data retention capabilities, the 
Interception of Communications Commissioner (IOCC) oversaw much broader areas of 
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access and analysis of the data retained.  Before turning to further discussion of the IOCC 
however it is crucial to note that this Commissioner and his relevant duties have been 
overtaken by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner (IPC).  The following section will 
focus on the role of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner; but it is necessary to first 
discuss the Interception of Communications Commissioner as, until 2017, the IOCC was 
the principal oversight body for the investigatory powers instruments.   
a.  Functions and Powers of the Interception of Communications Commissioner  
The Interception of Communications Commissioner was the primary supervisory 
authority for the investigatory powers instruments since the office first received statutory 
footing under the Interception of Communications Act 1985.43  Under the 1985 Act, the 
Commissioner acted as an ex poste review mechanism for authorisations.  Former 
Commissioner Sir Thomas Bingham described the role as ͚largely retrospective, to check 
that warrants have not been issued in contravention of the Act and that appropriate 
procedures were followed͛.44  The responsibility for retroactive review continued under 
RIPA and DRIPA.  As such, the IOCC worked to hold those public authorities exercising 
RIPA powers to account and to improve compliance and confidence by means of 
scrutiny.45   
The IOCC was provided with resources to satisfy the aim of increasing this scrutiny and 
compliance.46  With regard to communications data, the IOCC worked with both CSPs 
and the public authorities to ensure that appropriate procedures were in place.  As such, 
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the staff of the IOCCO required technical facilities and training, and the Secretary of 
State was required to consult with the Commissioner to ensure that these resources were 
adequately provided.47  In order to fulfil the objectives of the Commissioner͛s office, the 
IOCCO staff were pulled from a wide range of backgrounds, covering legal, 
investigative, analytical, and forensic telecommunications.48  However, as will be 
discussed, the qualifications of the members of the IOCCO could not necessarily 
overcome wider issues with regard to limited powers and resources.  In order to 
adequately assess the effectiveness of the oversight provided by the IOCC, it is first 
necessary to define the extent of their powers.   
The IOCC had several powers with regard to communications data.  Principally, the 
IOCC carried out inspections of public authorities.  In doing so, they would audit the 
records of these authorities; it is worth noting that the powers of the IOCC to audit 
extended to all public authorities with RIPA powers, not just law enforcement.49  
Inspections of the larger users, such as police forces, occurred over three to four days and 
were conducted by at least two inspectors.50  Smaller authorities were generally inspected 
in one day by a single inspector.  Due to the large number of communications data 
requests (over 750,000 in 2015), it was not practical for the IOCCO to audit all 
applications; therefore the audits occurred largely through sampling.   To assess the 
applications for communications data the IOCCO examined the standards of necessity 
and proportionality utilised by public authorities.   
For these standards to be considered adequate, applicants requesting access to 
communications data needed to provide a description of the perceived value of the data 
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for their investigation.  This normally would include an explanation of the crime under 
investigation, the suspect (or witness or victim) whose information they were seeking, 
and the relevant phone or communications address.51  The majority of the applications 
were put forward for preventing or detecting crime and/or disorder.52  These applications 
further required that the measures be proportionate and limit collateral intrusion.  
Consideration of these requirements must have been made before an authorisation was 
granted by the designated person, usually a senior officer.  The IOCCO in assessing 
whether the public authority adequately considered these elements would look to the 
͚operational conduct carried out, or put another way, the downstream use of the material 
acquired͛.53  Such an analysis looked at the way the material was used/analysed; whether 
it was used for the intended or a secondary purpose; what the actual, as opposed to 
perceived, interference with fundamental rights, including privacy, was; and whether an 
error or breach ultimately resulted from the use of the data.   
Once the inspection was complete, the IOCCO issued inspection reports which 
highlighted issues to be addressed by public authorities in future applications for data.  
Such inspection reports would come with recommendations on good practice to help the 
authorisations comply in future.  The IOCCO had no ability to impose sanctions on those 
authorities who had failed their inspections, nor could they remove the powers of 
offending authorities to access communications data until they complied with their 
recommendations.  Public authorities were required to have regard for the provisions 
which set forth the specific requirements concerning authorisations for access to 
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communications data, but there were no civil nor criminal liabilities for failing to do so.54  
The inability of the IOCC to impose sanctions or guarantee credible enforcement limited 
the potential effectiveness of the oversight, particularly with regard to criminal 
investigations.  As Jon Michaels notes, ͚absent the credible threat than an investigation 
will be for naught if it is shown to have been conducted in an extra-legal fashion, 
individuals may well be emboldened to act with less regard for legal formalities͛.55  In 
this regard, their power was largely advisory and there was little clarity on how pervasive 
non-compliance by a public authority could be mitigated.   
Despite the inability to issue sanctions where data was accessed in a manner contrary to 
the relevant guidance and Codes of Practice, the IOCCO did retain responsibility for 
errors and breaches concerning communications data.  This responsibility was confined 
to those errors which were identified by public authorities and subsequently reported to 
the IOCCO.  The IOCCO would review such errors and assess any mitigating actions 
that had subsequently been put in place.56  The provisions concerning error reporting 
were crucial for oversight.  Errors in requests for access can potentially lead to 
individuals being wrongly targeted and have severe impacts on individual rights.  Take 
the example of IP addresses.  These are often used to identify individuals who have 
accessed illicit materials online and can be the only line of inquiry into serious offences 
such as online child sexual exploitation.  However, this category of information is also 
the most prone to error, as requesting applications frequently fail to specify the correct 
date or time.57  This has the adverse effect of individuals being wrongly identified and 
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can have potentially devastating consequences.  Despite the potentially serious impact on 
individuals, there was no explicit requirement that an individual be informed of this error.   
However, the IOCC did have discretionary power to inform individuals of errors and 
breaches concerning the use of the communications data where such errors were 
considered ͚serious͛ and were a result of ͚wilful and reckless failures͛ of public authorities 
to abide by the requirements of the relevant Codes of Practice.58  No guidance existed as 
to what might enable an error to fall under this category.  Circumstances in which a 
breach could be classified as serious included: technical errors by CSPs which led to a 
significant number of erroneous disclosures; errors where the public authority 
subsequently initiated a course of action impacting on an individual as a result of the 
information; and errors which resulted in the disclosure of a large volume of data or data 
that was considered sensitive.59  Where the Commissioner was satisfied that such an error 
occurred, he could inform the individual of the suspected unlawful behaviour.60  There 
was no positive obligation on the Commissioner to inform individuals; the decision was 
left to his discretion.  The lack of a requirement for information when an individual was 
impacted by erroneous actions of a public authority was a significant gap in the oversight 
regime, and one which remains under the IPCO which will be discussed below.   
Upon completion of the aforementioned audits which examined the use of and access to 
communications data, the Commissioner issued an annual report to be laid before 
Parliament.  These reports served to provide evidence of the legitimate use of these 
powers and call attention to any ways the RIPA powers were being abused.  The 
existence of this annual reporting system was used to support the argument that the IOCC 
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is a sufficient safeguard for the use of investigatory powers, an argument with which the 
ECtHR agreed in the case of Kennedy v United Kingdom.  Therein it was held that, 
 The Court considers that the Commissioner͛s role in ensuring that the provisions 
of RIPA and the Code are observed and applied correctly is of particular value and 
his [then] biannual review of a random selection of specific cases͙provides an 
important control of the activities of the interception agencies and of the Secretary 
of State himself.61   
However, despite the initial judicial acceptance of the functions and powers of the IOCC 
as a safeguard against abuse, technological advances and subsequent case law called into 
question this determination.  The IOCC was no longer a sufficient safeguard for the 
communications data activities under the investigatory powers regime.   
b. Criticisms of the Interception of Communications Commissioner  
The IOCC was subject to limitations which greatly diminished his ability to function as 
an effective and efficient oversight mechanism.  In order to determine whether the IOCC 
provided sufficient oversight to justify privacy interferences occasioned by access to 
communications data, it is necessary to examine these limitations, before turning to 
discussion of how these issues were addressed in the creation of the new office of the 
Investigatory Powers Commissioner.   
In assessing the independence of the IOCC, it is necessary to first examine the 
appointment and financial provisions governing the office.  Case law has determined that 
the manner of appointment, duration of term of office, and guarantees against outside 
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pressures will be crucial factors in determining whether the body is truly independent.62  
For the IOCC, the Commissioner was appointed by the Prime Minister on 
recommendation of the Home Secretary.  This created a relationship with, and a potential 
dependency on, the Executive.    Further, budget and technical facilities were subject to 
Treasury approval.63  This provided Government control over crucial elements for the 
body, including staffing, funding, and facilities.  The Home Secretary remained 
responsible for recommending the appropriate resources to be allocated by Treasury in 
this regard.  In essence, the Home Secretary was responsible for funding a body which 
was responsible for reviewing the exercise of her powers.64  This considerably weakened 
the independence of the IOCCO; it is inappropriate for the Home Secretary to determine 
the budget for a body who is responsible for overseeing their own performance.  Close 
relationships between the Government and the supervisory agency, whilst not explicitly 
prohibited, must be circumscribed by clear legislative provisions.65  
Further, practical elements concerning the functioning of the IOCCO conflicted with its 
independence.  The offices of the IOCC were found in the Home Office and inspectors 
noted that there was often indirect pressure applied to ensure that their reports reflected 
perceived policy aims.66  This raised concerns over the perception of independence for 
the body.  The body must not only be independent; it must also appear independent to 
ensure public trust.67 Such limitations to independence, whether perceived or otherwise, 
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raised questions over the Commissioner͛s capabilities.  Independence needs to be clear; 
even the perception of government interference casts suspicion on the ability of the IOCC 
to function as an effective supervisory agent.  The inability to fully separate the IOCC 
from the Government supported the argument that the IOCC was insufficiently 
independent to satisfy necessary human rights requirements.  Conflicts arose due to the 
role of the IOCC as both a department of the Home Office and a regulator of it.   
In addition to questions of independence, the IOCC had relatively limited powers.  As 
noted above, the IOCC was entitled to make reports concerning the acquisition of 
communications data by public authorities and any errors or abuses therein.  This brought 
an important element of transparency to the authorisation process and acted as a check 
that these powers were not being used unnecessarily or disproportionately.  However, in 
auditing the communications data authorisations made by public authorities, there was a 
risk of regulatory capture.  JUSTICE, in their report ͚Freedom from Suspicion͛ noted that 
testimony of the IOCC indicated that the Commissioner at the time strongly identified 
with the work of public authorities in a manner that was inappropriate for a supervisory 
agent charged with the review of the decisions of those bodies.68   
The results of the inspections which determined errors were compiled into an annual 
report laid before Parliament. However, the Prime Minister, on advice of the Home 
Secretary, retained the ability to edit these reports prior to publication to remove 
potentially ͚sensitive͛ material.  This was criticised as amounting to a de facto veto power 
over the contents of the Commissioner͛s reports.69  Additionally, these reports were not 
comprehensive; they covered a sample of authorisations for communications data.  Even 
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if common errors or abuses of powers were determined which might be of public 
concern, the IOCC could not launch broader inquiries into these areas.70  This frustrated 
their abilities to assess more systemic failings within the communications data processes.   
Further, when errors were detected with authorisations, the powers of the IOCC were 
inadequate.  Despite a number of errors consistently occurring in the authorisation 
process, until 2013, the IOCC had yet to direct a public authority to provide information 
to an individual who has been adversely affected by any wilful or reckless exercise of, or 
failure to, exercise its powers under the Act.71 Furthermore, the Commissioner could not 
inform those individuals who have not been subject to a ͚serious error͛ i.e. one which 
causes significant prejudice or harm to the person concerned.72  In addition, the serious 
errors of which people could be informed were only those committed by public 
authorities; leaving a gap in protections for those errors committed by CSPs (approx. 
13% of serious errors).73  Such limitations called into question the protection such error 
reporting provided individuals. 
In addition to a lack of independence and limited powers, the ability of the IOCC to 
effectively oversee the provisions of the investigatory powers instruments was further 
diminished by the fragmented nature of the oversight regime and the use of a single 
Commissioner structure.  Prior to the introduction of the 2016 Act, oversight of the use 
of surveillance powers by public authorities was spread amongst the Surveillance 
Commissioner, the Intelligence Services Commissioner, and the Interception of 
Communications Commissioner.  Such a regime led to a highly fragmented and 
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inefficient system.  Critiques of the regime consistently called for the creation of a single 
body, placed on statutory footing, to counter the oversight gaps and remove overlaps.  
Throughout the legislative process which culminated in the Investigatory Powers Act, 
various Committees and interested parties offered recommendations for ways to improve 
the oversight regime.   
Notably, David Anderson, then Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, drafted a 
comprehensive report in which he proposed a shift in the structure and power of the 
supervisory agencies to better ensure meaningful oversight.  Anderson recommended that 
instead of the fragmented regime under previous instruments, wherein separate bodies 
were responsible for different areas of the same act (i.e. IOCC for interferences and 
communications data; Intelligence and Security Committee for oversight of intelligence 
agencies; etc.), these bodies should be merged into a single responsible agency.  This 
agency would not be a single Commissioner but rather a Commission which would be ͚a 
well-resourced and outward-facing regulator of all those involved in the exercise of 
surveillance powers and of the security and intelligence agencies more generally͛.74  This 
Independent Surveillance and Intelligence Commission (ISIC) would take on the existing 
powers of audit and inspection, but also take on the warrant and authorisation issuing 
powers, thereby removing those powers from the Home Secretary and vesting them in an 
independent judicial body.75  Anderson͛s recommendations were endorsed by members 
of the oversight bodies, the Joint Committee on the Investigatory Powers Bill, and 
various NGOs; however, despite this support, they were not wholly incorporated in to the 
IPA.   
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V. The role of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner (IPC) in overseeing 
communications data 
Rather than the Commission model advocated by Anderson and others, the Investigatory 
Powers Act amended the Commissioner system by creating the office of the 
Investigatory Powers Commissioner.  The relevant aim of the Commissioner is to 
provide effective oversight of the communications data powers of public authorities.  It is 
necessary to examine how the Commissioner achieves this aim in order to determine if it 
can satisfy requirements of independent oversight of communications data powers. 
a. Functions and Powers of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner 
The structure of the IPC differs from the IOCC by requiring not only a sole 
Commissioner but supplementing him with thirteen Judicial Commissioners who have 
oversight remit.  Both the Commissioner and his Judicial Commissioners are appointed;76 
these officeholders may not be appointed unless they hold or have held prior judicial 
appointment of at least the level of high court judge.77  In practice the Judicial 
Commissioners are composed of current and recently retired High Court, Court of 
Appeal, and Supreme Court Judges.  The current Commissioner is Lord Justice Sir 
Adrian Fulford, a serving Lord Justice of Appeal and former Senior Presiding Judge for 
England and Wales.78  The independence of the Commissioners is guaranteed by the 
limited circumstances in which they can be removed from office; i.e. only with the 
consent of both Houses of Parliament, unless extraordinary circumstances apply.79  To 
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satisfy his functions, the Commissioner is provided with a staff of around 70 people ʹ 
roughly twice the size of the three predecessor organisations whose functions the IPC has 
undertaken.  This staff, as well as other facilities, accommodation, and resources, are 
provided to the IPC by the Home Secretary.80  The Secretary will provide the resources 
they consider necessary, but the IPC may request additional resources be afforded to 
them in their Annual Report.81 
The Annual Report is one of the primary duties of the IPC and provisions concerning this 
largely replicate those that existed under the IOCC regime.  This report must be laid 
before the Prime Minister and will provide an account of the work done by the IPC.  In 
addition, the Prime Minister may require the IPC to provide additional reports.  
Similarly, the IPC can initiate its own reports on any matter that the Commissioner has 
oversight of and provide recommendations that he believes appropriate.82  The ability of 
a body to initiate investigations such as this on their own is recognised as a crucial 
element of oversight powers.83  Once a report is submitted to the Prime Minister, she has 
a duty to lay that report before Parliament.  However, the reports may be redacted in 
order to preclude disclosure of any information that is believed to damage national 
security or operational effectiveness.84   
The IPC and other Judicial Commissioners have discretion with regard to how they fulfil 
their functions, whether through audits, inspections, and investigations.85  However, in 
doing so the IPC must ensure that their activities do not impede the ability of law 
enforcement and security and intelligence agencies to perform their statutory functions.  
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The IPC has a positive duty not to act in a way that would, for example, prejudice 
national security or impede the effectiveness of operations.86  This places a constraint on 
the oversight capabilities of the IPC and runs contrary to the core of judicial scrutiny in 
ensuring that these powers are exercised in accordance with the principles of the rule of 
law.  Notably, in examining the issue of data surveillance, the Fundamental Rights 
Agency has stated that an important factor in assessing the effectiveness of an oversight 
system is whether the body has the power to quash authorisations, stop surveillance, and 
require the rectification or erasure of collected data.87  Whilst the IPC has powers with 
regard to quashing retention notices and stopping surveillance measures already 
undertaken, their abilities with regard to the rectification and erasure of data are limited.  
It is necessary to examine the extent to which the powers of the IPC in fact enable 
effective judicial oversight and whether they are subject to any limitations that would 
frustrate their role in ensuring the collection and processing of communications data 
accords with the rule of law.   
b. Criticisms of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner  
Upon undertaking the role of Investigatory Powers Commissioner, Sir Adrian Fulford 
promoted the necessity of the independence of the office.  ͚Independence is at the heart of 
the new organisation; IPCO is an Arm͛s Length Body of the Home Office but retains the 
authority to perform its statutory duties͛.88  Despite this pledge for independence and the 
improvement in statutory independence requirements under the IPA, many of the issues 
inherent with the previous oversight structure remain.  Namely, the Home Secretary still 
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remains responsible for the provision of funding, facilities, and staffing as they deem 
necessary.  This means that there still exists a financial dependency which is of 
significant concern for its independence.  The resources allocated will be those deemed 
necessary by the government agency whom the IPCO is ultimately responsible for 
overseeing.  Indeed, this is particularly salient as the IPCO now serves as a ͚double lock͛ 
on the warrant process.  All retention notices issued under IPA must not only be signed 
off by the Home Secretary, but also approved by the IPCO or one of his Judicial 
Commissioners.89  The availability of resources which the IPCO may devote to the 
scrutiny of each notice will be constrained by budgetary and staffing considerations.  In 
addition, the allocation of the annual budget will be put forth by the Home Office.  Any 
approvals for additional funds would have to be included in the Home Office allocation.  
There is a dependency between the IPCO and the Home Office which undermines the 
independence, whether real or perceived, of the office.  
More significant criticisms for the IPCO can be offered in regard to the limited powers it 
has concerning communications data access.  These criticisms concern authorisations for 
access to communications data, error reporting provisions, and the lack of appropriate 
mechanisms for redress for individuals under the IPC scheme.   
First, concerns remain over the inability of the oversight regime under the IPA to offer 
independent judicial scrutiny for applications prior to the disclosure of the relevant 
information.  This is in direct contrast to established precedent.  In the case of Digital 
Rights Ireland, for example, the CJEU held that Directive 2006/24/EC failed because,  
Above all, the access by the competent national authorities to the data retained is 
not made dependent on a prior review carried out by a court or an independent 
                                                          
89
 IPA Part 8.  
 234 
 
administrative body whose decision seeks to limit access to the data and their use to 
what is strictly necessary͙.Nor does it lay down a specific obligation on Member 
States designed to establish such limits.90   
The IPA does not meet these criteria; there is no requirement for prior independent 
judicial authorisation to access communications data.  The IPC is only able to scrutinise 
the retention notices which place an obligation on CSPs to retain data; they have no remit 
to scrutinise subsequent applications for access by law enforcement.  Prior judicial 
scrutiny is crucial to ensure that the exercise of the powers comports with the rule of law 
and guarantees that those in power can be held accountable for their actions.   
It is important to acknowledge that the Courts have held that the requirement for 
effective oversight can be met absent formal judicial control provided that the control is 
exercised by an official qualified for judicial office.91  The fact that oversight is not 
undertaken by a judicial body would not appear, in itself, to satisfy a finding that the 
oversight regime is inadequate.  Qualifications aside, there is a question of the adequacy 
of the process as a mechanism that meets the standards of independent oversight.  The 
office has no role in ex ante authorisations to access communications data.  The IPCO 
will only be engaged in approving notices to retain data and authorising access for those 
͚privileged professions͛ such as journalists, lawyers, and MPs.  Absent that, the IPC does 
not provide judicial control over the access process.  While the European Courts have 
held that such authorisation is not mandatory per se provided that there is extensive post 
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factum review to counterbalance the shortcomings,92 the Court did question any process 
which failed to do so in a blanket manner.93   
Even with a review ex post, the ability of the IPC in being able to provide such scrutiny 
effectively is questionable.  The sheer number of communications data authorisations 
mean that it is impossible for the Judicial Commissioners to review all authorisations.  
Review will necessarily only happen by sampling, which can limit the perceived 
effectiveness of these provisions.  In addition, as Judith Rauhofer notes, ͚Retrospective 
review is likely to be less rigorous than prior scrutiny and it may well be easier to satisfy 
the requirements of necessity and proportionality when armed with the incriminating 
results of the surveillance͛.94  Further, errors are unlikely to be found by the Judicial 
Commissioners unless they are specifically reported to them by the relevant CSP or 
public authority.  As a result, instead of performing an independent and open check, the 
primary oversight mechanism relies on self-reporting.  This is insufficient to mitigate 
privacy intrusions and offers only a veneer of oversight.     
Where serious errors are detected, the powers of the IPC remain constricted in much the 
same manner as the IOCC.  Under s 231 of the IPA, the IPC is entitled to inform 
individuals of serious relevant errors in the use of investigatory powers which relate to 
them.  Here a relevant error is ͚an error made by a public authority in complying with any 
requirement over which the Investigatory Powers Commissioner has oversight͛.95  This 
provision remains a power that may be exercised rather than a mandatory requirement.  
Further, the right to inform an individual is limited to those instances where it is both in 
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the public interest to inform the individual and significant prejudice or harm to the person 
concerned has resulted.96  A similar argument was put forth in S & Marper v United 
Kingdom and was held to be an insufficient justification for retention.  In that case, the 
Government argued that ͚retention could not be considered as having any direct or 
significant effect on the applicants unless matches in the database implicated them in the 
commission of offences on a future occasion͛.97  This arguably prioritises the law 
enforcement objectives over human rights concerns as it looks to subsequent rather than 
current harms and violations.   
It is for the IPC to undertake an examination of the error and balance the seriousness 
against the public interest in non-disclosure.  This is a discretionary power; there are no 
binding or determinative requirements for conduct that will amount to ͚serious͛.  The 
final report of the IOCC before its powers were undertaken by the IPC noted that the 
Commissioner would only notify the individual if ͚significant prejudice or harm (such as 
being arrested)͛ occurred.98  It is questionable whether lower interferences with 
individual rights, such as searches of homes or devices, or visits by the police which 
could potentially have similar negative effects on individuals would meet the 
Commissioner͛s definition of ͚significant prejudice or harm͛.  This provision is therefore 
open to criticism.  In determining seriousness, the emphasis appears to be on the 
consequences of the error rather than the seriousness of the conduct.99  Judging errors in 
this way thereby focuses on individual harms rather than more systemic issues that might 
arise from the conduct of public authorities.  Finally, the requirement that there be 
͚significant prejudice or harm͛ sets the threshold artificially high.  This can prevent 
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individuals from being able to seek adequate remedies for undue breaches of their 
privacy resulting from communications data processes.   
The ability of individuals who have been negatively impacted by the communications 
data powers to seek an effective remedy is crucial to ensuring that the interference 
occasioned by the actions of public authorities is justified.  In order to effectively 
exercise their right to remedy, individuals need to be notified of when their data has been 
used.  It was held in the case of Tele2 and Watson that ͚the competent national authorities 
to whom access to the retained data has been granted must notify the persons affected͙as 
soon as that notification is no longer likely to jeopardise the investigations being 
undertaken by those authorities.  That notification is, in fact, necessary to enable to 
persons affected to exercise, inter alia, their right to a legal remedy͛.100  This established 
case law is supported by bodies such as the UN101 and the Venice Commission102 who 
reiterate the necessity of notification for individuals who have been subjected to actions 
by public authorities, including communications data surveillance.  The IPC should be 
entitled to inform individuals who have been subject to this surveillance, once it no 
longer poses a risk to the aims of the retention and access.  Yet there remains no explicit 
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requirement of notification in the IPA.103  As a result, individuals are severely limited in 
their abilities to seek remedies.  ͚Effectiveness [of remedies] is therefore undermined by 
the absence of a requirement to notify the subject of an interception at any point, or an 
adequate possibility to request and obtain information about interceptions from the 
authorities͛.104  As the powers conferred on the IPC do not enable notification and 
thereby promote access to remedies, it is necessary to determine what rights the 
individual may have to challenge the retention or access of their data by public 
authorities.  Under the investigatory powers provisions, the only right to redress that an 
individual has is offered by the Investigatory Powers Tribunal.   
VI. The role of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT): judicial oversight 
for communications data? 
As the principal mechanism for challenges to powers of retention and access, it is 
necessary to examine the scope and capabilities of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal in 
adjudicating human rights claims which arise from the use of investigatory powers 
instruments.  The IPT itself has been the court of record for complaints concerning 
interception of communications and related data since these powers were first put on a 
statutory footing.  In its earliest iteration under the Interception of Communications Act 
1985, the Tribunal was entitled to investigate whether there were relevant warrants or 
certificates issued for intercepted information, and, if so, whether there were any 
contraventions of the provisions of the Act.105  If the Tribunal found that there had indeed 
been a contravention, notice was to be provided to the applicant and Prime Minister, and, 
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where applicable, the relevant warrant would be quashed, intercepted material destroyed, 
and compensation ordered.106  In essence, as the IPT saw it, their role was ͚largely 
retrospective, to check that warrants had not been issued in contravention of the Act and 
that appropriate procedures were followed͛.107   
Subsequently, the powers of the Tribunal originally granted under the ICA 1985 were 
subsumed into RIPA.  RIPA provided the IPT with the power to decide complaints and 
claims under the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) of allegations of unlawful intrusions by 
public bodies, the police, and local authorities, including those complaints which relate to 
the acquisition of communications data. Under ss 65-69 RIPA, the IPT is entitled to 
consider, and if necessary investigate, complaints made by members of the public for 
unlawful access or actions which do not meet the requirements of necessity and 
proportionality.108 By providing a mechanism for the investigation of complaints and 
HRA claims, RIPA sought to meet the requirements for a right to remedy as established 
under Article 13 of the ECHR.  This Article requires that ͚everyone whose rights and 
freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy 
before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by 
persons acting in an official capacity͛.109  The validity of the IPT in discharging this 
function was accepted in the case of Kennedy v United Kingdom.110  The RIPA 
provisions concerning the IPT have now been largely incorporated into the IPA, with a 
few notable developments as regards powers and functions.   
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A. Functions and Powers of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal  
Before turning to the relevant criticisms of the IPT, it is first worth noting the scope of its 
powers and its primary functions as regards the collection and processing of 
communications data.  The IPT is fundamentally different from traditional courts.  It is 
not a part of Her Majesty͛s Courts and Tribunal Service; nor is it a senior court which 
can make a declaration of incompatibility with the ECHR pursuant to the HRA s 4.111  It 
is classed as a Tribunal non-departmental public body of the Home Office.112  The 
Tribunal does not occupy a primarily adjudicative role; rather its principal function is 
investigatory.  It can follow through on questions which arise by ordering investigations 
with which the public authorities are required to cooperate.113  The investigatory 
functions of the IPT sit uneasily with the traditional judicial structure and application of 
the principles of judicial review.  In addition, the Tribunal͛s powers are reactive; they are 
derived from receiving a claim or a complaint.114  Once a complaint is received and 
investigated, the Tribunal uses the principles of judicial review to determine any potential 
remedy. 
In fulfilling their investigatory role, the IPT has several unique features.  The Tribunal is 
entitled to demand, receive, and consider evidence even where such evidence would be 
inadmissible in an ordinary court.115  The demand for this evidence must be complied 
with by public authorities.116  It is for the public authorities to provide the requested 
information to the IPT for the purposes of their investigation.  However, this will be 
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based on trust.  There is no process for the IPT themselves to audit any records or gain 
access to the records themselves; the only evidence which is provided is that given by 
those under investigation.  This further contributes to criticisms of the efficacy of the IPT 
as an effective oversight mechanism.  In theory, the investigatory powers of the IPT in 
demanding evidence have a broad scope: individuals can be ordered to appear to give 
evidence; organisations͛ files can be requested; and the Commissioners, such as the 
Judicial Commissioners discussed above, must provide any documents, information, or 
assistance to the Tribunal which is requested.117   
The Tribunal may place limits on the disclosure of information to the parties concerned.  
Such limitations on disclosure in the interest of national security or for the investigation 
of crime have received judicial approval and have been held to not directly interfere with 
human rights standards.118  In order to ensure confidentiality, the IPT is entitled to 
provide anonymity to witnesses, applicants, and other interveners in the case.  This is 
allegedly necessary in many instances to ensure the protection of national security and 
ensure that sensitive information is not disclosed.  The anonymity provisions are coupled 
with similar powers to hold closed hearings wherein not all the relevant parties are 
entitled to attend and decline to hold oral hearings.119  Where oral hearings are held, there 
is no requirement that the respondent or complainant be entitled to make representations, 
give evidence, call witnesses, or even attend.120 Further, there is no automatic right to 
open hearings under the IPT Rules.  
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Yet, at their discretion, the IPT may hold a public hearing.  This was done for the first 
time in January of 2003.121  There has been a rise in the number of public hearings since 
then, however, the more common practice remains closed hearings.  Indeed, hearings in 
the traditional adversarial sense are rarely held at all.  Rather, the IPT will meet to review 
the documents and then provide notification of the outcome.122  In addition to the lack of 
open hearings, the sensitive nature of the material relating to many of the complaints 
further means that ͚the complainant may not be aware of what [the Tribunal] has seen 
and will not be entitled to hear or see it͛.123  This represents a significant information 
disparity between the complainant and the public authority.  However, this has been held 
not to inhibit the complainants͛ right to a fair trial as established in Kennedy v UK.  ͚In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasises the breadth of access to the IPT enjoyed 
by those complaining about interception within the United Kingdom and the absence of 
any evidential burden to be overcome in order to lodge an application with the IPT͛.124   
Key to the ECtHR decision was the breadth of access provided to the IPT by the 
authorities under investigation.  The ability to investigate this material and the ability of 
the complainant to access the court were seen as sufficient to meet the necessary 
standards for a fair trial under Article 6, particularly given the secret nature of the 
information allegedly intercepted by the authorities.125  In this case the ECtHR afforded a 
wide margin of appreciation to the State in the use of its investigatory powers.  However, 
the Court in its ruling paid particular attention to the nature of the material at issue and 
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the need for secrecy surrounding that type of information; if Kennedy was argued with 
regard to communications data it is arguable that these issues would need to be re-
examined, paying particular attention to the blanket nature of the communications data 
powers and the lack of any statutory limitations which require its use only in instances of 
͚serious crime͛. 
Once a complaint has been investigated, the Tribunal will make a determination which 
can lead to one of seven possible outcomes.  The first of which is that no determination 
can be made in favour of the complainant.  Under this outcome, the Tribunal will either 
be satisfied that no wrongful conduct has occurred or that the conduct was not in 
contravention with the Act and was proportionate.126  There is no requirement, if no 
determination has been made, to inform the complainant as to which of these reasons 
apply.  To provide this information to the individual has been held to frustrate the 
purposes of the powers granted under the investigatory regime.  A ruling of no 
determination has been held to be sufficient for the principles of judicial remedy.127  The 
second potential outcome which can arise is that the complaint is out of jurisdiction, 
meaning the IPT has no power to investigate the complaint.128  The third possible 
outcome is that the complaint was lodged after the relevant time and the time limit should 
not be extended.129  Fourth, the complaint might be ruled frivolous or vexatious if it lacks 
foundation or is repeatedly taken.130 Fifth, the complaint might be dismissed due to 
procedural reasons.  The sixth outcome will result in no determination where the 
complainant has since withdrawn the complaint.  The final potential outcome is that the 
Tribunal finds in favour of the complainant.  In this case it is open to the Tribunal to 
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issue an order quashing or cancelling the relevant warrant or authorisation, order the 
destruction of records or information which have been obtained, and/or order 
compensation be paid.131  There is little guidance offered by the IPT on what will result 
in a finding in favour of the complainant.  Statements made by the President of the IPT 
indicate that the Tribunal evaluates the requirements of necessity and proportionality, 
having particular regard to the balance of public interest versus the individual harm 
suffered.  The low success rate of claimants to this Tribunal give rise to the inference that 
the margin of appreciation here is heavily weighted toward the State.   
Where a determination is made in favour of the complainant, the complainant is then 
entitled to a summary of that determination, including any findings of fact.132  However, 
in providing this information, the duty to give reasons and information concerning the 
findings will vary according to the nature of the decision and the circumstances of the 
case.  If the Tribunal declines to give reasons on the basis that it will jeopardise national 
and/or law enforcement interest, the competent national authority must prove that the 
giving of reasons is against the public interest.  If these interests do stand in the way, 
precedent dictates that there must be an appropriate balance between these interests and 
the requirements of the right to effective judicial protection, where any interference of 
that right is limited to what is strictly necessary.133  
Whilst this indicates that the IPT operates as a judicial check on the abuse of powers in 
the field of communications data, public confidence in the Tribunal as an effective 
oversight body is diminished by the typical outcomes of these cases.  From 2000-2013, 
the IPT heard 1,673 complaints, out of which only 10 were upheld, 5 of which related to 
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the same family.134  Whilst not necessarily indicative that the IPT serves as a mere façade 
of judicial scrutiny for the fundamental rights interfered with under the investigatory 
powers mechanisms, it does raise concerns.  The list of public authorities entitled to use 
powers under IPA is expansive; the low success rate of complainants indicates that these 
authorities consistently use these powers in accordance with the precise letter of the law, 
to the extent that 95.5% of applications to use these powers precisely comply with the 
letter of the law.135  Such a low rate of success for complaints creates the public 
perception that the Tribunal is not a truly effective mechanism for individuals to get a 
determination regarding their complaints.  As perhaps best summarised in the JUSTICE 
report ͚Freedom from Suspicion͛: ͚[It] beggars belief that public bodies and government 
departments that struggle to produce defensible decisions in the field of planning, 
pension credits, and incapacity benefits are somehow incapable of making mistakes when 
it comes to surveillance͛.136  
Furthermore, the lack of transparency regarding successful decisions raises concerns as 
to the accountability of the IPT.  The IPT has published two annual reports which are 
publicly accessible, one covering 2011-2015 and one for 2016.137  The IPT only sat in 
public for the first time in 2003 and held that their decisions could be made publicly 
available provided Neither Confirm nor Deny (NCND) was not violated and no risk to 
national security or the public interest was present.138  It was not until 2013 that the 
President of the Tribunal gave any sort of public interview.139  Whilst recent 
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developments of the IPT with regard to open hearings and positive obligations to give 
reasons, provided security or public interest concerns are not raised, are important 
developments, the functions and powers of the IPT still lack transparency.  The 
limitations of the IPT will now be analysed in greater detail.  
c. Criticisms of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal  
Low success rates do not automatically equate with an inability to garner a legitimate 
remedy in line with relevant human rights standards.  In this regard it is necessary to 
examine further criticisms which are raised about the IPT to appropriately assess whether 
it is an acceptable safeguard for individuals͛ rights concerning communications data.  
Several concerns are raised when discussing the legitimacy of the IPT: independence and 
the judicial role of the Tribunal; the transparency of the Tribunal process; the amenability 
of decisions of the Tribunal to further review or appeal; and the ability of individuals to 
secure adequate and effective relief.  Each of these criticisms will be addressed to 
determine the effectiveness of the IPT as an oversight mechanism.  
As noted above, the Tribunal is distinct from traditional English courts as it possesses an 
investigative function.  It is difficult to equate these functions with the independent 
judicial functions of a court.  Rather, as noted in the JUSTICE report ͚Freedom from 
Suspicion͛, ͚the Tribunal represents an attempt to combine the investigative functions of 
an Ombudsman with the judicial functions of a court͛.140  Such a distinction was made 
when the tribunal was first proposed under the ICA 1985.  Then Home Secretary, Mr. 
Leon Brittan, in describing the tribunal noted that the ͚arrangements are, in substance, the 
same as those which apply to the Ombudsman and they secure the tribunal͛s complete 
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independence͛.141  The arrangements referred to included that the tribunal consist of 
senior lawyers, appointed by the Crown, and may only be removed by both Houses of 
Parliament.  The current iteration of the IPT has the same structure as its predecessor.  
Appointments are ultimately undertaken by the Prime Minister who may appoint either 
͚judicial members͛ who are a serving member of the senior judiciary, or ͚non-judicial 
members͛ who may be senior members of the legal profession.142  
Rather than being overseen by Her Majesty͛s Courts and Tribunal Service who is 
responsible for promoting an independent judiciary, the IPT is overseen and sponsored 
by the Home Office. As the IPT remains a non-departmental public body of the Home 
Office it is argued that they are not manifestly independent of those whose decisions they 
are reviewing.  In the same manner as the IPC, budgetary considerations and funding 
decisions must also be approved by the sponsoring department and their offices are 
located within the Home Office.143  Whether perceived or in practice, such an 
arrangement raises concerns over the true independence of the IPT, particularly as it is 
the only body with domestic jurisdiction over the investigatory powers instruments.  This 
means that the body ultimately responsible for reviewing the legality of interferences 
with individuals͛ data which impact on individuals rights is closely linked to the Home 
Office who issues the warrants and retention notices that enable them to do so.   
In addition to the question of independence, the effectiveness of the IPT as a means of 
redress for complainants who have suffered a violation under IPA is further frustrated by 
the opaque procedures of the Tribunal.  Lack of disclosure and transparency creates 
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barriers for access to justice and has a negative impact on complainants͛ abilities to 
challenge unlawful activities.  Yet, this opacity lies at the heart of the powers of the IPT.  
This is in direct contradiction to the traditional judicial process which occurs in an open 
court and enables both sides to engage in an adversarial process.  In introducing the 
Tribunal in 1985, Leon Brittan, justifying the lack of information provided to claimants, 
stated that ͚it would clearly, however, be ridiculous for somebody to be able to discover 
whether an interception had been directed against him by applying to the tribunal͛.144   
The current Tribunal rules provide that,  
The Tribunal should carry out their functions in such a way as to secure that 
information is not disclosed to an extent or in a manner that is contrary to the 
public interest or prejudicial to the national security, the prevention or detection of 
͚serious crime͛, the economic wellbeing of the United Kingdom, or the continued 
discharge of the functions of any of the intelligence services.145   
Prevention of disclosure may be necessary in limited instances but as a standard practice 
of the sole body with jurisdiction to rule over human rights concerns wrought by the IPA 
it represents a substantial impediment to justice.  The materials obtained by the IPT as 
part of their investigatory role are often the primary information used to decide a case.  
Since that information is not required to be provided to the complainants, the Tribunal is 
typically limited to confirming that an investigation is still ongoing.146  The complainant 
has no right to challenge or access the information that forms the foundation of a decision 
relevant to him.   
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Furthermore, while the IPT can demand that the relevant bodies disclose information 
pertinent to their investigation to the Tribunal should they consider that the information 
be made available to the claimants, they cannot make a demand that the authorities 
disclose the information to the other parties; they may only request that they do so.147  
This is a weak mechanism for ensuring informational parity.  As Lord Kerr stated in his 
dissent in the case of Home Office v Tariq when discussing closed material procedures, 
͚withholding of information from a claimant which is then deployed to defeat his claim 
is, in my opinion, a breach of his fundamental common law right to a fair trial͛.148  The 
European Courts have echoed similar concerns, ͚The fundamental right to an effective 
legal remedy would be infringed if a judicial decision were founded on facts and 
documents which the parties themselves, or one of them, have not had an opportunity to 
examine and on which they have therefore been unable to state their views͛.149  Despite 
this, certain exceptional cases have entitled national authorities to limit the provision of 
information to complainants.  This was the case in Kennedy v United Kingdom which 
challenged the secrecy of the IPT͛s disclosure practices.  In that instance, the procedures 
were validated; despite the limited access, the right to a fair trial under Article 6 was not 
infringed. However, it is notable that the proceedings in Kennedy were validated because 
the prohibition on disclosure was not absolute; a policy of blanket refusal would likely 
fall foul of these proceedings.    
However, whilst a policy of blanket refusal to provide information to claimants is not 
enshrined in the IPT rules, the accepted practice of NCND in effect guarantees that 
claimants will not be provided with the necessary information to validate their claims.  
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The position of the IPT is to accept NCND where it is deemed to be lawful and serves a 
legitimate purpose.  The IPT for its part will neither confirm nor deny whether a warrant 
or authorisation has been issued against an individual unless that conduct is subsequently 
found to be unlawful.150  As noted by Sir Justice Burnton in a BBC interview, the role of 
the IPT is solely to make a determination as to whether there had been a breach of the 
law.151   
The willingness of the IPT to accept allegations that material must be subject to NCND 
must be criticised.  In its 2011 Report, JUSTICE noted that ͚the IPT have generally been 
too accepting of public authorities decisions to use an NCND response͛.152  In accepting 
the request of a public authority to NCND the existence of materials that give rise to an 
interference with individuals͛ rights, there is a threat to open justice and procedural 
fairness.  Individuals cannot challenge that information to which they have no access.  
The tendency to invoke NCND as an automatic or routine procedure by public authorities 
in this area can cause further issues where the information is eventually disclosed.  This 
occurred in the IPT in the Belhadj case, where late disclosures were made which 
impacted on Liberty/Privacy (No 1) and were later considered in Liberty/Privacy (No 
2).153  Late disclosures following an initial NCND suggested that an appropriate analysis 
of the true need for NCND was not adequately evaluated by the IPT.  Furthermore, as 
Judith Rauhofer notes, if communications data is less intrusive, as frequently argued by 
the Government, ͚then surely the body responsible for overseeing such use can afford to 
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be more open about the failures to meet legislative requirements without jeopardising 
ongoing inquiries or the position of those requesting information͛.154    
In addition to the limited provision of information to complainants, a further impediment 
to individuals͛ access to justice concerns the requirements that the IPT sit in private and 
the provision that principal parties can be excluded from attending these proceedings.  
There is no requirement for the IPT to hold oral hearings.  Even where such hearings are 
held, there is no requirement that the Tribunal disclose to the complainant that these 
hearings have occurred.155  However, the IPT does have discretion to grant oral hearings 
and even permit open hearings should they believe it is necessary to do so.  The Tribunal 
can similarly make public their transcripts or reasoning if they so choose.156  Whilst this 
discretionary power exists, open proceedings under the IPT remain the exception rather 
than the rule.  Once again Kennedy has been offered as substantive support for the 
provisions against open procedures under the IPT.157  However, new challenges to the 
regime are going through the Courts which might result in a different outcome.  Notably 
the case of Big Brother Watch and Ors v United Kingdom calls into questions the 
compatibility of the IPT͛s procedures with the provisions of Article 6.158  Once decided 
this case may potentially provide further precedent for the role of the IPT.   
The IPT does attempt to balance the limitations of these closed procedures by conducting 
cases based on ͚assumed͛ facts.  Under this provision, where points of law arise the 
Tribunal, without making any finding on the substance of the complaint, ͚may be 
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prepared to assume for the sake of argument that the facts asserted by the claimant are 
true; and then, acting upon that assumption, decide whether they would constitute lawful 
or unlawful conduct͛.159  This allows the Tribunal to reach a conclusion based on those 
assumed facts.  Subsequent to this, if the conduct based on assumed facts is judged to be 
unlawful, the IPT will then consider the issue in closed session.160  Following 
consideration of that issue, the IPT may make a determination in line with the outcomes 
discussed in the preceding section.  Yet despite this provision concerning assumed facts, 
the closed procedures and lack of disclosure put the claimant at an informational 
disadvantage in arguing his case.  Furthermore, the use of assumed facts has been used 
by the IPT to preserve the public authorities͛ use of NCND which creates additional 
obstacles for complainants.   
This has led to a situation where the odds are stacked against the complainant.  The 
principles of closed procedures are all the more problematic when noting that the 
procedures of the IPT are not open to judicial review.  Judicial review ensures that 
adjudicative bodies may be held to account and that the decisions made therein satisfy 
the requirements of legality.  Judicial review is procedural in nature; it is not for re-
examining the merits of a case nor substituting a different judgment for the decision of 
the IPT.  The concept of judicial review is seen as a key element of the rule of law.  
According to Paul Scott, ͚One of the principles most dear to the UK͛s constitution is the 
rule of law, at the core of which stands the requirement that the State abide by law and ʹ 
a necessary corollary of that ʹ the right of individuals to challenge the lawfulness of the 
acts of public-decision makers by invoking the supervisory jurisdiction͛.161  However, the 
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IPT is subject to an ouster clause which excludes the exercise of this supervisory 
jurisdiction.  Specifically, section 67(8) RIPA provided that: ͚Except to such extent as the 
Secretary of State may by order otherwise provide, determinations, awards, orders, and 
other decisions of the Tribunal (including decisions as to whether they have jurisdiction) 
shall not be subject to appeal or be liable to be questioned in any court͛.162   
Such ouster clauses are generally subject to criticism as they enable decisions of public 
authorities to escape effective scrutiny.  Precluding further review of the procedures of a 
court or tribunal similarly appears to insulate the procedures of these judicial bodies and 
is seen as repugnant to constitutional principles.163  The Courts are generally hesitant to 
permit such limitations on their jurisdiction.164 However, the IPT has been held to benefit 
from such a limitation, thereby insulating their decisions from judicial review.  This 
determination was made in the case of R (Privacy International) v Investigatory Powers 
Tribunal which sought to challenge the ͚ouster clause͛ for decisions of the Tribunal.  In 
holding that the procedures of the IPT were immune from review, Sales LJ placed 
particular emphasis on the circumstances in which the Tribunal operates.   
Parliament͛s intention in establishing the [IPT] and in laying down a framework for 
the special procedural rules which it should follow͙was to set up a tribunal capable 
of considering claims and complaints͙under closed conditions which provide 
complete assurance that there would not be disclosure of sensitive confidential 
information about their activities.165   
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Key to this decision was the specialist subject matter and procedure of the IPT which 
requires secrecy to ensure that the proceedings before the IPT do not frustrate the aims of 
the protection of national security or the prevention and detection of crime.  Enabling 
judicial review of the proceedings of the IPT would, according to Sales LJ, subvert that 
purpose.166  This must be criticised as it suggests that accepting subversion of the law is 
preferable and strongly prefers the aims of the State over that of the individual, in direct 
contrast with core liberal democratic ideals.    
The limitation on judicial review, such as that enabled in the decision of Privacy 
International, was argued not to run counter to constitutional principles and the rule of 
law due to the nature of the IPT and its statutory remit.  As Mark Elliot notes, ͚the 
Privacy International case did turn out to be an instance of Parliament using language so 
clear as to displace judicial review: but critically, the conclusion that it had deployed 
such language was reached only against the background of the judicial view which 
prevailed in the case to the effect that the ouster was not constitutionally egregious͛.167 
Further, the qualifications of those sitting on the Tribunal, namely that they were judges 
of at least High Court standing, furthered the argument that the IPT was itself exercising 
standards of review at least comparable to the High Court.168  However, even in his 
ruling, Sales LJ was cognisant of the fact that the prevention of judicial review of 
decisions raised serious concerns.  He acknowledged that ͚a provision which isolates a 
tribunal from any prospect of appeal through to this court and the Supreme Court on 
points of law which may be controversial and important ͙ involves a substantial inroad 
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upon usual rule of law standards͛.169  As such, the inability to demand judicial review of 
the IPT does not in itself result in a determination that the IPT is an ineffective 
mechanism for oversight.  However, when coupled with the other provisions concerning 
disclosure and closed procedures it does further demonstrate the lack of transparency of 
this mechanism.  Furthermore, it poses a threat to the basic values enshrined by the rule 
of law.  Immunising the decisions of the IPT from judicial review creates a situation 
where the IPT can fail to comply with a statutory procedural requirement in reaching a 
decision that impacts on the rights of a complainant but cannot be corrected by a court.  
Further, it is another area that makes it more difficult for individuals to seek effective 
remedies for violations of their fundamental rights which occur through actions 
undertaken by public authorities.  
However, whilst the decisions of the IPT remain impervious to judicial review, the IPA 
has, for the first time, included a provision that allows individuals to appeal the finding 
of the IPT to a domestic court.  Prior to the 2016 Act, individuals had no further rights 
barring ultimate appeal to the European Courts. Such a policy ran counter to the ideals of 
transparency.  ͚Where there is no possibility of challenging the alleged application of 
secret surveillance,͙, widespread suspicion and concern among the general public that 
secret surveillance powers are being abused cannot be said to be unjustified͛.170  The lack 
of a right of appeal was highly criticised during the various reviews of the investigatory 
powers instruments.  David Anderson, in calling for the institution of a right to appeal, 
noted that, ͚the IPT is unusual in being subject to no process of appeal, an incongruous 
state of affairs given that it is the only appropriate tribunal for certain categories of 
human rights appeals and that it can decide issues of great general importance involving 
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vital issues of principle͛.171  As a result of these criticisms, a domestic right of appeal on 
decisions and determinations by the IPT was introduced under the IPA.172   
This provision permits appeals to the Court of Appeal ͚in circumstances where there is a 
point of law that raises an important principle or practice, or where there is some other 
compelling reason for allowing an appeal͛.173  It remains to be seen how this will be 
interpreted in practice as the wording does not confer a clear right of appeal to ensure the 
IPT acts in accordance with the law.  In order to obtain leave for appeal, an applicant 
must apply to the Tribunal, no later than 21 days following the provision of the 
determination or decision of the Tribunal to the applicant.174  Upon receiving that 
application, the Tribunal will decide whether or not to grant leave to appeal.  Such a 
decision will be made utilising a procedure similar to that of the second-tier appeals test 
as set out in s 13(6) of the Tribunals, Courts, and Enforcement Act 2007 which examines 
first, whether the appeal would raise some important point or principle, or, second, if 
there is some other compelling reason to hear the appeal.  In addition to these criteria, 
there must also be a determination that the appeal will raise a point of law.  If the 
Tribunal refuses to give leave for appeal, it must provide the parties with a statement of 
its reasons for refusal and notification of the right to make an application to the relevant 
appellant court for leave to appeal.175  In the Impact Assessment for the IPT  which 
considered this domestic right to appeal, the Government noted that the requirements 
necessary to grant a right of appeal will mean that the power will be exercised sparingly, 
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with fewer than ten annually based on the current rulings which gave rise to matters 
which warranted appeal.176   
The right of appeal is a necessary check on the decisions of the IPT and one that can 
increase public confidence in its role as an oversight mechanism.  Without a check on the 
decisions of the IPT, its effectiveness in ensuring individual rights can be called into 
question; a question that is not helped by the low success rate of applicants.  The right of 
appeal can help to mitigate these concerns.  Whilst the right of appeal represents an 
improvement for individuals in seeking remedies for human rights breaches under the 
IPA, the closed procedures remain an impediment to the appeal process.  To mitigate this 
concern there should be a presumption in favour of open disclosure which may be 
rebutted by the public authority if they can provide that there is a greater public interest 
in preventing disclosure.  This would also prevent the blanket application of policies of 
secrecy that frustrate open justice and would thereby promote increased transparency. 
The State cannot benefit from the protections of the Tribunal at the expense of the 
individual.  Such an imbalance in power undermines respect for and confidence in the 
rule of law.  Furthermore, enabling judicial review of the decisions taken by the IPT as 
well as ensuring that the right to appeal is able to be effectively exercised by 
complainants would strengthen the protections offered by this mechanism.  Absent 
further reforms to the area, the IPT is ineffective to satisfy the requirements that the 
privacy violations experienced by individuals in the collection and processing of data 
under the investigatory powers instruments are adequately balanced against the State 
interests.   







VII. Applying Contextual Integrity to the oversight mechanisms  
As demonstrated in the preceding analysis, the oversight mechanisms which exist under 
the investigatory powers instruments cannot satisfy the requirement that the use of such 
powers are in accordance with law, necessary, and proportionate.  The current regime 
cannot counter the impact of the violations of privacy resulting from the retention, 
access, and analysis of communications data.  The context relative informational norms 
associated with these areas have raised concerns over the nature of the information, the 
attributes it can reveal, who it is communicated to and why, and who is in charge of the 
retention, access, and processing of it.  Effective oversight needs to address these 
concerns to ensure that it can provide the needed protections to guarantee privacy in this 
area.  However, the current regime fails to do this.  The following looks at the elements 
of the informational norms which need to be addressed in order to provide an effective 
oversight regime for privacy.  These elements will be incorporated into the prescriptive 
recommendations for future changes to legislation to be undertaken in the next chapter to 
guarantee privacy in the collection and processing of communications data in the ICT 
system.     
The elements which fundamentally underpin informational norms are those which are 
altered in violation of contextual integrity, namely: information types, transmission 
principles, and actors.  With regard to oversight the important attribute of the information 
is its ability to violate privacy by revealing highly personal information.  This is a 
characteristic satisfied by communications data as has been established in the preceding 
chapters.  Current analysis of interferences with data and the oversight protections 
ascribed to it largely focus on interception of communications rather than the relevant 
communications data.  The latter must be distinguished from the former.   
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Communications data has a number of unique features.  Principally, the data is expansive 
and relates to a large proportion of the population, not just those who are relevant to an 
investigation.  As an information type, communications data is seen as less intrusive and 
therefore it is not required to be subject to the same level of oversight.  This is despite the 
fact that the provisions concerning this type of data cover, in a generalised manner, all 
means of communications types without differentiation, limitation, or exception.  The 
Courts have accepted that in determining the interference which results from the 
collection and processing of communications data, consideration must be given to the 
legislation and the persons who can be affected by it, particularly when the legislation 
directly affects all users of communications services by applying a blanket policy of 
interception.177  Blanket and indiscriminate policies are much more likely to give rise to 
rights violations.  Indeed, the general collection of this information lends itself to the 
argument that the precedent concerning oversight of targeted interceptions is inadequate 
to be applied in this context.  As was held in the case of Szabo & Vissy v Hungary: ͚The 
Court recalls that in Kennedy, the impugned legislation did not allow for ͞indiscriminate 
capturing of vast amounts of communications͟ which was one of the elements enabling it 
not to find a violation of Article 8͛.178 Such an acknowledgement is important and must 
be taken into account when assessing the oversight mechanisms.   
Further, as the powers given to law enforcement regarding this data have increased, so 
too has the use and flow of this information, thereby altering the transmission principles 
which dictate how the information is spread between parties.  The desire to collect this 
type of information with ubiquity is a direct corollary to contemporary forms of crime 
and threats to national security.  It is seen as necessary due to improvements in 
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technology which make it easier for individuals to subvert detection and frustrate 
investigations.  However, this cannot preclude oversight.  ͚In the face of this progress the 
Court must scrutinise the question as to whether the development of surveillance 
methods resulting in masses of data collected has been accompanied by a simultaneous 
development of legal safeguards securing respect for citizens͛.179  Yet oversight in this 
area remains ex post rather than ex ante.  Oversight only occurring after, and not prior to 
or during the interferences renders those measures less effective for guaranteeing 
privacy.  It is only with the recent cases of Digital Rights Ireland and Tele2 that the need 
to have stringent oversight of communications data has been acknowledged.  The 
oversight regime must be modified to explicitly account for these information types and 
the specific issues they raise.  Applying the considerations for oversight which are 
derived from interception fails to account for the unique nature of this information, 
ubiquitous and all encompassing, and covering vast swathes of the population.  A 
specific communications data oversight regime is therefore necessary to ensure that the 
fundamental privacy interests are not violated by these powers.   
In addition to shifts in information types and flows, there has been a shift in the powers 
and functions of relevant actors under the oversight regime.  This shift has altered the 
traditional norms applied to these actors and represents a prima facie breach of 
contextual integrity.  Notably, the predominant actors under the surveillance 
infrastructure have shifted from public to private entities as evidenced in the analysis in 
Chapters 3 to 5.  The communications data provisions are undertaken and facilitated by 
these private actors who are not subject to traditional accountability measures.  The 
utilisation of private actors to perform the functions regarding communications data 
                                                          
179
 Szabo n(9) para 68.  
 261 
 
represents an interference with privacy.  The European Courts have accepted this 
position, calling particular attention to the communication of the information obtained by 
the private actors to public authorities.  ͚Communication of personal data to a third party, 
such as a public authority, constitutes an interference with the right to respect for private 
life, regardless of the subsequent use of the information communicated͛.180  The 
relationship between public and private actors in this regime creates accountability gaps 
and privatises sensitive responsibilities.   
In order to mitigate the impact of the shift in actors under the communications data 
regime, oversight must account for the change from public to private, particularly in the 
collection and retention of data.  However, the current oversight regime fails to do so.  
Significantly, the IPT, which serves as the primary mechanism of relief for individuals, 
has no investigatory powers where complaints are made about private individuals or 
companies who are performing functions delegated to them by the investigatory powers 
instruments.  This creates a considerable accountability gap, as even those CSPs who are 
required, under notice, to collect and process data for law enforcement purposes, cannot 
be held to account for the human rights violations which occur as a result of these 
actions.  As such, the current oversight regime lacks the capability to provide a check on 
the powers of one of the dominant actors in the surveillance of communications data.  
Such a gap is a violation of the traditional norms associated with oversight.     
VIII. Conclusion  
The preceding analysis has established that the oversight mechanisms provided for in the 
investigatory powers instruments fail to preserve the context-relative informational 
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norms associated with communications data.   The failings of the existing mechanisms 
mean that the rule of law is threatened in the use of these powers.  There are insufficient 
checks on the powers of the State to collect and process data that is highly revealing and 
all-encompassing.  Where the balance of interest is weighed, it falls too often in favour of 
the State at the expense of individual rights.  As such, overhaul of the oversight 
mechanisms is necessary to ensure that privacy is protected from unjust interferences 
occasioned by the powers of communications data retention, access, and analysis.  The 
following chapter will now set forth prescriptive proposals to ensure that the 
informational norms associated with the ICT system are protected and that adequate 





CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
I. Introduction  
This thesis set out to determine the extent to which the existing legal and policy 
frameworks surrounding the collection and use of communications data by law 
enforcement represented a violation of privacy.  The preceding chapters have examined 
the processes by which communications data is retained, accessed, and analysed, and the 
oversight mechanisms which seek to notionally satisfy the requirements of privacy and 
the rule of law in these processes.  In each instance, developments in the ICT system, 
associated with their legislative, organisational, and technical components, have enabled 
the processes to alter context relative informational norms.  The development and use of 
ICT systems for the investigation and detection of crime has been accompanied by 
changes in the scale and scope of data, classical spatial distinctions, changes in the 
traditional temporal limits of information, and conceptions of presence in technologically 
dominated worlds. These changes are not represented in the concept of privacy as it is 
currently applied to this system.  Significant changes in actors and their roles, in 
information types, and transmission principles, demonstrate that the practices permitted 
under the investigatory powers mechanisms must be re-evaluated.  The current 
safeguards and oversight mechanisms are insufficient to guarantee privacy and require 
change.  This is necessary in order to prescribe effective reforms to the investigatory 
powers structure which is the ultimate aim of this thesis.  Such prescriptive measures 
must look at the practices utilised and their resultant impact to determine the best targets 
for reform.   
This chapter will be comprised of three parts.  Part I addresses the changes in 
informational norms which have identified in the previous chapters.  This section is 
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intended to provide an overview of the areas of concern discussed throughout this thesis 
in order to accurately situate the discussion for future reform.  As such, it offers a 
summary of the findings of how key ICT methods and processes are utilised to pursue 
criminal justice objectives in a manner contrary to privacy, evidenced throughout the 
thesis.  In presenting these findings, the focus is on the informational norms which exist 
in the system and values which they reflect.  Part II then examines, the overall normative 
shifts identified within the thesis which have occurred as a result of the use of 
communications data in the ICT system.  This section therefore presents the key findings 
of the thesis on how the conceptualisation of privacy must be redefined to address these 
changes and thereby provide for legal instruments which better reflect the technological 
capabilities and privacy.  The normative shifts must be taken into account in order to 
ensure that the concrete policy changes offered do not suffer from the same failings as 
their predecessors.  In considering the shortcomings of the current system and the 
normative shifts identified in the two preceding parts, Part III will then offer specific 
prescriptive recommendations to amend the investigatory powers mechanisms to ensure 
that privacy will be adequately protected.  This section offers an answer to the core 
question of how to balance privacy rights with the needs of law enforcement in the 
collection and processing of communications data.  Four core recommendations are 
offered: purpose limitation, data minimisation, increased rights of the individual, and the 
reclassification of CSPs.  Such recommendations are intended to present a better 
reflection of the informational norms associated with technologies and prescribe a 
general normative framework of elements that must be considered even in the 




II.  The informational norms and values of the ICT system 
The contextual integrity decision heuristic applied to the retention, access, analysis, and 
oversight mechanisms in Chapters 3 thru 6 indicates that developments in the ICT system 
have resulted in a breach of contextual integrity.  This was evidenced through an analysis 
of the component elements of the informational norms, namely: information types, 
transmission principles, and actors/roles.  However, the mere indication that 
informational norms have been altered through the development of the system does not in 
itself indicate that the new practices are illegitimate.  Rather, further analysis is required 
to determine whether the breach of contextual integrity is justified on the grounds that it 
better represents social, political, and legal considerations and supports the attainment of 
the context based values.  If the new practices are more effective in supporting or 
promoting respective values, then the changes in information flows are acceptable.   
In order to determine whether this is the case, it is necessary to examine the respective 
norms and values which exist in the system.  These norms are not created through the 
construction and use of technology nor through legal instruments alone; rather they are 
derived from interactions between the elements of the system in the legislative, 
organisational, and technological forms.  As Nissenbaum notes, ͚to fully appreciate and 
find norms that are elements of a normative system compelling, one needs to consider 
them against the backdrop of the system itself.  Otherwise, in isolation, they might appear 
arbitrary or even dubious͛.1  In the context of the system, it is important to note that law 
and technology are co-constructed.  Therefore, any assessment of the normative elements 
must incorporate the associated dimensions of law, policy, and values which exist within 
the material and social formations of the technology.  These formations play important 
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roles in the system within which the alleged violations occur.2  Questions abound as to 
whether the development of the system supports privacy and its related values such as 
autonomy, freedom, security, and justice.  If so, how are these elements reflected and 
protected through further developments and uses of the system. As Jasanoff notes, 
important normative choices are made throughout the life of the system; in ͚the phase of 
emergence; the resolution of conflicts; the classification of scientific and social objects͛ 
the standardisation of technological practices; and the uptake of knowledge in different 
cultural contexts͛.3 
In determining the overall impact on privacy occasioned by changes in informational 
norms, it is crucial to examine not just how these norms have shifted, but contextualise 
the use of the ICT system in the different spaces and roles it inhabits, and how that has 
similarly influenced its development.  These contextual factors both mould the 
production of the technology and enable technological achievements to loop back and 
shift the organisation of society.4  To determine how the changes in technology have 
achieved this in the context of the ICT system, it is necessary to assess the shifts in 
information flows and the concomitant alteration of informational norms.   
These norms are the principles which prescribe acceptable actions in context.  In the 
collection and processing of personal information for law enforcement, these norms have 
been associated with investigative goals and surveillance.  Information about individuals 
would be collected in the course of investigations; the resultant data could be used to link 
suspects to crimes or build cases for prosecution.  Such information gathering procedures 
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were limited, tied to a particular investigation, and typically granted through an 
independent oversight mechanism.  The targeting of surveillance and requirements of 
additional safeguards provided guaranteed that the measures were legitimate and 
necessary.5  However, developments in the ICT system have altered these norms in ways 
which impact on the overall values of the system and the social goals that they seek to 
embody.   
Within the system, these developments have manifested themselves in changes to the 
nature of the data, shifts in the nature of borders, and the increasing role played by non-
human actors.  
a. Changes to the Technical Artefact: Communications Data 
In contrast with traditional law enforcement procedures, the developments in law and 
technology in this system have resulted in the expansion of monitoring of individuals.  In 
part this is a result of individuals being subject to increasing datafication; 
communications and transactions no longer occur without digital trails.  The data in these 
systems is aggregated and mined for information of value to investigations.  As 
Nissenbaum notes, these processes ͚deviate from entrenched practices by enlarging the 
set of attributes and, possibly, the recipients of aggregated information͛.6  This change in 
informational norms is apparent in all elements of the ICT system.  Data retention and 
processing has enabled general surveillance and addresses all users of communications 
services.  Such widespread retention, irrespective of suspicion and the seriousness of any 
alleged crime undermines the legitimacy of the surveillance.  The rule of law can be 
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frustrated by these policies and a disproportionate interference with individuals͛ 
fundamental rights can arise.7   
Historically, this data has been treated as less intrusive than other types of data used in 
police investigations, such as intercepted communications.  This was in part due to the 
perceived innocuous nature of communications data when these provisions were first 
being envisaged.  Personal ties could be intuited from this information but such 
relationships could not be conclusively proven without further investigation.  However, 
modern day communications data, due to its expansive nature and ability to permeate all 
aspects of everyday life, can no longer be readily distinguished from content or treated as 
less intrusive. Even where retention and processing are considered acceptable, such as 
when individuals authorise it in order to obtain a particular service, it is purpose limited.  
The types of information retained are those which people willingly allow to be processed 
by private companies; they do so in order to be able utilise or customise services.  But 
they do so with the belief that the data that is processed will be used for purposes to 
which they broadly agree.  They do not do so for it to potentially be later used against 
them in criminal investigations.  However, the impact of this is that current policy means 
that even if behaviour is altered, the data will continue to be retained and processed.  
͚Increasingly, all that we do in our daily lives involves some form of communications 
transaction.  In so doing, we are subjecting ourselves to surveillance by default, as our 
activity is retained indiscriminately, preventing us from avoiding such surveillance͛.8  
This demonstrates a shift away from the entrenched norms we associate with surveillance 
and data. 
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The nature of the data and the methods of analysis themselves engage privacy concerns, 
as processing the data systematically examines personal information in order to 
determine what is relevant.  This sort of systematic processing of information is not 
traditionally associated with law enforcement; social norms in this area relate to those 
processes which target individuals under suspicion.  Traditionally, certain types of 
personal information were exempt from these law enforcement procedures, whether due 
to their sensitive nature or the inability of law enforcement to access them.  This is no 
longer the case.  By incorporating CSPs and their data into the analysis processes, 
information that was previously unavailable can now be used to reverse engineer past, 
present, and even future breaches through secondary use of the data.9  The use of this 
information, from the various data sources, creates categories of individuals that situate 
populations according to their value, reliability, or risk level.10 
It is necessary to tightly circumscribe the ends for which this analysis should be 
permitted.  As King and Richards argue, ͚We can now do things that were impossible a 
few years ago, and we͛ve driven off the existing ethical and legal maps.  If we fail to 
preserve the values we care about in our new digital society, then our big data 
capabilities risk abandoning these values for the sake of expediency͛.11  Ethical and legal 
guidelines need to take note of the potential intrusiveness of this information in creating 
an effective framework for governing the use of communications data.  In fully assessing 
the impact of the new methods of collection and analysis facilitated by technology, a 
balancing exercise must be undertaken.  The wider impact of the data and the ability of 
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the analytical tools to intrude farther into the private sphere than previously possible must 
be taken into consideration.  In ascertaining whether these tools meet the necessary 
requirements of necessity and proportionality, due regard should be had, not only to the 
individual data itself, but the potential implications which arise through its aggregation 
and analysis.  It is through these tools that the data reveals more about individuals, and 
therefore, acceptance of their use without an overriding public interest is an interference 
with privacy. 
b. The fluidity of borders within the system 
The changes in informational flows resulting from the developments in the ICT system 
are also reflective of the malleability of traditional boundaries.  ICT is not bounded in the 
manner of other systems.  Data flows across jurisdictional spheres.  Historically, 
instruments such as Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties were the mechanisms through 
which access to data was sought from other jurisdictions.  The legislative developments 
under the investigatory powers instruments now impose direct requirements on CSPs to 
provide access where the individual or content relates to the jurisdiction, regardless of 
where it is located.  The actors, in the form of CSPs and law enforcement now play 
different roles in the system, with CSPs performing more investigative functions and law 
enforcement serving as recipients of data.  Legislative developments in this area fail to 
take this into account, basing their conception of intrusiveness on the social norms which 
existed prior to these technological developments and failing to consider how social 
norms have changed because of the technology.  When data was limited in the spaces it 
could be generated and transgress, individual were more likely to be aware of its 
potential access and use by law enforcement.  There were limitations on the extra-
territorial effects of the law.  Individuals could know the laws of their jurisdiction and be 
expected to comply; however, with the deconstruction of these traditional jurisdictional 
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boundaries, this becomes increasingly difficult.  Such developments run in contrast to the 
rule of law and the idea that individuals should be able to know when such legal 
provisions might be applied to them.   
Beyond jurisdictional issues, the ICT system has developed in a way which challenges 
traditional notions of space.  Traditional investigative means are no longer sufficient in 
light of technology which removes individuals from the traditional spheres wherein they 
could be physically monitored and investigated.  David Lyon argues that the ͚integration 
of different kinds of surveillance is rapidly being enabled by computer networking and 
the creation of techniques capable of tracing and tracking ͚data subjects͛ behaviour 
through and between once distinct social realms͛.12  Human surveillance and the use of 
informers are not effective substitutes for achieving law enforcement aims here.  ͚As the 
National Policing Lead emphasised, the alternatives to the use of communications data 
tend to be more intrusive and to carry both a higher associated cost (in equipment and 
workforce development) and a higher risk to those deployed͛.13  The legislative elements 
of the system have developed to facilitate the use of this data to confront this difficulty.  
Such developments run counter to accepted normative considerations which consider the 
need for private spheres and spaces free from state intrusion.  In removing these 
boundaries, individuals are subject to increasing encroachment on their autonomy as the 
spaces wherein the self can be freely expressed and develop become increasingly limited.  
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c. Shifts in the roles of relevant actors   
In the development of the system, the roles of human and non-human actors have shifted, 
with increasing reliance being placed on the non-human elements of the system.  
Proponents of these developments argue that the increase in automation and removal 
from the human sphere renders the technology more effective and less prone to the biases 
which inhibit human action.  As Jasanoff notes, ͚the hope is that technology, through its 
mechanical reproducibility, will be impervious to context and will provide unbiased and 
reliable evidence about the facts of the matter͛.14 
Advocates of removing human actors from the system through technological 
developments such as Judge Richard Posner hold that these systems confer an 
impartiality on the processing of personal data and limit the intrusions into personal 
information and privacy.  
Machine collection and processing of personal data cannot, as such, 
invade privacy.  Because of their volume, data are first sifted by 
computers which search for names, addresses, phone numbers, etc. that 
may have intelligence value.  This initial shifting, far from invading 
privacy (a computer is not a sentient being), keeps most private data from 
being read.15   
Such an interpretation suggests that the fact that the information is processed and 
analysed automatically by technology implies that it can be removed from undue human 
influences.  Based on this logic, there can be no shift in the entrenched social norms as 
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there is no substantive change in who ultimately examines or utilises the data.  However, 
this does not accurately reflect the nature of the information nor the diminish the impact 
on social norms when this information is retained and processed. 
Key to this is the impossibility of the technology ever being fully removed from human 
influences.  This is most readily apparent when algorithms used to perform analysis 
functions are considered.  An algorithm is a mathematical equation which is used to 
determine a specific result; in this case, the algorithm is used to filter out data which is 
not relevant to the request (e.g. location data of all cell phones that were not in both 
specified locations at the specified times).  On its face, this would appear to build a 
neutral element into the filter; however, this interpretation ignores the human role in 
shaping and developing these algorithms.  ͚Computer algorithms are written by people, 
and their output is used by people...Whether or not anyone actually looks at our data, the 
very fact that (1) they could, and (2) they guide the algorithms that do͛ has implications 
for the ability of that processing to constitute an intrusion.16  Instead of removing the 
human element, algorithms merely transfer that element into the decision making process 
itself in a manner that is more opaque.17 
This lack of transparency is significant as the algorithms and filtering allow for 
interpretations to be made and meaningful patterns to be found within the data.  Indeed, 
the promise of these technologies is that they can produce predictions of social 
behaviour, thereby enabling the detection of potential criminals and national security 
threats.  However, the interpretative element calls this into question.  Basing these 
predictions on set categories of data is insufficient to be determinative.  This is 
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exacerbated by the idea that the more any indicator is used, the greater its apparent 
impact will be, both on users and data subjects, and therefore its importance may become 
self-reinforcing.18 As technology is more heavily relied on in investigations, this will 
become increasingly important.  There is a need to ensure that there are no biases in the 
processes.  To fail to do so will potentially cause greater harms to individuals than would 
occur under traditional investigative means.19  Further, data analysis can lead to a 
potential mechanism to squash dissent and target people for other purposes, for example, 
identifying lead activists or protesters in a movement.  ͚Suspicious profiles might involve 
information about people͛s free speech, free association, or religious activity͛.20  These 
impact directly on established norms and the interferences, due to their automated nature, 
are subject to less transparency, less oversight, and offer fewer remedies than their 
traditional counterparts. 
d. The impact on the values of the system 
The changes in informational norms indicate that the developments in the ICT system 
have occurred in a manner which results in an interference with privacy.  However, it is 
necessary to examine whether these changes result in a system which better reflects 
current social and legal values.  ͚After all,͛ as Nissenbaum states, ͚in the absence of 
purpose and drained of teleology, normative practices are little more than empty 
rituals͛.21  In assessing these values, it is necessary to weigh the benefits for law 
enforcement in the use of communications data against the interference felt by 
individuals.  It is not enough that there is a legitimate aim in gathering more information; 
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 Campbell͛s Law as set out in Donald Campbell, ͚Assessing the impact of Planned social change͛ (1979) 
2 Eval & Prog Planning 67. 
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 Think for example of the difference between being brought in under suspicion of a crime and later being 
released when it was discovered that the information leading to your suspicion was incorrect as opposed to 
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 Daniel Solove, Understanding Privacy (Harvard University Press 2008) 189. 
21
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individual rights must be respected as well to ensure that such actions are in accordance 
with the rule of law and the aims of a democratic society.  To balance the aims of the 
entities involved in the ICT system, it is necessary to examine how the system reflects 
their values and whether it is weighted disproportionately in favour of one party at the 
expense of another.   
Throughout the thesis the growth and development of the ICT system and concomitant 
collection and processing powers of communications data has been examined to identify 
areas where problems arise and how the relevant elements of the system, legislative, 
organisational, and technical, respond to those problems.  The analysis has found that the 
responses to these problems favour the State, with individuals increasingly being 
subverted in the process.  With regard to the legislative component, the common theme 
throughout the development of the system has been an increase in the powers of law 
enforcement to require further retention, easier access, and more revealing analysis.  For 
law enforcement the developments in this area and the statutory provisions which 
guarantee they can be used enable crime control and the better security of society.  By 
creating surveillance mechanisms which cannot be meaningfully evaded, control can be 
exercised, ultimately inducing behaviours that are perceived as more socially acceptable.   
However, the risks with the legitimisation of these powers are significant.  The law is 
inadequate for the objectives sought to be achieved.  As Benjamin Goold summarises:  
Far from being forward looking or progressive, the legislation is instead uniformly 
backward looking and begrudging.  It is hardly surprising that the system of 
regulation that now operates in the United Kingdom ± while detailed and far-
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reaching ± is riddled with gaps and lacks any clear set of overarching legal 
principles or common objectives.22   
The existence and use of such legislation which allows for blanket surveillance poses a 
threat to the rule of law.  This threat is further exacerbated by the pre-emptive nature of 
the legislation.  The argument is that the data must be retained for its value for future 
investigations, regardless of whether it relates to an offence that has heretofore been 
committed.  No suspicion is required for the initial retention.  This is fundamentally 
contrary to basic values, including the presumption of innocence.  Enabling law 
enforcement to focus on intelligence gathering and prevention rather than ex post 
investigations shifts their civic function.   
The roles of the organisations involved have also shifted dramatically and accountability 
LVPDGHGLIILFXOW$V9DQ%UDNHODUJXHVµZLWKWKHLQFUHDVHGXVH«RIVXUYHLOODQFH
technology it becomes tempting to blame the technology when the risk effectuates itself 
with the result that no one will be held or fHHOVDFFRXQWDEOH¶23  Take for example the 
developments of new methods for analysis discussed in Chapter 5.  If the data allows for 
new inferences to be made about individuals due to technological developments there is a 
question of who is responsible for the data as it is then conceived.  This is coupled with 
difficulties which exist in holding CSPs to account discussed in Chapter 6.  Individuals 
cannot challenge these bodies in the same way as traditional public authorities.  This is 
made all the more difficult due to the increased use of these companies to police the 
online world.  The infrastructure of digital society is privately owned, multinational, and 








segmented.  Cooperation from the private sector is fundamental for public authorities to 
be able to fulfil their duties in this area.   
The combination of these factors is apparent in the interaction of the organisations with 
the legislation which delegates further responsibilities to these organisations.  Acting as 
gatekeepers of the necessary information, the CSPs become agents of surveillance 
themselves, thereby dispensing with the need for more direct state action.24  However, 
the shift in actors cannot be used to usurp the expectations of a traditional democratic 
VRFLHW\µ5XOHRIODZREOLJDWLRQVLQFOXGLQJWKRVHIORZLQJIURP$UWLFOHVULJKWWR
respect for private life) and 10 (freedom of expression) of the ECHR, may not be 
circumvented through ad hoc arrangements with private actors who control the Internet 
DQGWKHZLGHUGLJLWDOHQYLURQPHQW¶25  Where powers are delegated to private actors to 
fulfil a state objective, those actors need to be held to account.   
States do not relinquish their international human rights law obligations when they 
privatise the delivery of services that may impact upon the enjoyment of human 
rights.  Failure by States to ensure that business enterprises performing such 
services operate iQDPDQQHUFRPSOLDQWZLWKWKH6WDWH¶VKXPDQULJKWVREOLJDWLRQV
may entail both reputational and legal consequences for the state itself.26   
States must require that both their public authorities and the private actors to which they 
delegate responsibilities are protecting human rights.  However, the law must be precise 
LQWKHZD\LWGRHVWKLV$VUHFRJQLVHGE\7DGGHRDQG)ORULGLµLWLVDOVRSUREOHPDWLFWR
ascribe to [CSPs] full responsibility for the fostering and respecting of human rights.  For 
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 Uta Kohl, Jurisdiction and the Internet (Cambridge University Press 2007) 191. 
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 UNHCHR and CoE, The rule of law on the Internet and the wider Digital World (2014) 21.  
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 UNHCHR, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (2011 HR/PUB.11.04).  
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this entails that [CSPs] can arbitrarily and independently decide the circumstances and 
WKHPRGHVLQZKLFKWKH\QHHGWRUHVSHFWVXFKULJKWV¶27 
The development of the technical elements similarly raises concerns for the system and 
they themselves become objects for further development or, alternatively, must be 
FRQVWUDLQHGWRSURPRWHQRUPDWLYHLQWHUHVWV$V5RJHU%URZQVZRUGQRWHVµDUHJXODWRU\
environment that is dense with these new technologies is a very different place to an 
environment that relies on compliance with norms that are either legally or morally 
H[SUHVVHGRUVLPSO\LPSOLFLWLQFXVWRPDQGSUDFWLFH¶28  The impact of the technology is 
different depending on what technical means are employed.  For example, in the context 
of retention, blanket collection and retention requirements prefer State objectives over 
that of the individual.  These retention policies are embodied through the architecture of 
the technology.  This architecture, comprised of both software which identifies and 
processes the data for collection, and hardware in the form of servers and infrastructure 
to store and maintain that data, is dictated by the legislation.  Similar technical elements 
can be identified in the access and analysis areas.  Access requests are undertaken 
utilising workflow software which translates the requests and pulls the necessary 
information from the relevant servers.29  Subsequent analysis of the data is done through 
automated processing techniques utilising both hardware and software components.  In 
this way, the government regulates the conditions under which the targeted activities 
occur through the infrastructure of the technology.30  Leenes and Koop, discussing these 
SRZHUVZLWKUHJDUGVWRLQWHUFHSWLRQIRXQGWKDWµJRYHUQPHQWVKDYHSDVVHGOHJLVODWLRQWKDW
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requirHVWHFKQRORJ\SURYLGHUVWREXLOGLQFHUWDLQIHDWXUHVUHODWHGWROHJDOQRUPV¶31  The 
same is true of the communications data processes.   
By embedding the legal requirements within the technical elements, the State is able to 
further delegate responsibilities to the organisational elements of the system.  As 
5HLGHQEHUJVXPPDULVHVµLQIUDVWUXFWXUHGHVLJQRIIHUVWKHVWDWHDQex ante means to assure 
that policy decisions are enforced.  States can require that rules for the treatment of 
information be embedded wLWKLQWKHWHFKQLFDOV\VWHPDUFKLWHFWXUH%\µKDUG-ZLULQJ¶
particular rules within the infrastructure, states preclude violations and automate 
HQIRUFHPHQWRISXEOLFGHFLVLRQV¶32  The effectiveness of this as a means for regulating 
behaviour is enhanced by the inability to evade the technology.  As has been discussed 
throughout this thesis, communications data is generated at a mass scale and with an all-
encompassing scope.  It is impossible to communicate without generating some form of 
communications data.  Mandating a technological design which provides for the 
collection and processing of this information in essence requires that individuals interact 
with the mechanism.  Rowland et al QRWHWKDWWKLVµJHQHUDOO\OHDYHVXVHUVQRFKRLFH
whether to comply with the law or not, because they are physically prevented from non-
FRPSOLDQFH¶33   
However, removing the ability of individuals to make decisions to comply with the law 
raises concerns over moral, social, and political issues.  With regard to the former, 
BrowQVZRUGFRPPHQWVWKDWµDIXOO\WHFKQR-regulated community is no longer an 
RSHUDWLYHPRUDOFRPPXQLW\«>,I@WHFKQR-regulators know how to stop us from being bad 
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only by, at the same time, stopping us from being good, then ordinary law for all its 
imperfectionsKDVVRPHWKLQJJRLQJIRULW¶34  Furthermore, utilising architecture and code 
as a mechanism to ensure compliance and better enforcement of law lacks democratic 
legitimacy and undervalues the public interest.35  Any requirements to build technical 
infrastructure for communications data under the ICT system must incorporate these 
technical elements but the use of these elements cannot usurp the rule of law or 
IXQGDPHQWDOYDOXHVRIDGHPRFUDWLFVRFLHW\$VZDVUHFRJQLVHGE\(JJHQVFKZLOHUµWKH
excess and coming together of technical and non-technical issue areas can severely 
FRPSOLFDWHDFFRXQWDELOLW\VWUXFWXUHV¶36  In order to provide for effective accountability in 
this area, it is therefore necessary to take both the technical and non-technical into 
account and determine how they directly impact on norms and values.  This requires 
prescriptive measures which are better adapted to the particularities of the issues that 
arise from the development of the system.   
III. Addressing the changes in informational norms in the ICT system to 
better reflect privacy 
0HOYLQ.UDQ]EHUJ¶VILUVWODZRIWHFKQRORJ\LVWKDWLWLVQHLWKHUJRRGQRUEDGQRULVLW
neutral.37  Technologies will amplify the ideology and reinforce the norms of those who 
develop it and direct its growth.  Outside elements, when they possess significant will 
and influence, can impose their own objectives on the technology and intensify its 
effects.  This has occurred with the ICT system.  In order to understand the significance 
of the technology for privacy, it was necessary to reconceptualise privacy in a context 
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relative manner.  This required an examination of the impact of changes in context 
relative informational norms, precipitated by changes in information types, transmission 
principles, and actors, in the context of the ICT system which has been at issue in this 
thesis.  In finding that the ICT system is reflective of a co-constructed relationship 
between law and technology and that relationship is currently inadequate in guaranteeing 
privacy rights, the question became how to best guarantee social norms in the system. 
The system itself embeds its own ethical values and norms in a wide variety of areas, 
including accountability, social connectivity, security, and privacy, among others.  These 
norms, embedded in the system, tend to reflect historic practice, rather than account for 
the impact of the changes which have been wrought by the development of the system; in 
the context of ICT, this means that the system embodies entrenched norms rather than 
those which are context relative.  This creates concerns as these entrenched norms are 
then hard to change.   
As the thesis has established, applying entrenched norms in the wake of technological 
developments is insufficient to guarantee privacy.  New norms which better reflect the 
nature of the technology must direct the development of future legislation in this area; 
this thesis has identified key areas wherein these normative shifts are evident in the 
context of communications data.   Notably, it is through acknowledging the significance 
of these normative changes that privacy can be best incorporated and protected within the 
system.  It is necessary to utilise privacy in a manner which is cognisant of the impact of 
these developments and the context in which it is used.  As demonstrated in the 
preceding chapters, the shifts in information types, transmission principles, and actors 
alter context relative informational norms and thereby violate contextual integrity.  The 
violations of these norms fall into several categories which must be addressed in the 
substantive prescriptive measures imposed: scale/scope, spatial, temporal, and visibility.  
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Any policy recommendations must consider the significance of the changes in these areas 
in order to protect privacy.   
A. Scale/Scope  
The amount of communications data generated and the breadth of the areas which it 
covers has fundamentally altered how we think of that information and the typical norms 
we assign to it.  The most common technologies used by individuals, i.e. mobile phones, 
laptops, tablets, etc. produce a steady stream of this information, to be potentially 
collected and processed.  Indeed, the technical capabilities of these devices place vast 
quantities of potentially very revealing personal information directly in to the hands of 
individuals.  The records kept on smartphones of persons contacted, locations visited, and 
websites searched, provide a thorough record of the most intimate aspects of an 
individual in small, portable devices.  As recognised by Justice Sotomayor of the United 
6WDWHV6XSUHPH&RXUWWKLVGDWDLVFDSDEOHRISURGXFLQJµDSUHFLVHFRPSUHKHQVLYHUHFRUG
RIDSHUVRQ¶VSXEOLFPRYements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, 
SROLWLFDOSURIHVVLRQDOUHOLJLRXVDQGVH[XDODVVRFLDWLRQV¶38  Prior to this technological 
development, amassing this level of information would have required multiple persons 
monitoring the actions of the individual constantly.  The comprehensive amount of 
information which is generated is done so on a scale and with a speed not previously 
possible.   
As demonstrated in Chapter 3, CSPs in the United Kingdom are under obligations to 
retain this information.  However, such notices to retain are placed under a duty of 
confidentiality which requires that they do not disclose to their users that the information 
they are generating will be retained per this legislation.  Even if individuals were able to 
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exercise their own discretion in selecting a provider that they believed would not be 
beholden to the retention demands, they cannot similarly control whether their 
correspondents would be equally discerning.39  As such, the data of the discerning user 
may still be caught as it would be retained as a record of communication with their 
colleague.  The inescapable nature of the surveillance promoted by the expansive scale 
and scope of communications data raises fundamental concerns for a democratic society.  
Furthermore, the permissive access capabilities which apply to this category of 
information allow it to be used more readily by law enforcement.  Analytical techniques 
are heightened by the mass amounts of data that can now be processed and filtered to 
derive more meaningful information for investigators.  The scope of such information 
FUHDWHVWKHSRWHQWLDOIRUQHZKDUPV$V3URIHVVRU&KULV0DUVGHQUHFRJQLVHGµ,WLV
extremely difficult to calculate the probability of harm that results from a single 
disclosure, let alone the cumulative impact, and what data could reveal when combined 
ZLWKDODUJHQXPEHURIRWKHUSRVVLEOHGDWDVRXUFHV¶40 
The abundance of information which exists shifts traditional power relationships.  
Individuals lose access and control over their data and the ability to decide when to 
engage with various institutions in society.  Power rests with those who can access data 
and possess the abilities to capture, store, and process it at scale.41  In the ICT system, 
these actors are the CSPs who collect and control the data, and law enforcement who are 
entitled to access provided a low threshold is met.  These entities strengthen their power 
by demanding that the pool of information they have access to continues to increase.  
Further expanding the pool of information enables the creation of pre-emptive 
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surveillance strategies, further removing traditional democratic principles from the 
SURFHVV$V9DQ%UDNHODUJXHVµ>LI@\RXVHHWKDWLQIRUPDWLRQLVZKDW\RXQHHGWRVROYHD
problem but you do not quite know what the problem is and you do not know what future 
events you are going to be responding to, the temptation is to collect all information 
DERXWDOOSHRSOH¶42  Yet despite the desire to exploit the volume of communications data 
generated by the ICT system, law enforcement must be cognisant of the risk that arises 
with mass data.  Law enforcement may suffer from infoglut, demanding new 
technologies be developed to analyse the data.  Similarly, the volume of the data creates 
security risks and data breaches which can damage the credibility of the system.  
Furthermore, the monitoring of individuals via this data fundamentally diminishes trust 
between law enforcement and individuals.  This has direct implications for the 
relationship between the police and the people they are meant to protect and undermines 
their effectiveness.   
b. Spatial  
System developments must further account for considerations of spatial elements which 
have been fundamentally altered by technology.  In the context of communications data, 
the spatial is triggered in various ways.  In generating the data by connecting 
communicating parties, information is frequently routed across servers which may or 
may not be confined to the traditional jurisdiction of the state.  Even communications 
between two people residing mere miles apart may transgress borders.  As Jennifer 
'DVNDOVXPPDULVHVµWKHHDVHVSHHGDQGXQSUHGLFWDELOLW\ZLWKZKLFKGDWDIORZVDFURVV
borders makes its location an unstable and often arbitrary determinant of the rules that 
DSSO\¶43 .  Furthermore, there is no direct link between individuals and their data; it is 
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not physical records in their possession but packets of information in virtual space.  This 
physical disconnect between the user and the location of the data impacts on the 
normative significance assigned to the data.44   
In an effort to apply traditional normative restrictions regarding space to data which has 
become untethered from spatial limitations, the investigatory powers instruments seek to 
apply restrictions on where the data can be kept.  These legislative powers further seek to 
extend the jurisdiction of the State beyond its borders by enabling it to place obligations 
on providers whose services transgress the state in some form.45  This comports with the 
precedent that if control can be exercised either over an individual or their assets, 
including, in this case, a CSP, then a court may exercise jurisdiction regardless of where 
the data is actually located or where the CSP is domiciled.46  However, this ignores the 
nature of the technology.  Networks do not have fixed boundaries and their expansion or 
contraction correlates with the interests and values they promote.47  Companies forced to 
comply with stricter obligations within the UK in order to facilitate law enforcement 
under the investigatory powers instruments may chose instead to relocate or alter their 
networks to frustrate these obligations.  This will be particularly true with large 
multinational corporations who have the infrastructure and capacity to relocate to 
jurisdictions that better align with their business needs.48   
Applying regimes which seek to enshrine norms associated with traditional spatial 
bounds will therefore not work in this context.  Rather, spatial constraints need to be 
UHFRQVLGHUHG0DQXHO&DVWHOOVDUJXHVWKDWµUDWKHUWKDQORRNLQJIRUWHUULWRULDOERXQGDULHV
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we need to identify the socio-spatial networks of power that, in their intersection, 
configure VRFLHWLHV¶49  This requires an understanding of the networks, how they are 
built, function, and connect with one another as assemblages.  According to Saskia 
Sassen these assemblages are neither global nor local but both simultaneously.50  Castells 
defines this as the space of flows which allows for social continuity without territorial 
congruity.51  This allows for a consideration of the social beyond the traditional confines 
of the state.  To fully understand the impact of the collection and processing of 
communications data the impacts need to be understood beyond the territorial bounds 
within which they occur.   
c. Temporal  
The entrenched norms associated with the use of data by law enforcement have also been 
fundamentally altered by temporal changes.  This has been evidenced throughout the 
thesis by reference to the powers which enable not only retrospective, but also pre-
emptive policing techniques.  The wider significance of this and the development of the 
capabilities of the ICT system more generally is a fundamental shift occasioned by the 
development of the technology to the nature of time.  With technology, time can become 
compressed.  Communications and interactions can occur instantaneously.  When an 
email is sent, it can be received and read by the end user within seconds.  The same can 
be said of a text message.   
The communications data associated with these transactions is a representation of the 
compression of time through technologies.  For Castells these communication 
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technologies allow for the annihilation of time and the elimination of the known 
sequences of past, present, and future.52  Relatedly, the capabilities to retain and store 
LQIRUPDWLRQUHPRYHVHSKHPHUDOLW\IURPVRFLHW\$V/HHQHVDQG.RRSQRWHµWKH
continuous localisation offered by current and future technologies thus significantly 
FRQWULEXWHVWRWKHµGLVDSSHDUDQFHRIGLVDSSHDUDQFH¶WKDWLVDGHILQLQJFKDUDFWHULVWLFRIWKH
LQIRUPDWLRQDJH¶53  The change in the temporal resulting from the development of the 
ICT system is not adequately reflected in the legislation.  The permanence of data and the 
immediacy with which it can be accessed alter law enforcement processes.  In particular, 
the ability of the individuals to challenge access requests are defeated by the speed with 
which information is conveyed to law enforcement.  The investigatory powers 
instruments do not take this into account in dictating the limits and constraints of the 
provisions concerning access.  Nor are they addressed in any oversight mechanism.  Such 
a shortcoming must be provided for in subsequent legislation.   
d. Visibility/Presence 
Closely aligned with the preceding categories of norms which have been fundamentally 
altered as result of the development of the ICT system are the interrelated concepts of 
visibility and presence.  These concepts relate to the ability of the individual to be 
µNQRZQ¶EDVHGRQWKHFRPPXQLFDWLRQVGDWDJHQHUDWHG$V*LOOHVSLHH[SODLQVµWKHPRVW
knowable information (geolocation, computing platform, profile information, friends, 
status updates, links followed on the site, time on the site) is a rendering of that user, a 
³GLJLWDOGRVVLHU´RU³DOJRULWKPLFLGHQWLW\´WKDWLVLPSHUIHFWEXWVXIILFLHQW¶54  The nature 
of communications data is comprehensive.  It produces digital selves of individuals that 
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are representative of information that is deemed relevant to law enforcement.  Yet there 
LVDGLVFRQQHFWEHWZHHQWKLVLQIRUPDWLRQDQGWKHµVHOI¶$VWKHLQIRUPDWLRQFROOHFWHGLV
only that which is deemed relevant to the law enforcement aims, it does not create a 
single identity.  Rather there is a multiplication of identities which become disconnected 
from the self, yet, reconnectable when deemed necessary.55   
Such a separation of the information from the individual means that law enforcement 
does not ascribe the same protections to that information as they would to a known 
individual.  Yet it is not sufficient to claim that the data means the individual should be 
removed.  Individuals and their discrete data cannot be so easily divorced and any 
prescriptive changes to the law needs to take this into account. To fail to link the data and 
the µself¶ results in privacy being easily sacrificed for the needs of law enforcement.  
After all, if it is seen as a mere factum or piece of information rather than a potentially 
revealing aspect of the µself¶, then the individual interest in privacy can easily be 
VXEYHUWHGWRWKHDLPVRIODZHQIRUFHPHQW$V9LQFHQW0LOOHUUHPDUNVµLIZHDUHWR
UHWDLQDQ\VHQVHRISULYDF\«ZHDOVRQHHGWRUHFRJQLVHWKHQDWXUHRIFRQWHPSRUDU\VHOYHV
and their non-material assemblDJHVDQGWKXVFRQVLGHUH[SDQGLQJWKHQRWLRQRIµVHOI¶
OHJDOO\DQGLQHWKLFDOSUDFWLFHWRLQFOXGHWKHSUHVHQFHVZHDFKLHYHWKURXJKWHFKQRORJ\¶56  
The acceptance that discrete units of communications data can still trigger privacy 
concerns as they can be tied to the embodied lives of persons must be acknowledged if 
future legal instruments are to comport to the necessary informational norms.   
7KHWHFKQRORJLFDOGHYHORSPHQWVZKLFKDOWHUHQWUHQFKHGQRUPVFRQFHUQLQJGDWD¶VVFRSH
and scale, spatial confines, temporal limits, and the notion of the self must be reflected in 
the prescriptive recommendations to amend the investigatory powers instruments.  
                                                          
55
 Lyon (ed) Theorizing Surveillance: The Panopticon and Beyond (Willan Publishing 2006) 335. 
56
 Vincent Miller, The Crisis of Presence in Contemporary Culture (Sage 2016) Loc 2354. 
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Failing to account for the changes in these norms means that the legislation will continue 
to violate contextual integrity in a manner that represents a distinct privacy intrusion.  
Practical recommendations for amendments to the legislation which can better ensure 
that these normative ideals are considered will now be discussed.   
IV. Recommendations for future developments to address the issue of 
privacy in the collection and processing of communications data 
The question becomes what practical policy recommendations can be implemented to 
account for the shortcomings identified throughout the thesis regarding the collection and 
processing of communications data.  The following prescribes substantive measures 
which take into consideration the changes in context relative informational norms and 
can better protect privacy in the context of the ICT system and this data. Such 
recommendations address a key contribution of this thesis, namely prescribing an 
alternative legal regime for communications data which protects privacy. 
a. Purpose Limitation  
The most fundamental change to the investigatory powers instruments which must be 
undertaken is to limit the purpose for which the data may be retained and accessed.  
Specifically, communications data should be retained, analysed, and accessed solely for 
WKHSXUSRVHRISUHYHQWLQJLQYHVWLJDWLQJRUGHWHFWLQJµserious crime¶µSerious crime¶LV
a subjective term and therefore requires defining.  Across the EU there is no single 
GHILQLWLRQRIµserious crime¶6RPH0HPEHU6WDWHVGHILQHLWZLWKUHJDUGWRDPLQLPXP
prison sentence; to the possibility of a custodial sentence being imposed; or with regard 
to a list of specific criminal offences.57  6WLOORWKHU0HPEHU6WDWHVUHIHUWRµserious crime¶
                                                          
57European Commission, Evaluation report on the Data Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC) 
(18.4.2011, COM (2011) 225 final, 2011) 7HQ0HPEHU6WDWHVGHILQHµVHULRXVFULPH¶LQWKLVPDQQHU
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without defining it.58  6HYHUDOGRPHVWLFVWDWXWHVLQWKH8.PDNHUHIHUHQFHWRµserious 
crime¶DQGFDQRIIHUIXUWKHUJXLGDQFHDV to the elements which define the term.  Under 
WKH3ROLFH$FWµserious crime¶LVGHILQHGDVWKDWZKLFKLQYROYHVWKHXVHRIYLROHQFH
results in substantial financial gain, or is conducted by a large number of persons in 
pursuit of a common purpose.59  With regard to the investigatory powers instruments, 
µserious crime¶ZDVRULJLQDOO\GHILQHGLQWKH,QWHUFHSWLRQRI&RPPXQLFDWLRQV$FW
VHFWLRQ7KHUHLQLWZDVKHOGWKDWFRQGXFWZRXOGRQO\PHHWWKLVWKUHVKROGLIµDLW
involves the use of violence, results in substantial financial gain or is conducted by a 
large number of persons in pursuit of a common purpose; or (b) if the offence or one of 
the offences is an offence for which a person who has attained the age of twenty-one and 
has no previous convictions could reasonably be expected to be sentenced to 
LPSULVRQPHQWIRUDWHUPRIWKUHH\HDUVRUPRUH¶7KLVGHILQLWLRQZDVUHWDLQHGXQGHU
section 81(3) RIPA and subsequently under s 263 IPA.   
:KLOVWµserious crime¶LVGHILQHGLQWKH,3$LWGRHVQot currently apply to the provisions 
regarding communications data; rather its restrictions pertain to those powers under the 
Act for which a warrant is required: namely, interception of content, equipment 
interference, bulk interception warrants, and bulk personal dataset warrants.  This is in 
direct contradiction to the CJEU ruling in Tele2 and Watson wherein it was held that 
µ*LYHQWKHVHULRXVQHVVRIWKHLQWHUIHUHQFHLQWKHIXQGDPHQWDOULJKWVFRQFHUQHG
represented by national legislation which, for the purpose of fighting crime, provides for 
the retention of traffic and location data, only the objective of fighting µserious crime¶ is 
                                                          
Bulgaria, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Finland.  
)RUH[DPSOHLQ,UHODQGµVHULRXVFULPH¶LVGHILQHGLQUHODWLRQWRRIIHQFHVSXQLVKDEOHE\LPSULVRQPHQWIRUD
term of 5 years or more.  [Communications (Retention of Data Act) 2011 Article 6.] 
58
 This is the case for Malta, Portugal, and the United Kingdom which merely state: for the investigation, 
GHWHFWLRQDQGSURVHFXWLRQRIµVHULRXVFULPH¶(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQQ57). 
59
 Police Act 1997 s 93(2) 
 291 
 
FDSDEOHRIMXVWLI\LQJVXFKDPHDVXUH¶60  The Court went on to say that the targeted 
retention of data for this purpose could be met provided that the retention was limited to 
what was strictly necessary.61  The use of the term targeted retention here is telling.  In 
the judgment, the Courts frequently referred to the powers at issue as blanket data 
retention.  The specific allusion to targeted retention as the type of retention which could 
be justified indicates that the Court believed there should be specific limits.  Indeed, in 
Tele2 the CJEU provided an example of what those limits might be, for example,  µXVLQJ
a geographical criterion where the competent national authorities consider, on the basis 
of objective evidence, that there exists, in one or more geographical areas, a high risk of 
SUHSDUDWLRQIRURUFRPPLVVLRQRIVXFKRIIHQFHV¶62  The ruling in Tele2 made clear that 
WKHUHTXLUHPHQWRIµserious crime¶VKRXOGEHDSSOLHGWRUHWHQWLRQSROLFLHVThe case of 
Tele2 and Watson further went on to establish that access to the retained data should also 
RFFXURQO\LIWKHµserious crime¶WKUHVKROGZDVPHW63  However, in implementing the 
ruling of Tele2 and Watson the Court of Appeal held that the regime at issue was in 
YLRODWLRQLQWKDWLWGLGQRWFRQVWUDLQDFFHVVWRFDVHVZKLFKLQYROYHGµserious crime¶64 
It is notable that the ruling in the domestic courts did not interpret the retention 
SURYLVLRQVLQWKHVDPHPDQQHUDVWKH&-(8%\FRQVWUDLQLQJWKHOLPLWDWLRQWRµserious 
crime¶WRDFFHVV, the ruling permits the retention policies to continue and potentially 
expand.  This certainly comports with the police aims in this area as any limitation on 
their power to retain and access communications data frustrates their aims.  Even limiting 
DFFHVVWRWKLVGDWDLQOLQHZLWKWKHUHTXLUHPHQWWKDWLWPHHWWKHµserious crime¶WKUHVKROG
                                                          
60
 See also Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-549/12Digital Rights Ireland v Minister for Communications & 
Ors and Michael Seitlinger & Ors [2014] 2 All ER; Joined Cases C-203/15 Tele2 v Post-och telestyrelsen 
& C-698/15 Watson & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department (2016) ECLI 970 para 102. 
61
 Tele2 n(60) para 108.   
62
 Tele 2 n(60) para 111. 
63
 Tele 2 n(60) para 125.  
64
 Watson v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 70 para 27.  
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is seen as an action which diminishes police powers.  The Chief Constable of 
Gloucestershire Richard Berry described tKHODZHQIRUFHPHQWYLHZRQWKLVµ&rimes may 
QRWPHHWWKHWKUHVKROGIRU³serious crime´EXWWKH\PDWWHUWRWKHSHRSOHDQGFRPPXQLWLHV
who fall victim to them; solving and preventing these crimes is at the very heart of what 
>WKHSROLFH@GR¶65  7KHKHVLWDQF\RIODZHQIRUFHPHQWWRDSSO\Dµserious crime¶WKUHVKROG
was apparent in the evidence offered during the Bill stages of the IPA.  Therein a survey 
was undertaken to establish WKHFRPPRQSHUFHSWLRQRIZKDWGHILQHGµserious crime¶
DPRQJVWODZHQIRUFHPHQW,WZDVIRXQGWKDWµODZHQIRUFHPHQWLVQRWDEOHWRGHILQH
µserious crime¶.  Most definitions that are used are very subjective and what may be 
classed as serious to one victim PD\QRWEHVHULRXVWRDQRWKHU¶66   
Despite the opposition of law enforcement to constrain their powers to instances of 
µVHULRXVFULPH¶, current proposals to amend the IPA do seek to implement this distinction 
as it regards access to communications data.67  The Government proposals would 
GLVWLQJXLVKEHWZHHQDFFHVVLQJµHQWLW\GDWD¶DQGµHYHQWVGDWD¶µ(QWLW\GDWD¶LVVLPLODUWR
µVXEVFULEHULQIRUPDWLRQ¶,WFRQFHUQVSKRQHQXPEHUVRURWKHULGHQWLILHUVOLQNHGWRD
device, the physical address provided to a CSP, and IP addresses linked to individuals.68  
The Government alleges that this type of communications data is less intrusive and 
WKHUHIRUHDµserious crime¶SURYLVLRQZRXOGQRWKDYHWREHPHWIRUODZHQIRUFHPHQWWR
access this information; rather, the data could be accessed for the previous purposes of 
preventing or detecting any crime or preventing disorder.69  7KHµserious crime¶SURYLVLRQ
                                                          
65
 Richard %HUU\µ8SGDWLQJRXULQYHVWLJDWRU\SRZHUVPDWWHUVIRUGD\-to-GD\FULPHWRR¶The Telegraph 17 
Oct 2016) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/17/updating-our-investigatory-powers-matters-for-
day-to-day-crime-t/> accessed 4 Feb 2017.  
66
 Joint Committee, Investigatory Powers Bill Witten Evidence, Law Enforcement Submission Annex E 9;  
It is interesting here that the focus is on the victim rather than the act.  This would seem to indicate that 
WKHUHLVDWHQGHQF\IRUµVHULRXVFULPH¶WREHassociated with result crimes rather than conduct crimes.  
67
 This is all the more pressing following the ruling of Liberty v SSHD [2018] EWHC 976 on April 27 2018 
which set a deadline of November 1st WRLPSOHPHQWWKHµVHULRXVFULPH¶OLPLWDWLRQLQWRWKe legislation.   
68
 IPA s 261(3). 
69
 Home Office, Government Consultation on the Investigatory Power Act (November 2017).  
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would then apply to requests to access µevents data¶.  This is data that identifies events 
taking place on a telecommunications network at a specific point in time and space.70  
This would include for example, call records, text message records, data concerning 
messages sent via non-traditional CSPs (WhatsApp, Facebook, etc.), and location data.  
The reasoning behind this, arJXHVWKH*RYHUQPHQWLVWKDWµHYHQWVGDWD¶LVPRUHUHYHDOLQJ
WKDQµHQWLW\GDWD¶DQGZRXOGWKHUHIRUHEHVXEMHFWWRWKHµserious crime¶OLPLWDWLRQ,Q
practice, it is difficult to separate these two categories of data and difficult to see why the 
blanket retention and access to one should be provided at a lower threshold than the 
other.   
$IXUWKHUFRQFHUQDULVHVZKHQWKHSURSRVHGGHILQLWLRQWREHDSSOLHGWRµserious crime¶LV
FRQVLGHUHG$VSHUWKH*RYHUQPHQWSURSRVDOVµ7KHQHZ³serious crime´WKUHVKROGLs 
defined as an offence for which an adult should be capable of being sentenced to six 
months or more in prison, an offence by a person who is not an individual, or an offence 
ZKLFKLQYROYHVWKHVHQGLQJRIDFRPPXQLFDWLRQ¶71  Such a definition considerably 
ORZHUVWKHWKUHVKROGIRUZKDWPDNHVDFULPHµVHULRXV¶,WFDQQRWEHSHUFHLYHGDVD
meaningful reform of the current framework which has been held to be unlawful. There 
will be very few criminal offences which do not fall under this definition.  Indeed, the 
Home Office stated that in practice the only offences that would not be included in this 
GHILQLWLRQZRXOGEHµVXPPDU\RIIHQFHV¶72  While the proposals for reform to the IPA 
appear to try to meet the letter of the law they do not meet the spirit with which it was 
intended.  Nor do they offer any additional protections which are necessary to protect 
                                                          
70
 IPA s 261(4). 
71
 Home Office n(69) 6. 
72
 Liberty, 5HVSRQVHWRWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VFRQVXOWDWLRQRQWKHUXOLQJRIWKH&RXUWRI-XVWLFHRIWKH(XURSHDQ
Union on 21 December 2016 regarding the retention of communications data (18 Jan 2018) < 
https://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/sites/default/files/2018.01.18%20liberty%20consultation%20respo
nse%20FINAL.pdf> accessed 4 Feb 2018, 6.  
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against the undue privacy intrusions which result from this data.  For true reform to be 
offered, in line with the principles set forth by the CJEU rulings, further action is 
required.   
1DPHO\WKHGHILQLWLRQRIµVHULRXVFULPH¶PXVWDWOHDVWPHHWWKHWKUHVKROGRIH[LVWLQJ
GHILQLWLRQVRIµserious crime¶LQWKHFXUUHQW$FWV7KHUHLVQRUHDVRQZK\WKHWKUHVKROGRI
a minimum three-year sentence in the context of interception cannot be applied to 
communications data.  As discussed throughout this thesis, communications data can be 
just as, if not more revealing, than that of the content derived from an interception.  
)XUWKHUPRUHWKHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQµHQWLW\¶DQGµHYHQWV¶LVLPSUDFWLFDO%RWKFDWHJRULHV
of data are revealing and their retention triggers privacy intrusions.  Distinguishing 
between the two adds unnecessary complexity to the issue.  Access to all categories of 
communications data should be required WRPHHWWKHVDPHµserious crime¶WKUHVKROG 
$QLQWHUUHODWHGLVVXHLQGHILQLQJµserious crime¶LVWKHEOXUULQJRIGLVWLQFWLRQVEHWZHHQ
activities that would fall under this threshold, and those that fall under the remit of 
national security.   The State is afforded a wide margin of appreciation in cases of 
national security and the Courts have recognised this.  Where national security is at stake, 
data access provisions may be broadened to people other than the specific targets.73  
However, permitting this additional access must be based on objective evidence that the 
data will contribute to the fight against a specific national security threat.  In countering 
these national security threats, enhanced cooperation between law enforcement and 
security and intelligence agencies is required; yet there must be strict organisational 
separation between law enforcement and intelligence agencies.74  The interactions 





 This is the case in the UK; other EU Member states fail to provide for strict organizational separation of 
intelligence and law enforcement, including Austria, Denmark, Finland, and Ireland where the body 
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between the two become embedded in the processes they undertake.  Law enforcement 
becomes increasingly pro-active and focused on preventative policing and investigating 
future threats.  Intelligence agencies are, for their part, increasingly assigned a role in 
WDFNOLQJUHOHYDQWµVSHFLDOFULPHV¶EH\RQGWKRVHWKDWVROHO\UHSUHVHQWDWKUHDWWRQDWLRQDO
security, such as online child abuse.75   
The concern that arises in the blurring of the distinction between national security and 
µserious crime¶ is that the increased powers and wider margin of appreciation afforded to 
issues of national security may gradually be extended to lesser crimes as well.  In the 
case of data collection and processing as discussed in this thesis, national security is often 
used to justify more intrusive and enhanced powers.76  However, this term is loosely 
GHILQHG,WLVDµSURWHDQFRQFHpt designed to encompass the many, varied and (it may be) 
XQSUHGLFWDEOHZD\VLQZKLFKWKHVHFXULW\RIWKHQDWLRQPD\EHVWEHSURPRWHG¶77  As the 
definition is vague and capable of being easily extended it poses a threat to fundamental 
principles of the rulHRIODZµ*LYHQWKHLQFUHDVHGSDUWQHUVKLSVEHWZHHQODZHQIRUFHPHQW
and intelligence and security agencies, this negation of the rule of law threatens to spread 
IURPWKHODWWHUWRWKHSROLFHPDQDQGSURVHFXWRUV¶78  In order to counter the threat to the 
rule of law which exists from the use of the national security exception for data collection 
and processing powers, claims that information concerns national security must be 
subject to rigorous scrutiny.   
                                                          





No 16/2017) March 2017, 27.   
76
 This takes the form of permitting these agencies to retain bulk data sets and process that data en masse to 
find targets of interest.  Profiling and filtering takes place at scale.  Furthermore, powers can be granted to 
interfere with equipmeQWDOORZLQJWKHVH$JHQFLHVWRDFFHVVLQGLYLGXDOV¶GHYLFHVDQGWKHLQIRUPDWLRQ
within.  The oversight provisions in this area are even more opaque than those concerning law enforcement 
access.   
77
 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman [2003] 1 AC 153  
78
 UNHCHR and CoE n(25) 19.  
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If the powers are to be exercised under the national security exemptions, the State should 
first prove that the threat cannot be met by processes of ordinary criminal law.  This 
needs to occur through a judicial or at least independent process.  As McIntyre notes, the 
judiciary are best placed to make these assessments DQGµFRQVLGHUZKHWKHUPHDVXUHV
which appear desirable in the short term are in accordance with law and ± in the last 
resort ± whether they are compatible with the longer term interests of a democratic 
VRFLHW\¶79  Cases which blur the distinction between national security and µserious crime¶ 
need to critically assess whether the acts or threats under investigation truly fall under the 
national security ambit.  Furthermore, any claims that the use of the powers are for the 
purposes of national security must be subject to some threshold of proof.  This is 
particularly relevant for the IPC and IPT to be able to fully fulfil their duties.  Any 
application or notice that is issued under the IPA for the purposes of national security 
must receive thorough scrutiny and evidence must be offered by the State to prove that 
the wider powers permitted by this reasoning are thus necessary.  As Solove notes, 
µQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\LVDQHEXORXVFRQFHSWWKDWWRRRIWHQLVXVHGWRMXVWLI\GHFUHDVHG
UHJXODWLRQRYHUVLJKWDQGDFFRXQWDELOLW\¶80  Subjecting claims of national security to 
scrutiny would enhance the legitimacy of actions taken on foot of these claims and 
further ensure the rule of law is upheld.  As then Independent Reviewer of Terrorism 
0D[+LOO4&VWDWHGµ6XJJHVWLRQV«WKDWKXPDQULJKWVSUHYHQWWKHSROLFe from fighting 
WHUURULVPDUHPLVJXLGHG«+XPDQULJKWVH[LVWWRSURWHFWXVDOO:HDNHQLQJKXPDQULJKWV
SURWHFWLRQVZLOOQRWPDNHXVVDIHU¶81 
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 7-0F,QW\UHµ-XGLFLDO2YHUVLJKWRI6XUYHLOODQFH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(Edward Elgar 2016) 3. 
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b. Data Minimisation 
In addition to limiting the purposes for which data can be retained and used, another 
method to better protect privacy under the investigatory powers instruments is the 
minimisation of data collected and accessed.  As noted throughout the thesis, 
communications data is generated through interactions, whether they occur via telephone, 
online, or even via post.  The connectivity of individuals and frequency of 
communications means that the amount of data which falls under the definition of 
communications data is increasing exponentially.  This information is spread across 
platforms and networks.  Data minimisation emphasises collecting less data ab initio.  
This can be achieved through the infrastructure, in the form of software and hardware 
which creates and utilises the data, and also by reliance on legal principles.82  Such data 
minimisation can promote privacy by preventing personal information from being 
circulated. 
 With regard to changes in infrastructure, system design should incorporate data 
minimisation aims.  For example, certain categories of data must be explicitly excluded 
from the scope of the data retention provisions.  These provisions should not mandate the 
retention of any categories of data which are not generated by the CSP in the ordinary 
course of their business.  This is not currently the case, as categories of data, such as 
ICRs, are retained under the current legislation.  This requires additional infrastructure on 
the part of the CSP and the processing of more data to meet these aims.  These 
provisions, and any further recommendations to expand the categories of data required 
                                                          
82/LOLDQ(GZDUGVµ3ULYDF\DQG'DWD3URWHFWLRQ2QOLQH7KH/DZV'RQ¶W:RUN"¶LQ(GZDUGVDQG:DHOGe 
(eds) Law and the Internet (Hart 2009) 468.  
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under the investigatory powers instruments should be subject to increased scrutiny and 
where possible rolled back.  As technologies develop there will be new and increasing 
amounts of data and ways for law enforcement to potentially use that information.  
However, this raises the threat to privacy and cannot be done in a blanket manner which 
promotes the collection and processing of personal data over individual rights.  Further, 
strategies to permit data minimisation should include technical access requirements 
which require that multiple persons oversee and authorise the disclosure of the relevant 
information from the CSP.  This will ensure that the information provided is limited to 
what is necessary.  Encryption technologies could be applied to categories of data that 
cannot be retained or accessed via these instruments.83  In this case, even if the 
information were accidentally disclosed, no meaning could be garnered from it without 
further analysis by the law enforcement authority.   
In addition to technical changes to ensure data minimisation, further legal requirements 
must be instituted.  A key method for achieving data minimisation is to subject any 
retention, access, or analysis provisions to judicial scrutiny which assesses whether the 
measure is strictly necessary to satisfy the objective and whether it is proportionate to the 
interference which will result.  The aim of this scrutiny is to minimise the data, and 
consequently, individuals, interfered with and constrain the powers governing 
communications data.  Judicial scrutiny requires the CSPs collecting and providing the 
data, and the bodies requesting access to that information to more concisely define their 
needs.  With regard to retention, Professor Ian Brown recognised the benefit of this 
DSSURDFKH[SODLQLQJWKDWµ$V\VWHPIRUMXGLFLDOO\DXWKRULVHGSUHVHUYDWLRQDQGSURGXFWLRQ
orders of communications data stored by Internet Service Providers and other 
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intermediaries would avoid the blanket intrusion into privacy of population wide data 
UHWHQWLRQODZV¶84   
Access provisions would similarly benefit from further judicial scrutiny.  These requests 
should be specific and only used when strictly necessary.  It is unacceptable to ask for a 
broad range of data in the hopes of identifying a suspect.  Rather, these powers should be 
used as a corroborative mechanism.  Communications data access should not be the first 
step in the investigative process.  Once a suspect is identified, the data may be accessed 
to further build a case or identify associates.  However, even then this power should be 
confined to what is strictly necessary and the data needs to be limited in its scope.   
Furthermore, the use of the information accessed must be linked to a specific 
investigation and excess data provided to law enforcement must be destroyed.  This is not 
currently the case.  The existing Code of Practice permits any excess data disclosed on 
receipt of a communications data access request in the course of an investigation to be 
used if an addendum is made to the original application for the data.85  Furthermore, there 
must be limits on the sharing of communications data by law enforcement once that 
information is accessed.  Neither RIPA nor the Codes of Practice place restrictions on 
further disclosure between authorities.  Rather, the provisions that exist concerning the 
sharing of communications data are solely concerned with CSPs.  The potential spread of 
communications data to law enforcement authorities beyond the investigating officer 
greatly increases the risk of collateral intrusions, data misuse, and violations of privacy.  
The investigators able to view and utilise the data must be confined to mitigate this risk.   
                                                          
84
 Ian Brown, 'Communications Data Retention in an Evolving Internet' (2010) 19(2) International Journal 
of Law and Information Technology, 101.  
85




In order to ensure that the access is limited in its scope, access request must be subject to 
judicial approval rather than the current process wherein approval by a designated person 
within the public authority is sufficient.  This would allow it to comport with the rulings 
of the CJEU which made clear that requests to access communications data must be 
approved by a court of independent administrative body.86  To address this, the 
Government is establishing an Office for Communications Data Authorisations (OCDA).  
This will be a non-judicial administrative body to authorise requests to access 
communications data.  Currently the OCDA is set to begin overseeing access requests in 
April 2019.87   
Whilst not much is yet known about the specifics of the Office, some of the information 
provided does raise concerns about the independence of the Office and its ability to fully 
satisfy the requirement that authorisations be scrutinised by a judicial or independent 
administrative mechanism.  Much like the IPC, the OCDA will ultimately be responsible 
to the Home Office.  As already criticised in the context of the IPC, this essentially 
requires the OCDA to oversee the work of its employer and raises concerns over its 
ability to exercise its powers with full independence.  Further, the person specification 
for applicants to the OCDA requests prior experience working with public authorities or 
law enforcement.88  Whilst not necessarily prohibitive, this raises concerns of potential 
bias in favour of the applicants applying to access the data.  There is no requirement that 
WKHµDXWKRULVLQJRIILFHUV¶KDYHDQ\OHJDOH[SHULHQFHRUTXDOLILFDWLRQV5DWKHUWKHRQO\
essential qualifications for the post are the ability to analyse and evaluate information and 
communicate their decisions.  Furthermore, the description of the OCDA and the roles of 
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those involved focus solely on the importance of communications data for investigations 
and the ways it will assist authorities.89  The importance of the individual whose data is 
being accessed and their privacy is not acknowledged in the information.   
The current proposals and information provided for the OCDA do not indicate that it 
would provide for the independent check on the use of communications data required.  In 
order to fix these shortcomings, any body which approves an access request for 
communications data must be fully independent of the Home Office.  Ideally such a body 
would be a judicial body, bound to the principles of judicial independence and with a 
thorough understanding of the limits and requirements of necessity and proportionality.  
7KLVERG\FRXOGIDOOXQGHUWKHUHPLWRI+HU0DMHVW\¶V&RXUWVDQG7ULEXQDOV6HUYLFHWKH
unit responsible for the judiciary in the UK.  Furthermore, the individuals who approve 
or deny the access request should have a background that enables them to fully 
understand the requirements of necessity and proportionality as prescribed in law.  In 
addition, authorising officers should have a thorough understanding of technical systems 
and the nature of data as these are key elements to understanding the full scope of the 
powers and risks to individuals that can arise from illegitimate and unnecessary access to 
the information.  To fail to mandate these requirements means that the OCDA merely 
provides a veneer of oversight; the systemic issues remain.   
c. Rights of the Individual at the IPT 
Related to the two preceding prescriptions for purpose limitation and data minimisation 
is the need for the individual to be brought back in to the process.  The capabilities of law 
enforcement that arise through increased communications data retention, access, and 
analysis increases the power of the State at the expense of the individual.  As Leenes and 
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.RRSUHFDOOµWKHSDUWLHVFDSDEOHRIPonitoring are usually the people in power, 
governments or large corporations, who have a vested interest in personal information for 
various reasons.  Since they set the rules, one cannot expect monitoring efforts to 
GHFUHDVH¶90 This poses a risk to the nature of the democratic society.  Under the 
investigatory powers instruments, the role of the individual in the process has 
diminished; individuals are broken down into discrete units of data and control over that 
data is removed.  The individual lacks the power to challenge the retention of their data 
and is not informed when that data is subsequently accessed and analysed.   
The ability of the individual to exercise their rights by recourse to the judicial process is 
severely constrained.  The only judicial mechanism of record for these powers is the IPT 
who has limited powers; as such the judiciary is largely side-lined in the process.  Even 
where challenges before the IPT are brought, they are made difficult due to a low 
awareness amongst individuals about the existence or function of the tribunal; the 
reliance on assumed facts; the minimal reasoning given for the determination by the IPT; 
the complexity of the matters; and the fact that legal aid is not available for individuals 
who seek a remedy in this manner.  For privacy to be truly protected, the oversight which 
guarantees the legitimacy of the privacy interferences which result from the powers 
under the IPA must be subject to an oversight mechanism that better guarantees 
individual rights.   
A critical step to ensure that individuals can exercise their rights with regard to the IPT is 
to provide for a right to ex post notification of surveillance activities that are undertaken 
on the basis of the provisions of the IPA.  This would allow individuals to better craft 
their complaints before the IPT and ensure that all those whose right to privacy had been 
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interfered with as a result of their data being retained and accessed could benefit from the 
RYHUVLJKWRIWKH7ULEXQDO,WZRXOGUHPRYHWKHUHOLDQFHRQµDVVXPHGIDFWV¶ZKLFKLV
currently employed by the IPT.  A right to ex post notification following surveillance 
measures exists in other jurisdictions.91  As early as 1987 the Council of Europe issued 
Recommendation R(87) 15 requiring the notification of individuals who had been subject 
to surveillance measures.  The United Nations has similarly acknowledged the 
LPSRUWDQFHRIVXFKDULJKWµ,QGLYLGXDOVVKRXOGKDYHDOHJal right to be notified that they 
have been subject to communications surveillance or that their communications data has 
EHHQDFFHVVHGE\WKH6WDWH¶92  The CJEU has similarly recognised that individuals must 
be notified.  In Tele2 WKH&-(8KHOGµWKHFRPSHtent national authorities to whom access 
to the retained data has been granted must notify the persons affected, under the 
applicable national procedures, as soon as that notification is no longer liable to 
jeopardise the investigations being undertaken by WKRVHDXWKRULWLHV¶93  The ECtHR has 
similarly recognised the necessity of these measures.94  Indeed, the Court has held that 
the omission of this notification can be regarded as a violation of both Article 8 and 
Article 13.95 Permitting ex post notification of the individual, once that notification will 
no longer prejudice ongoing investigations, would help to mitigate the informational 
disparity that currently exists in the IPT.   
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Despite the advantages of ex post notification and its acceptance by international bodies 
and the European Courts, the UK has declined to institute such a protection under the 
IPA.  As per the Home Office consultation of 2017, which was undertaken to implement 
the ruling of  WatsonµWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VSRVLWLRQLVWKDWDJHQHUDOUHTXirement to notify 
an individual that their data has been accessed would unnecessarily inform criminals, 
suspected criminals, and others of the investigative techniques that public authorities 
XVH¶96  The Home Office went on to note that due to the large number of authorities able 
to use the communications data powers, it would be impossible to note when all of the 
relevant bodies were done with their investigations and use of the data.97   
These arguments represent a weak justification for why notification cannot occur.  The 
fact that the data is spread widely across public authorities should reinforce the ideas of 
purpose limitation and data minimisation discussed above.  The data should not be shared 
so widely as to make it impossible to determine what authorities are using it for and 
when it will no longer be relevant to them.  Nor can the fact that it would inform 
criminals of the investigative techniques be used to justify the absence of the 
requirement.  Particularly when the Home Office report subsequently notes that these 
criminals will be informed if that data is then used against them as evidence during the 
criminal justice process.98  Such a provision offers little oversight or guarantee for those 
individuals whose rights have potentially been violated.  As McIntyre notes, the 
distinction that such evidence will be disclosed in criminal proceedings means that the 
RYHUVLJKWLVµad hoc in that it depends on whether a prosecution is brought in a particular 
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case and does not necessarily provide any insight LQWRZLGHUSUDFWLFHV¶99  Such a refusal 
to implement notification is contrary to the established international principles and 
precedent in the area.   
It is accepted that notification may not be possible in all cases but it is submitted that this 
should be the exception rather than the rule.  In order to determine whether the 
prevention of notification was necessary, the IPT could evaluate the particular 
circumstances against the requirements of necessity and proportionality.  In this way, the 
powers could be limited where disclosure would threaten national security or the 
investigation of µserious crime¶.  Barring the establishment of an overriding reason for 
not disclosing the surveillance, the surveillance subject should be notified.  In this 
manner notification can act as a safeguard against abuse.  Furthermore, it would provide 
an essential tool for individuals to seek an effective remedy in cases where they were 
subject to communications data surveillance.   
As was discussed at length in the preceding chapter, individuals who make complaints 
regarding the use of these powers often lack sufficient information to be able to 
persuasively make their case.  As disclosure of relevant information is precluded and the 
Tribunal operates in secrecy there cannot be said to be open justice in the context of 
claims arising under IPA.  Such informational disparity and opaque proceedings 
represent a significant impediment for individuals in securing an effective remedy.  
Notification offers a much needed corrective to the imbalance of power.  Indeed, as 
JUSTICE recognised in their report Freedom from Suspicion,  
,WLVWHOOLQJIRULQVWDQFHWKDWWKH,37¶VPRVWQRWDEOHsuccess ± the Poole Council 
case which accounts for a full 50 per cent of the complaints it has upheld over the 
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last decade ± was one in which the family was subsequently notified by the Council 
that they had been subject to surveillance.100   
By providing for a right to notification, fundamental rights to privacy are subject to more 
stringent oversight and the right of individuals to seek remedies is strengthened.   
d. Reclassification of CSPs 
The limited rights of individuals are reinforced by the role played by CSPs and the fact 
that these companies are not bound by the requirements of the human rights instruments.  
In their role as generators of vast pools of information, CSPs have shifted from private 
actors to bodies fulfilling a public duty.  Investigative and surveillance functions 
typically fall to public authorities.  CSPs are increasingly being asked to perform 
functions related to these core law enforcement tasks. Historically, the private and public 
sectors were divided into two separate spheres with distinct areas of competence.  The 
interplay between these two spheres was subject to legislation.  In the case of data 
retention, CSPs could choose what data to retain and for how long, and access to this data 
could only be granted to law enforcement agencies following proper authorisation 
procedures.101  As illustrated above, the development of the data retention regime placed 
additional obligations on CSPs in terms of retention, requiring the data to be retained for 
longer periods.  As technological capabilities increased, the needs of CSPs to retain data 
for their own purposes began to diminish while the needs of law enforcement agencies to 
compel this retention to ensure further access increased.  This has led to divergence in the 
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aims of the two parties, with CSPs being compelled to retain data that they no longer 
require simply to facilitate law enforcement goals. 
Despite this, in fulfilling the statutorily mandated functions of retention, CSPs are still 
regarded as private actors, directly impacting on privacy by allowing intrusive measures 
to be undertaken without the subsequent protections that would be required if the process 
were performed by a public authority.102  In recasting CSPs as public authorities, they 
could then be held accountable through mechanisms such as public oversight and judicial 
review.103  A public authority would be bound to the protections guaranteed in the 






result, any person or body whose functions are of a public nature can be considered a 
public authority, other than in relations to those particular acts which are of a private 
nature.   
It is argued that following these provisions, the role of the CSPs in retaining data should 
EHFODVVHGDVDµIXQFWLRQRIDSXEOLFQDWXUH¶IRUWKHSXUSRVHVRIWKH+5$7KLV
argument is based on judicial precedent which holds that a private actor can be classed as 
µSHUIRUPLQJDIXQFWLRQRIDSXEOLFQDWXUH¶104  This precedent establishes several criteria 
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to determine whether a private actor is fulfilling this public role, including: whether its 
actions are governed by statutory authority or contractual arrangements; whether there is 
an element of public funding; whether the body is acting in its own commercial interest; 
and whether there is a public interest in performing the function in question.  CSPs 
retaining data fulfil these criteria.  
First, CSPs are performing a duty which is imposed on them by statutory authority.  As 
discussed in the foregoing analysis, they are required to retain data if placed under notice.  
The notice dictates who must retain the data, which services it must be retained for, how 
long it is retained for, and additional requirements or restrictions pertaining to the data.105  
While there is an element of consultation with CSPs before they are placed under a 
notice,106 the requirement can be waived.107  Further, the consultation does not require 
WKDW&63V¶LQSXWRUREMHFWLRQVEHWDNHQLQWRDFFRXQWQRUGRWKH\KDYHWKHDELOLW\WR
effectively challenge a notice, regardless of any potential costs or hardships it might 
place on them as a private company.  CSPs are under a statutory duty to comply and a 
failure to comply with these requirements is enforceable through civil proceedings by the 
Secretary of State for an injunction or for the specific performance of a statutory duty 
under s 45 of the Court of Session Act 1988108 or for any other appropriate relief. 
Further, there is an element of public funding to the retention obligations placed on 
CSPs.  CSPs are entitled to an appropriate contribution in respect of the costs incurred in 
complying with a notice.109  It is recognised that different levels of contributions will be 
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made but the appropriate contribution must never be nil.110  This element of subsidy 
recognises that the notice imposes additional costs, particularly for CSPs who must 
employ staff specifically to manage compliance with the requirements of the notice.  
Neither the creation of these databases nor the hiring of additional staff to facilitate the 
retention of communications data for policing and intelligence purposes represents a 
profitable function for the company.  Indeed, based on the precedent which forms the 
EDVLVRIWKHGHILQLWLRQIRUµIXQFWLRQDOSXEOLFDXWKRULWLHV¶WKLVHOHPHQWRISXEOLFIXQGLQJLV
LQGLFDWLYHWKDWWKH&63LVSHUIRUPLQJDµIXQFWLRQRIDSXEOLFQDWXUH¶ 
In addition, it is arguable that the CSP could be said to be acting in its own commercial 
interest in retaining the data.  The value of the data to the company, due to development 
in technology and altered commercial models has decreased.  For example, algorithmic 
processing of the data allows for quicker interpretation and decreased necessary retention 
period for processes like targeted advertising.  Overall usage and call logs have 
diminished as the traditional method for paying for services; bundle payments and 
unlimited data arrangements are now the norm, making is unnecessary to retain specific 
details of usage and calls.  The costs discussed above regarding the implementation 
measures of the notice similarly decrease the commercial value to the company.  This 
does not however mean that no types of data retention are of value to the company; but 
rather the categories of data which they are required to retain to facilitate law 
enforcement are not necessarily those they would store for business purposes.  This was 
acknowledged in the development of the data retention instruments.  For example, Lord 
West noted the problem in his parliamentary contribution to the Investigatory Powers 
Bill: 
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I was made aware that changes to communications technology meant that a record 
of communications information would no longer be held by communications 
service providers and that technology was changing the types of data that were 
DYDLODEOH7KLVLQIRUPDWLRQZDVKHOGSXUHO\DVLWZDVQHHGHGIRUWKHFRPSDQLHV¶
billing procedures ± that is why they kept it - and, as such was available for use by 
properly authorised state officials, in particular for prosecution of µVHULRXVFULPH¶ 
and terrorism cases.  New technologies and methods of communication meant that 
firms were beginning to, and going to, charge differently.111 
If the data which they are statutorily required to retain does not possess a commercial 
value, the question is what function are they fulfilling in retaining it?  The argument is 
that they are fulfilling a public function primarily in the public interest in retaining the 
data.  This is clear from the value of the data to law enforcement over the commercial 
value.  If left to their own devices, the companies would not continue to retain the data at 
this level.  This would thereby diminish the available data pools for law enforcement, as 
IDFWWKDWKDVEHHQIUHTXHQWO\QRWHGE\WKH*RYHUQPHQWµ*LYHQWKHHVVHQWLDOUROH
communications data plays in assisting law enforcement agencies in protecting our 
citizens and bringing offenders to justice, the Government has for some years sought to 
ensure that it is retained and made available to appropriate public bodies lawfully, 
consiVWHQWO\DQGHIILFLHQWO\¶112  If the above criteria are satisfied, then the argument can 
be made to classify CSPs as performing a public function.  As such, individuals whose 
privacy had been infringed by the actions of these companies would be able to challenge 
the procedures and better exercise their rights.   
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V. Concluding Remarks 
This thesis has established that the current legal and policy frameworks governing the 
retention of, access to, and analysis of communications data by law enforcement 
represent a violation of privacy.  This violation is not minimised or offset by the current 
oversight regime.  Amendments to these legal and policy frameworks are necessary to 
ensure that an appropriate balance can be struck between privacy rights and the criminal 
law enforcement objectives of the State.  As such, the thesis offers a prescriptive 
framework to correct the shortcomings of the current regime in a manner that better 
protects privacy.  Privacy in this thesis has been conceptualised to take into account the 
significant normative changes which have resulted from the development of 
communicative technologies.  As such, this conceptualisation of privacy, along with the 
analysis of how it can be applied to various data types, provides an avenue for further 
research into the use of technology by law enforcement.   
Due to lack of resources and demands for greater efficiency, there is increasingly a drive 
toward the incorporation of technological tools into the policing process.  These tools are 
based on various types of data, much of which do not fall easily into any 
communication/content distinction.  Further, it is not necessarily possible to distinguish 
between what is personal and sensitive information and what is innocuous data.  The 
inability to clearly or accurately classify data may lead to data being utilised in a manner 
inconsistent with the fundamental rights of individuals.  This is particularly true as the 
generation of data is now lending itself increasingly toward algorithmic tools which are 
gaining acceptance in the policing process.  The significance of these technologies and 
their normative implications remain unaddressed in legal and policy frameworks, but it is 




raised in this thesis, regarding the changes in informational norms, can relate to the data 
incorporated into these systems.  Future research can build on the findings herein to 
identify ways to ensure that legal and policy regimes better reflect the changes in norms 
associated with the use of new technologies by law enforcement in a manner that 
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